1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
3	IN RE: VALSARTAN, LOSARTAN, CIVIL ACTION NUMBER:
4	and IRBESARTAN PRODUCTS 1:19-md-02875-RMB-SAK
5	LIABILITY LITIGATION Case Management Conference/
6	Daubert Hearing
7	Mitchell H. Cohen Building & U.S. Courthouse 4th and Cooper Streets
8 9	Camden, New Jersey 08101 Monday, September 9, 2024 Commencing at 10:13 a.m.
10 11	B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE RENÉE MARIE BUMB, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, and THOMAS I. VANASKIE (RET.), SPECIAL MASTER
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(PROCEEDINGS held in open court before the Honorable
Renée Marie Bumb, Chief United States District Judge, and
Thomas I. Vanaskie (Ret.), Special Master, at 10:13 a.m. as
follows:)
         THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
         MR. SLATER: Good morning, Your Honor.
         MS. ALLON: Good morning, Your Honor.
         MR. HONIK: Good morning, Your Honor.
         MS. BRANCATO: Good morning, Your Honor.
         ALL COUNSEL: Good morning.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good to see you all. You can all
have a seat. Happy end of summer.
         All right. Let me just -- well, I was going to start
with appearances.
         Okay. We're here, the case is the In Re Valsartan
        The docket is 19-2875. So I'm going to start with the
appearances. We'll start with the plaintiffs.
         MR. SLATER: Good morning, Your Honor. Adam Slater
and Chris Geddis here for plaintiffs.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Good morning.
         MR. HONIK: Good morning, Your Honor. Ruben Honik.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
         MS. WHITELEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Conlee
Whiteley on behalf of plaintiffs.
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1	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
2	MS. ALLON: Good morning, Your Honor. Devora Allon
3	from Kirkland & Ellis for Torrent.
4	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
5	MS. BRANCATO: Good morning, Your Honor. Alexia
6	Brancato from Kirkland & Ellis, also for Torrent.
7	
	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
8	MR. OSTFELD: Good morning, Your Honor. Greg Ostfeld
9	for Teva.
10	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
11	MS. LOCKARD: Victoria Lockard, Greenberg Traurig,
12	for Teva.
13	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
14	MS. DAVIDSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Jessica
15	Davidson, Skadden Arps, for ZHP.
16	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
17	MS. BROWN: Good morning, Your Honor. Alli Brown,
18	also from Skadden, for ZHP.
19	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Good morning.
20	MS. ROSE: Good morning. Nina Rose, also from
21	Skadden, for ZHP.
22	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Good morning.
23	Anybody else want to enter an appearance?
24	(No response.)
25	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No? Okay.

So I set this down. Thank you for your case management -- I want to acknowledge Judge Vanaskie is with me today. Always so happy that he is here with us.

So I've received the case management conference letters. I want to go through as many of the issues, hopefully all of them, that I can. But I thought that I would start with the testimony of Expert Conti because I want to resolve that issue.

But before I do that, I really want the parties to talk to me about -- it seems to me the parties, which I'm not understanding why there is such a disconnect. But it seems to be a disconnect between the plaintiffs' theory of the case in terms of damages. And this is how I'm just going to frame it, and then I'm going to have the parties respond.

So there are separate theories of economic loss, benefit-of-the-bargain, which, generally speaking, discusses that the measure of damages is the difference in the value of what was bargained for versus what was received; and then the defendants say there's an alternative product theory, a quantity effect theory, which says that the damages are that one can recover the entire amount if they prove — if in this case the plaintiffs prove that their members would not have been prescribed any other drug. So it's sort of in the "but-for world."

The defendants say, well, the plaintiffs' theory of

damages is sort of in the middle of both.

Mr. Slater, I guess I'll turn to you. It seems to me your measure of damages that you're pursuing is the benefit of the bargain. Plaintiffs got nothing. They had no value.

Am I right?

MR. SLATER: That's correct.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so in doing that, you then concede that the defendants should be permitted to present evidence that they did have value.

MR. SLATER: Well, obviously, this has been heavily argued and briefed, and I'm going to hand off to Ruben Honik in a moment. I'll just say briefly, we think that there's reasons they shouldn't because of the adulteration issues.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Help me understand that.

MR. SLATER: Because the drugs had no -- they did not have a legal right to sell those drugs because they were adulterated, because they had NDMA and NDEA in them, which was not approved and which was a basis for adulteration for the reasons that Your Honor is aware of.

So that's the argument that we make, that they shouldn't be allowed to. Because this whole but-for world, it didn't exist. And since it's a warranty case and really the consumer fraud claims run the same theories basically, what was sold did not have value. And you don't look to what would have happened in a but-for world, because in that case, as we've

argued, you would end up with no damages in any case where you actually would have bought a different -- like if you bought a car and you got the warranty. They would say, well, you needed a car anyway, so you didn't really lose the benefit. But, no, you recovered the cost of the car.

I'll hand it off to Mr. Honik if he wants to put a finer point on it.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. Okay. We need to really flesh this out because -
MR. HONIK: If Your Honor, please.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MR. HONIK: If I may answer your question directly.

In a theoretical world, the defendants should be permitted, in some form or fashion, to present expert testimony about the

The problem -- and we have briefed this -- is that none of their experts have done that. They have not arrived at a model, a formula, a method, or a calculation of any sort that demonstrates value associated with this drug. They've largely spent their entire breath in attacking the model that we have. And of course, Judge Kugler, on no fewer than I think three or four occasions, said it is a perfectly sound economic model that the jury can consider.

value of this drug and under whatever theory they can advance.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Are you saying to me that Judge Kugler ruled unequivocally, defendants, go ahead, retain your

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experts, your experts will be permitted to testify that these drugs did what they were supposed to do, they lowered the blood pressure, and you can present evidence? Did Judge Kugler unequivocally rule that? MR. HONIK: He didn't rule that. What he did rule, as I read his writing in this case, is that the damages are somewhere between zero and the full value, conceptually, and that defendants may have experts that address where on that continuum the damages lie. What we've done, because we've now had the benefit of seeing and reading their expert reports, is to file motions in limine to preclude their testimony on this subject, because they have failed to meet the requirements of 702 and present any demonstrable, reliable method for arriving at what the value could be. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So you -- it sounds like you and Mr. Slater are saying two different things. Mr. Slater is saying to me it doesn't matter if they had therapeutic value. They couldn't have sold them to begin with because they were deemed adulterated. You seem to be saying that the defendants had an

You seem to be saying that the defendants had an opportunity to show that they had therapeutic value, but under Rule 702, their experts fall.

MR. HONIK: I think --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Those seem to be two different

things you're saying to me.

MR. HONIK: They're not. I believe that they can be held in two hands at the same time. We believe in our economic model.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MR. HONIK: The fact that this is a benefit-of-the-bargain case without question and that the point of sale is where that transaction, economically speaking, has been complete — is complete, we know that the price at that point in time is what the damages are. And in its simplest way, Professor Conti has taken the price from reliable data times a quantity and said those are the damages that we've suffered.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. That --

MR. HONIK: And that flows from what Mr. Slater said, because this is a benefit-of-the-bargain calculus.

All I'm adding is that Judge Kugler, for however one might view it, has ruled that the actual measure is somewhere between zero and the full value that we claim, and I don't know that there has been a ruling specifically precluding the defendants from trying to establish that. All I'm conveying at the same time, that this is a benefit-of-the-bargain case, is that they failed to do that.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So you are agreeing then that -- your theory is the benefit-of-the-bargain. You are agreeing

that the issue for the jury to decide is did these drugs have zero value? Yes or no. Or the defendants say that they had some value, they had some therapeutic value.

You believe that that issue can be squared up and put to the jury, right?

MR. HONIK: I believe that the issue should be decided as a matter of law by Your Honor in precluding the defendants from attempting to show that.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why?

MR. HONIK: Because they don't have an expert.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's a different issue. Because then the question I'm going to ask is, and this is what I'm concerned about, do they not have an expert because of some prior ruling that prevented them from doing it? I'm just trying to square this all out.

It seems to me that if the plaintiffs' theory is the benefit-of-the-bargain, then the plaintiffs present evidence to the jury that these drugs had no value, okay.

The way I look at it is this: Let's just assume hypothetically that what the defendants sold were placebos, sugar pills, whatever you want to call them. The question then, under the benefit-of-the-bargain theory is, the jury is then asked did they have any value? There wouldn't be any dispute. They had no value. How could the defendants in good faith argue that they had any value? They were sugar pills.

Okay. Here the jury is being asked did the defendants -- did the plaintiffs pay for something that didn't have any value?

The defendants, it seems to me, should be permitted to present evidence that there was a therapeutic value, that they did, in fact, lower blood pressure. If their experts have failed to do that, then that's on them. Then they have no evidence to present to the jury.

If, however, they've been perhaps precluded from presenting that evidence, then I would want to hear more about that, but it sounds to me you're agreeing with me that that is an issue that goes before the jury. Plaintiffs say no value; defendants say value. Jury, you decide.

How a jury decides this -- and this is going to be, you know, some bells are going to go off -- without the issue of causation is concerning to me.

MR. HONIK: Judge, let me respond to you this way. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

MR. HONIK: If Dr. Conti on our behalf wrote an exemplary report that said, without more, the drugs have no value because they could not be legally placed into the market by reason of the FDA regulations, which is a true statement, and stopped there and didn't quantify that proposition, there's no question that under 702 she wouldn't be permitted to get onto the stand and present that and invite the jury to

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     speculate on what those damages are.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But those aren't the facts.
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               MR. HONIK: If I may.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I know, but --
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               MR. HONIK: But that's what the defendants have done
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     through Dr. Stiroh. Dr. Stiroh has said the drugs have some
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     value because therapeutically that's a true proposition, and,
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     in fact, Professor Conti agrees.
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               What Judge Kugler, quite wisely, noted is that
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     therapeutic or clinical value has no place in the economic
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     damage model that we've prepared, full stop.
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               Having said that and I'm not sure --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Explain that to me. Explain that
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     to me.
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               MR. HONIK: Well, what I was looking for is the
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     Judge's actual language, which I think can state it far better
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     than I possibly can.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: In the summary judgment?
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               MR. HONIK: It appears in a couple different places.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because I read through his summary
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     judgment ruling, and he seems -- the way I read the summary
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     judgment ruling is the jury will decide whether they were
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     worthless or not, which says to me that the plaintiffs get up
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     and they present their case, they say these drugs were
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     worthless, zero value, the defendants get up and say, well,
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there was some value to them.

MR. HONIK: And 702 should preclude anybody, whether the defendants or us, if we were to take this position, from saying they have some value without demonstrating a methodology to calculate it.

We can't have the jury speculate on what that value is and then use it as an offset.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that I agree with. That's a 702 issue. But I think we're saying the same thing, but you don't think we are. I think we're saying the same thing, which is it is up to the jury to determine whether or not these drugs had value. No, they didn't, and the defendants can then present evidence that they had some value. How they do that is an issue under 702. I get that.

But you can't present evidence that they should never have been sold in the first place because that's -- that's not what the facts are. I mean, it wasn't determined that they were adulterated until later on, but then -- well, I suppose you could, but then you could make that argument.

But by the same token, the plaintiffs can then say, well, okay, yeah, they shouldn't have been sold because they did have the contaminant, but there still was some therapeutic value. So I think we're saying the same thing. You don't think we are.

MR. HONIK: I don't think so. And I think Judge

Kugler addressed the argument that a point of adulteration or the recognition of adulteration in 2018 by the FDA is not the seminal point in time that says that's when the drugs could not have been sold.

He does not preclude, in fact, he thinks it's facile to not recognize that if the drugs had been sold in that condition, as we now know, from 2012 forward to say that you can't deem it adulterated until the FDA says so. That's not the facts, operative facts of this case.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, I agree. But then that sounds like you're veering — it sounds like the plaintiff is trying to have it both ways. You're now veering into the but-for territory. Because had the plaintiffs known back then that these were adulterated, they wouldn't have sold it, and they would have gone to another supplier had another supplier existed. The plaintiff can't have it both ways.

MR. SLATER: Judge.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I must be missing something.

MR. SLATER: The issue is if the contamination -- and this has been admitted. I'll start with the ZHP witnesses. I questioned many of them. Every single one of them said if we knew about the contamination and once we knew about it, the pills would never be sold. They've admitted they could never sell the pills with the NDMA and NDEA in it.

So when you asked, well, would the plaintiffs, the

class members, had bought these pills if they knew about the adulteration, where I had started with is they could not have — they never would have gotten to the class members.

They never would have gotten to the counter. Because if they had disclosed this has NDMA in it, it immediately would not have been able to be marketed.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's right.

MR. SLATER: So that's where I was going to say, look, we made the arguments, and Judge Kugler did deny the summary judgment motion --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.

MR. SLATER: -- on the adulteration-ends-the-case issue. But from our perspective, he was being conservative leaving the case for the jury and the fact finder, but we will clearly be making directed verdict motions once the Court has had the benefit of letting the facts be heard on that issue.

So that's where I was starting. So I think that's the starting point, but then you get to, okay, if we're not going to get summary judgment on it, on that legal issue, where do we go? And where we go is, I think the question you're asking is a very fair question, do they get to put on proof that there was some value, and that's where Mr. Honik was, which is Judge Kugler did say in a vacuum I'm going to let you try to prove that. There was no ruling that precluded the defense experts from calculating alternative economic damages.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. I'll hear from them in a minute.

MR. SLATER: They did not do it, as you know, because oftentimes they don't want to create a floor or whatever other reason, maybe they couldn't do it. But they did not do it, and they were not precluded by Judge Kugler from doing it. So without that evidence — so it's really two levels, not that we're contradicting each other. But I'm saying at the first level, we think, as a matter of law, we should have won but respect the decision. We'll be back again at the end of the evidence with a DV motion.

But even before you get there, even though in a vacuum they were given the right in the summary judgment motions, the *Daubert* process for the damages experts had not yet occurred, and that's where we are now. And they do not have any expert who can give the jury a methodology to actually reliably calculate their alternative damage model.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So --

MR. HONIK: And the language --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Hang on one second.

So, Mr. Slater, it just seems — so when you stand up and say that, sure, the defendants can present evidence that the drug had value, but then you also stand up and say, well, we're going to present evidence that these were adulterated let's just say from the beginning and we wouldn't have bought

telling me you are.

them -- we couldn't have sold -- because they couldn't have
been sold, does the plaintiff then just get a free pass?

Because the third-party payors would have at some point -- they
wouldn't have left their patients, their members, high and dry.

So how do you address that issue?

MR. SLATER: Because warranty law doesn't say, okay,
well, what would you have had to do instead? What would you
have bought instead? Warranty law says if you buy something
based on a warranty and the warranty was breached, you get your
money back.

And the warranty law doesn't say, well, what would
you have bought otherwise. Otherwise you would never recover
in a warranty case where you would have needed to buy a product
for that purpose. So that would be -- I don't like to use the

they would have had to buy something anyway, that is not as a matter of law an acceptable legal defense to this.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. And that's if you are pursuing the benefit-of-the-bargain theory, which you are now

word "absurd," but you get what I'm saying. You could never --

that's not what the law says. So this but-for world, well,

I mean, the case that I think about is the *Volkswagen* case. Everybody thought it got 50 miles to the gallon and that it was clean diesel.

Well, I'm sure the defendants aren't going to stand

up before me and say, well, they would have bought a car anyway or, you know, well, it got 50 miles to the gallon anyway.

Because that's to your point, that's why it's a warranty claim.

MR. SLATER: Right. We don't think they should be allowed to say that, honestly, to say they would have had to do something else. Because, again, everybody's different. Some people may not have taken pills. Maybe somebody would have taken a different treatment. They would have changed their diet. There's all different treatments.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so that's why I'm pinning you down. It does sound like it's a benefit-of-the-bargain, and that's why the defendant should be permitted to say that the drug had therapeutic value.

Yes.

MR. HONIK: Your Honor, I just wanted to read the language that I was thinking of that Judge Kugler wrote that I think is very instructive on this point. This is from the Opinion on the decertification, which he denied.

"Plaintiffs' theory of damages rests not on a biological basis but on an economics one, that the supply curve of contaminated drugs the FDA never would have allowed for sale is zero, making the drugs unmerchantable," full stop.

"Contrary to defendants' characterization,
plaintiffs' theory of damages, while not biologically based, is
nonetheless based in recognized case law as economic theory."

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And I think that's instructive because the Court is recognizing that an unmerchantable drug, in this case under the rubric of the FDA regulations which required the drug manufacturers to assure the purity and so forth of the drug so as not to be adulterated, that rendered it unmerchantable. And the fact that it may yet retain some therapeutic or clinical value is of no moment in calculating the damages. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, it is on your warranty claim. MR. HONIK: I don't -- I don't think that this language --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It appears to me -- well, you know, I think the summary judgment came after that. If the plaintiffs' theory is, is that these drugs weren't what they were warranted to be, the defendants should be permitted to introduce evidence that, well, they were. were therapeutic. They reduce blood pressure. Why should they not be allowed to introduce that evidence? MR. HONIK: I think, Your Honor, they should certainly be permitted to do two things: To demonstrate, if they can, that the drugs were not adulterated. I think the Court has ruled that way. And I think that they should conceptually be permitted to have an expert attempt to present a different economic model that, if it meets the requirements

of 702, can get to the jury.

We have filed motions to preclude that because try as they have, and I deposed Dr. Stiroh myself, she was incapable of articulating any kind of a formula to embrace economically the idea that there's value associated with a contaminated drug into dollars. And I think it's black letter law that a jury shouldn't be handed a proposition, namely there's some value, and ask them to assign a value that they think is proper.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, that's a different issue. That's a 702 issue.

MR. HONIK: I think that's where we are. I think at the conceptual level, if the Court doesn't, as a matter of law, determine, which we think the Court should, that presenting evidence of, quote, value is speculative, that it falls to the defendants to demonstrate it. We've pointed out very clearly that they have not.

And so I think it's a bit circular, but I think it ends up at a point where we get to put in our evidence subject to today's ruling on Dr. Conti, and the defendants, I think, are going to fail to satisfy 702 in order to put some damages in front of the Court that relate to their theory that there's retained value in the drug.

MR. SLATER: And I'll just add to that, I think that the thing about this case that makes it from our perspective so straightforward is because of the regulatory overlay.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Help me understand that.

MR. SLATER: Because the FDA regulations and the actual approval of this drug did not allow the sale of the drug with NDMA or NDEA in it, so therefore there was no legal right to sell it from day one. They did it because nobody knew.

We have evidence that we think that -- well, we have evidence that they knew at some point, but the FDA didn't know and the world didn't know. So they were selling this drug. But as the ZHP witnesses all admitted, 30(b)(6) witnesses for the company, if it was known, it could not be sold, unequivocally.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If it was known, it could not be sold.

MR. SLATER: If it was known that this contamination existed, these pills could not and would not have been sold.

No customer would buy it. They never would have sold it. And every witness said and that's why as soon as we found out about this in June 2018, that's why we immediately stopped, went to the FDA, and recalled the drugs because we knew we couldn't sell the drugs once we found out about this.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: So they've admitted that they couldn't sell the pills; that there is no legal market. It's not just a warranty issue with a consumer product, but this is a regulatory overlay. And all of the guidances and all of the

regulatory rules, I'll call them, ICH and all the others, unequivocally said that the NDMA and NDEA could not be in these drugs. The tolerance level was zero. After this came out, the FDA said, all right, we're going to allow these tiny amounts moving forward. But for this trial it's not a problem because everything exceeded those levels, so we don't have to worry about that.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But I think that it matters whether or not there was fraud involved. It just seems to me that if the defendants did not know that these were contaminated at the time, for the plaintiffs to be able to prevail on, well, we should be able to go all the way back and say they were worthless when no one knew they were worthless.

Now, if there was fraud involved, then you're into a different -- you're into fraud territory. But I'm having a hard time understanding why it is that the plaintiffs should be able to say, well, these drugs should never have been sold because the FDA -- because they were contaminated for years, and therefore we get the entire -- we get the entire refund, when clearly the members would have -- the plaintiff would have had to pay for an alternative drug. And that's where perhaps your theory is different with respect to merchantability as it is with respect to benefit-of-the-bargain/warranty, and maybe that's how I can reconcile these two different positions that the plaintiff seems to be arguing.

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MR. SLATER: Well, there's two things at work there. One is the idea that the plaintiff would have had to get something else really is from our perspective, I think, legally irrelevant, because the issue is the defendants sold their drug and they're responsible for the damages they caused, number one. Number two, warranty and consumer protection, which are two of the three claims at issue, do not have intent as an element. So we don't have to prove intent, and that's why warranty law is as it is. Because if you had to prove intent, there would be so many warranty cases where they would say, well, we just didn't know. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So then we just get back to they're entitled to prove that they had value. Right. MR. SLATER: I think that where we end up practically

MR. SLATER: I think that where we end up practically because of the rulings that have taken us to here is that the lay of the land is that Judge Kugler's rulings allow them to say there was therapeutic value.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MR. SLATER: And, however, that is subject to what you're about to look at in these *Daubert* hearings with the economic damages experts where they literally don't have an expert who actually does establish a reliable methodology and calculation to do that.

So Judge Kugler left the door open for the trial.

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Again, we feel very confident that we're going to have very strong motions at the end of the evidence when the standard is different when now the facts have been heard and the Court has heard the facts, and they've had every chance to try to establish the things they've said we might be able to establish, but... CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, it sounds like in the conversation that we're having, and I'm going to ask the defendants to speak, the argument that had the FDA known back then what it then knew, it may not even be relevant. It may not be an argument the jury should hear. Well, however it's raised, the MR. SLATER: regulations, the regulatory framework that governed these drugs would not allow them to be sold because it was not legal to sell them. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. I agree with that. may not be relevant because those weren't the facts. It comes down to: Were they therapeutic or not? Was there a misrepresentation? MR. SLATER: Well, when you say it wasn't the facts, the facts were that the regulation did not permit the sale of these drugs. They never were permitted because they had NDMA and NDEA in it. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Correct. The fact that the company sold them, MR. SLATER:

whether they knew it or not, doesn't make it right and doesn't entitle them to not have to pay damages to people that bought these drugs that should not have been sold.

And there's no world in which anybody's going to stand up -- you're not going to hear one defense witness stand up and say it was okay. The FDA regulations, which would govern these drugs, so that has to be part of the case, you can't jettison it out because that's what regulated the sales of these drugs. There's no witness who's going to say, well, you know, under those regulations, we could have sold these drugs and let me tell you how.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They're not going to say that, but they're going to say, I presume, because the briefing seems to be all over the place, I'll just say, it seems to me they're going to get up and say we agree that had we known, we couldn't have sold them. We didn't know and the FDA didn't know. And so to stand before the jury and say our damages should be zero from the get-go because they should never have been sold in the first place presumes several things; that everybody knew that there was this contaminant, that — and then —

MR. SLATER: But those just aren't elements of the claim. Intent or knowledge is not an element of either the consumer protection or warranty claims.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm having a hard time.

MR. SLATER: They're very simple claims. You said it

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     was this. It wasn't. You recover.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm having a -- here's what -- I'm
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     going to leave it at this.
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               MR. SLATER: The fraud claim you're right on.
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     agree on the fraud claim we have to prove that they had
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     knowledge, and we're ready to go on that.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm having a hard time
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     understanding how it is that the plaintiff can stand before the
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     jury and say they should never have been sold in the first
     place; therefore, we get everything. That's -- that's the
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     problem I'm having.
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               Okay. Let me hear from the defendants.
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               MS. ALLON: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               So there are two damages arguments, primary damages
     arguments, which are distinct, and I think it's important to
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     treat them separately. The first argument is that the pills
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     were not worthless because they had some therapeutic value,
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     right.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. What's that damage claim,
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     benefit of bargain?
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               MS. ALLON: Yeah. Yeah.
                                         Absolutely.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  Okay.
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               MS. ALLON: Judge Kugler, crystal clear on this
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     topic, right. It's page 58 of the summary judgment decision.
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     He says there's a genuine dispute of material fact as to the
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     amount of TPP damage, which centers on whether the damages are
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     nothing because they gave the TPPs what they paid for, lowered
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     blood pressure, right, that's therapeutic value, or are they
     worthless. That's this debate, right? Judge Kugler said it
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     comes in.
               I'm a little bit surprised that the plaintiffs are
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     now saying they have a Daubert argument because they're not
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     moving to exclude that opinion by Dr. Stiroh. In their -- in
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     the Daubert briefing, this is ECF-2673, that's at their reply
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     brief, they said: Dr. Stiroh's other primary opinion is not
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     the subject of this Daubert motion; that the VCDs had some
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     non-zero economic value because they purportedly delivered some
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     therapeutic benefit. That opinion is not subject to a Daubert.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It hasn't been challenged?
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               MS. ALLON: It hasn't been challenged. It's not
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     subject to a motion in limine. So Judge Kugler said there's a
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     disputed issue of fact. The plaintiffs haven't challenged it
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     under 702. So as far as I can tell, it's coming in. That's
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     opinion number one.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Where is that admission?
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               MS. ALLON: It's ECF-2673 at page 4. That's their
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     plaintiffs' damages Daubert reply brief.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  Okay.
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               MS. ALLON: Okay. So that's that opinion.
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There's another argument. The other argument is that

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     Dr. Conti should have considered the cost of alternatives,
            If TPPs hadn't reimbursed for these products, they
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     would have had to reimburse for other products, and she didn't
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     take that into account.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. I don't agree with --
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     that's your argument.
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               MS. ALLON: Yeah, that's the second defense damages
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     argument.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I'm just going to -- maybe
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     I'll shortcut this a little bit or maybe I'll extend it.
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     don't know. Sometimes when I say things it tends to extend
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     things. But I don't agree with that on the warranty, and the
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     reason I don't agree with it on the warranty claim on the
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     benefit-of-the-bargain, because then that just gives -- if a
     defendant represents a product to be so and it's not so, and
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     then the argument is, well, you would have had to buy it
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     anyway, you would have had to buy a car anyway, then that just
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     gives the defendants a free pass.
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               MS. ALLON: So I hear you, Your Honor. I think the
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     situation is a little bit different. I agree that the
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     plaintiffs are pursuing a benefit-of-the bargain theory.
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     agree.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MS. ALLON: There is a dispute over what the bargain
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     is. And that dispute, what is the bargain that was struck, is
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     a fact question for the jury. That is clear.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What's the fact question?
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               MS. ALLON: The question is, given that the
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     plaintiffs are not people ingesting this product, they are
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     companies that are reimbursing for this product, right?
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     Dr. Stiroh's opinion is that so long as they were able to
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     satisfy their coverage obligations, the bargain was that they
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     would be able to satisfy their coverage obligations, and if
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     they were able to satisfy their coverage obligations with a
     less expensive alternative, then they have received the benefit
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     of their bargain.
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               The plaintiffs and the defendant are allowed to
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     disagree over what the bargain is. The plaintiffs can present
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     their theory, and the defendants should be entitled to present
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     their theory.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So the defendants are going to
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     stand up before the jury and say: Well, we don't really care
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     what the drugs did. As long as we provided them a low-base
     drug, we're okay?
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               MS. ALLON: What Dr. Stiroh is going to say is that
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     because the plaintiffs received alternative products likely at
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     a lower cost --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  Yeah.
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               MS. ALLON: -- they were not deprived of the benefit
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     of their bargain.
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, that's just a circular way of saying that they provided a value, and so we're kind of back to where we were.

You can't just stand up -- the defendants just can't stand up and say, oh, well, we just gave them, you know, we just gave them a low-base product, and so no case, no controversy, sit down. I mean, what is that low-base product you provided, something that was adulterated or not?

MS. ALLON: No, no. We all agree the alternative — we all agree that the alternative is unadulterated, right? The alternative product is unadulterated blood pressure medication. We all agree with that.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MS. ALLON: And what Dr. Stiroh is going to say is that Dr. Conti should have considered that, and she didn't. It's a criticism of the plaintiffs' model.

And I think actually there's only one decision that is on point on this topic, because many of the decisions really are not on point. They're talking about other issues.

The one decision that is on point is the *Blue Cross*Blue Shield decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

and in that case the Court ruled that to the extent GSK, who

was the defendant in that case, wants to argue that the

plaintiffs' damages calculation has to deduct for the cost of

therapeutic alternatives, that this is a decision for the jury

of those drugs.

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     to decide at trial based on evaluation of the parties'
     conflicting expert testimony. That's at 559. That's the only
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     decision we have that's on point. Because, again --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. But you're trying to
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     frame the representation too narrowly. It seems to me you're
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     trying to frame the representation that was made by the
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     defendants to the plaintiffs is that we will provide you a
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     lower-cost drug, period. No. We will provide you a lower-cost
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     drug that is unadulterated.
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               MS. ALLON: Well, but, Your Honor, there can be a
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     breach of warranty without corresponding damages. The damages
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     question is not the same thing as the liability question.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You really aren't -- you're really
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     not standing before me and telling me that the plaintiffs'
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     claim is that -- that the plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim
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     is that you were supposed to provide us with the lower-based
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     drugs and you didn't, period.
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               Is that what you're saying?
               MS. ALLON: The plaintiffs' claims is --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because we may have to just start
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     over from scratch.
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               MS. ALLON: The plaintiffs' warranty claim is you
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     were supposed to provide us with drugs that didn't have NDMA
     and you didn't, and therefore we're entitled to the full cost
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh.
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               MS. ALLON: That's their claim.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MS. ALLON: But we're entitled --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's something different from
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     what you just said.
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               MS. ALLON: Well, but the defendants are entitled to
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     respond to that and say, no, what the actual bargain was, was
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     that you would be able to reimburse your members' drug
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     prescription costs and you were at a lower cost. And therefore
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     there's no economic injury. That's a -- that's a rebuttal to
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     their damages argument. I don't see why the defense isn't
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     permitted to challenge the claim of economic injury.
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               Because, by the way, if the plaintiffs are entitled
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     to do what they want to do so they can get a windfall, right?
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     They can recover the full cost while they also spent less money
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     on alternatives. We know that's not true. We know that
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     violates basic damages principles.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me just read what you just
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     said.
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                      I guess you could make that argument.
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               MS. ALLON:
                           And --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But that just -- okay.
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               MS. ALLON: And then the last point that I'll make
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     is, when we're talking about this opinion, the plaintiffs do
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have a challenge, which is essentially there's no methodology,
       We don't offer -- I think I heard somebody say we don't
have an alternative number, right? And I would say that's not
our burden, right? We're entitled to poke holes in their
damages case. We don't have to offer our own damages model.
We're entitled -- Dr. Stiroh, as a rebuttal expert, is entitled
to say, look, I think Dr. Conti should have considered it.
         By the way, the plaintiffs could have provided a more
nuanced model. They just chose all or nothing.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I think we're -- we'll get
to Conti, but I think the fight about Conti is much to-do about
nothing, to be perfectly candid. I think that she can assume
that they were worthless. Because the jury is going to decide
whether they were or not. She can decide whether they were
worthless, and then she can do her analysis based upon that
they had no value.
          I think there's issues with the unjust enrichment
claim.
       But when we get to her, I'm just going to skip through
this all "assuming they were worthless." She can assume they
were worthless.
         MS. ALLON: So I agree, Your Honor. I think the real
fight is about Dr. Stiroh, frankly, not Dr. Conti.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
         MS. ALLON: The real fight is, well, what can
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Dr. Stiroh say in response? Once Dr. Conti is permitted to say

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     that, what can our expert say in rebuttal?
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MS. ALLON: And that's the point I'm trying to make;
     that we should have the right to rebut their damages model by
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     saying there's something they should have considered that they
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     didn't.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I think we're agreeing on
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     everything. It just doesn't seem like we are.
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               MR. HONIK: Your Honor, I think counsel misspoke at
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     the beginning.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. HONIK: And I commend to Your Honor ECF-2694.
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     That was a summary or is a summary judgment ruling that Judge
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     Kugler made --
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. HONIK: -- that a warranty exists in this case
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     that runs to the TPPs. So there's no question about that.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, I don't think she's disputing
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            She's disputing what that warranty itself was.
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               They are -- they, the defendants -- and I don't know
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           I'd have to, I guess, go back and look at the complaint,
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     but they are framing the warranty as you, defendants, agree to
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     provide us low-cost drugs. We've provided them, so what's the
     issue?
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               Plaintiffs are saying, no, the warranty was you
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1 agreed to provide us low-cost base drugs that did not have NDMA 2 in them. 3 MR. HONIK: We're actually saying that and more. 4 We're saying the FDA doesn't permit their warranty proposition. 5 The FDA literally does not allow a low cost drug that is 6 adulterated. 7 And what Dr. Conti will testify about --8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah, I think that they will have 9 a very hard time persuading a jury of that. 10 MR. HONIK: So now we're full circle, and we are in 11 agreement that we're talking about benefit-of-the-bargain. 12 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. 13 MR. HONIK: Here's the essential point, Your Honor, 14 respectfully. The measure for benefit-of-the-bargain damages 15 is objective. There is no scienter whatever. The question is 16 simply what was the value given versus what should have been 17 received. 18 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I think we are all saying the same 19 thing. 20 MR. HONIK: And the economist in this case is saying, 21 because the FDA precludes, and all the defendant pharmacy 22 retailers, everyone agrees, frankly, that you're not permitted 23 to put adulterated drugs in the stream of commerce, that the

value from an economic standpoint is zero. And so the delta

between that value objectively determined and the price are the

damages.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I don't agree with that because now I think you get into the but-for.

I think there comes a point in time where, if the drug had been recalled, it wouldn't have been put into the stream of commerce. And, therefore, there is — there is a different analysis.

I think, unless you folks persuade me differently, I think there is -- you can't pretend as if these drugs should never have been sold in the first place. I think on the breach of warranty, you get into the value issue, whether or not these drugs had any value. But to stand before the jury and say we get it all because they never should have sold them in the first place, a jury should be able to say, well, did they know they should never have been sold in the first place and when did they know, and that becomes your measure of damages, because otherwise you're back into breach of warranty land.

That's -- that's just how I see it.

Because I don't -- you'll have to persuade me differently, but for the plaintiffs to stand before and say, well, they should get a full refund because these shouldn't have been sold in the first place, unless there is a breach of warranty and unless there is scienter, it seems to me the plaintiffs get an unnecessary windfall.

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, let me, because I know

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you're focused on when did they know and should that matter.
That's the cGMP piece of this case. They don't get a pass for
being ignorant of what they were selling, that it had poison in
     They, under cGMPs, one of the violations that the FDA
found and made the finding that they violated cGMPs and as a
result the drugs were adulterated, one of the primary
violations the FDA found was the failure by ZHP to perform an
adequate risk assessment as required by cGMP.
          So there's no -- first of all, there's no scienter
requirement in the cause of action. And under the regulatory
law, as the FDA found it, and I don't think you're going to
have a witness who's going to argue this for the defense, that
the lack of a risk assessment would be immaterial.
what stands between -- or basically is the answer to what your
question, which is --
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What is the claim? What is the
claim?
          MR. SLATER: For why it's adulterated?
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Other than the breach of warranty,
other than the warranty claims. What's the claim?
                      There's three claims in this case:
          MR. SLATER:
breach of express warranty.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                            Yeah.
          MR. SLATER:
                      The consumer protection.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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MR. SLATER: And the fraud.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: And the FDA found you, ZHP, the warning letter actually goes through it and says: You say you didn't know and nobody could have known because it wasn't something understood. And the FDA said we disagree, because you are responsible for the quality of your drugs and you're responsible to do a risk assessment and to know what's in your drugs.

And the person that I deposed, Eric Gu, who runs the part of ZHP that actually developed this process, that's the main process at issue, admitted that if they had found that there was NDMA being produced during this process, they would have had to stop the process, and they would have had to scrap the project and go back and reformulate the manufacturing process they were creating because they could not have sold this with NDMA in it.

So this is not us saying that they couldn't do it and defense is going to say, well, it was okay that we sold it.

They're not saying that. Their own witnesses are saying that they needed to know. And their own witnesses are saying that they had to do an adequate risk assessment.

They try to argue about why they didn't learn these things, but scienter or knowledge is not an element. It's not an element of the claim, and it's not an element under the

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     regulatory construct that governed their development and sale
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     of the drugs with the manufacturing process that they
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     developed.
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               They have to develop that process the right way with
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     a proper risk assessment, and in this case the lack of risk
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     assessment was they didn't evaluate the chemical reactions,
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     which they should have done and the FDA said they should have
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     done, because they, as they've admitted, their 30(b)(6)
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     witnesses, they were responsible for the quality of their drugs
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     and could not have sold it as soon as that would have been
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     shown. And the risk assessment, if done right, would have
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     shown it.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What claim does that go to?
               MR. SLATER: It goes to -- well, it definitely -- it
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     goes to probably -- it certainly goes to the warranty claim.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MR. SLATER: Look, we don't even think you need to go
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     that far, but --
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But you have to tie what you're
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     presenting to the jury to the claim.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Right.
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absolutely no value, and the defendants are permitted to say

think there's a -- I think we've all agreed now, the breach of

warranty is that the plaintiffs are permitted to say they have

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: The breach of warranty, I don't

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1 they had a value. What are the other two claims? Because it does 2 3 become relevant, I think, for the causes of action as to when the defendants knew or whether there was fraud. 4 MR. SLATER: Or should have known. 5 6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Otherwise it becomes a strict 7 liability. 8 MR. SLATER: Or should have known based on a proper 9 risk assessment. 10 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Fine. MR. SLATER: And that's the rub that I think is 11 12 maybe --13 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Fine. But a jury has got 14 to make that determination in terms of calculating damages. 15 MR. SLATER: Well, look, because there's been a lot 16 that's happened, we don't think, as a matter of law, that we 17 should even have to prove cGMP violations because we know we 18 have an FDA ruling of adulteration and we know that every pill 19 was adulterated. You can't say the pills were not adulterated before the FDA said they were adulterated because they had NDMA 20 21 in it from day one. But we were told by the Court, I'm not 22 going to grant you a ruling that cGMP is not a part of this 23 case. So it's in the case as of now.

doesn't mean that just by showing that they violated the

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It is in the case, but it also

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     cGMPs --
               MR. SLATER: Well, the violation is a reason for
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     adulteration. That's what the FDA found.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. But you're somehow
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     turning your cause of action into a strict liability. That's
 6
     the issue that I'm trying to --
 7
               MR. SLATER:
                            Well --
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It seems to me that it becomes
 9
     relevant to the jury's determination of damages as to -- the
10
     breach of warranty I think we're clear on. The other two
     violations, I'm going to have to get briefing on this, because
11
12
     I think it sounds more like strict liability to me, and that
13
     does not seem to comport with what I understand the case law to
14
     be.
15
               MR. SLATER: Well, a warranty claim really is
16
     basically a strict liability claim. You sold something, you
17
     said it was this --
18
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: True.
19
               MR. SLATER: -- and it wasn't. So it really is, it
     really is, and I think that the state of mind --
20
21
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, when I say --
22
               MR. SLATER: -- element that Your Honor is
23
     questioning, that is supplied, because we don't think it should
24
     be a part of the case but is in the case right now. That is
25
     addressed by the cGMP piece of it and by their internal
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1
     documents showing what they knew and when they knew it and
 2
     everything else. But you're concerned about when did they know
 3
     it and that being the case.
 4
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know, but what I'm saying is I
 5
     don't think that any party has helped me in tying these
 6
     disputes to the causes of action and the elements. Breach of
 7
     warranty, it's pretty well understood what breach of warranty
 8
     is. I represent this, and the representation is false. Okay.
 9
     You folks will argue about whether or not the drug was
10
     therapeutic or no or not.
11
               The other two causes of action, what are they? What
12
     are the elements? And what does the defendant have to prove?
13
                            The consumer protection is very similar.
               MR. SLATER:
14
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. That has a fraud element in
1.5
     it.
16
               MR. SLATER:
                            Well, we're not trying a consumer -- a
17
     scienter we knew it's fraudulent consumer protection.
18
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
19
               MR. SLATER: It's very similar to the warranty claim
20
     in terms of what they said. And they did affirmatively
21
     represent, by the way, this is USP quality valsartan, which
22
     Judge Kugler's already ruled in the warranty claim that is a
23
     warranty as a matter of law that they gave.
24
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  Okay.
25
                            It's the statement they made here, that
               MR. SLATER:
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1
     was an affirmative misrepresentation.
               There's no element of knowledge that they -- when you
 2
 3
     make an affirmative misrepresentation like that for consumer
     protection purposes, the act of making that representation, we
 4
 5
     don't have to prove they knew it was false. We just have to
 6
     prove they made a false statement and induced people to buy
 7
     based on that statement.
 8
               The fraud claim we are going to show.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What's the other cause of action
 9
10
     in this?
11
               MR. SLATER: Fraud, common law fraud.
12
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Other than breach of warranty,
13
     what's the other cause of action?
14
               MR. SLATER: Consumer protection.
1.5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  Okay.
16
               MR. SLATER: And then the last cause of action is
17
     common law fraud.
18
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So that's why I'm saying
19
     all of these, the last two have a scienter element to them.
20
               MR. HONIK: And Mr. Davis can address the elements.
21
               MR. SLATER: One second.
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And to stand up and say, well, no,
23
     we got to rely on the regs, you can't sell them, period, end of
24
     story, I think does not address the elements of the causes of
25
     action.
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1
               MR. SLATER:
                            I'm not saying that for the common law
 2
     fraud claim.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. What are you saying it for?
 3
               MR. SLATER: I would say it for the warranty claim,
 4
 5
     scienter is not a factor.
 6
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Agreed.
 7
                            State of mind is not a factor.
               MR. SLATER:
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Agreed.
 9
               MR. SLATER: For the common law fraud claim, there's
10
     an argument that can be made that maybe you don't have to go
11
     all the way to that, if you just don't want to know it's there,
12
     maybe it's fraud, but we're going to prove anyway they had
13
     knowledge.
14
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
1.5
               MR. SLATER: We have documents that show knowledge.
16
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So I think you've -- I
17
     think you've assuaged my concerns.
18
               MR. SLATER:
                            Okay.
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Which is the plaintiff cannot get
20
     up and say in a vacuum that its case is met by relying on the
21
     FDA regs that these are adulterated, they shouldn't have been
22
     sold, period. You got to do more than that with respect to
23
     these causes of action.
24
               MR. SLATER: Definitely for the fraud claim, the
25
     common law fraud claim we do. I don't think we need to do more
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analysis is.

for the warranty claim for the reasons we've explained.

Mr. Davis, to the extent you have questions about the consumer protection claim, he can answer those questions because he's more familiar with all the standards and he can explain it and he's briefed a lot of that. But I think it falls very similar to the warranty claim. It basically ends up in the same place, but if you want more information, Mr. Davis can provide that, Your Honor.

MR. DAVIS: We're not arguing that we don't have to prove all of the other elements of liability. This is strictly as to the damages element. And for breach of warranty, for fraud, for the common law fraud — or the consumer protection claims, that standard is benefit—of—the—bargain. The defendants themselves have agreed to that. And so it's going to be the same objective inquiry of looking at the value of

And you'll hear from Dr. Conti. She's going to get up there and say that this isn't some counter-factual, but-for world we're modeling. She's looking at the objective value that these drugs had when sold, because they were sold. They were sold. And that's what gives rise to the causes of actions here.

these drugs as represented versus the objective value they had

when sold at the point of sale, which is what the damages

And so, you know, Congress, as a matter of

congressional policy, has set a value of zero to these drugs by deeming the adulterated drugs illegal to sell. That's just an economic basis for saying that they had zero value at the point of sale from an objective economic standpoint.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, do you agree, though, that that should not preclude the defendants from saying that, yes, we could not have sold them, we didn't know we couldn't have sold them, we didn't know that they were adulterated, but in any event, for the past umpteen years, they had a value? They should be permitted to say that; you agree with that?

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I think it's important to go back to an expert that the defendants tendered at class certification. Her name was Punam Keller. She's a marketing professor out of Dartmouth. She put forward a report saying that if, you know, in some hypothetical world, you could do a consumer study and the consumers might ascribe some economic value to these drugs. But she didn't do that study. I think we all know whether —

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. And that's another -- I mean, that's an issue. I mean, I think that -- well, okay.

MR. DAVIS: And so Judge Kugler struck -- correctly struck her opinion as a lot of "I think so" and speculation about value, but she didn't have an actual methodology or any results to actually come up with a number to ascribe some economic value.

And I'll say my own reason for thinking why the defendants didn't do that is because a properly designed study would have said look at the value of what you got, adulterated valsartan, versus what their comparative would have been, which is non-adulterated valsartan. Of course, every consumer would have wanted to pick the version that didn't have the carcinogen in it that does the exact same thing.

So the defendants have been on notice for several years now that they need to put forward an expert that actually can take all these points that they're trying to make and tie them to objective economic value, and that's not what's been done here.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Thank you.

MR. DAVIS: One more point, Your Honor.

Ms. Allon, I think you'll stand up again after I say this, she brought up the BCBS case. And the whole theory of alternative drugs is a different — this is different from value, because value, in some conceptual sense, like Mr. Honik said, is something that can be imported into the benefit—of—the—bargain damages analysis. Replacement drugs cannot because — and the defendants have cited RICO cases. They've cited antitrust cases where the case — the whole theory of the case was modeling a market impact. That's not what this case is about. This case is about valuing these drugs actually as they were sold.

And so what Judge Sanchez did in BCBS is he rejected GSK's argument that Dr. Conti should have accounted for alternative drug prices. He said she doesn't have to do that. He did say that GSK could present their own theory, but that wasn't something that was actually before him. That was dicta. The plaintiffs in that case did not have a Motion in Limine 16 like we have here, and there was no summary judgment that was filed by plaintiffs. They didn't move for a motion in limine at all on that.

And so I think if you take the crystallization of what that ruling is, is that he was nonplussed with the argument. He said Dr. Conti does not need to account for this in this warranty case. It does not need to -- the defendants, sure, they can argue it, but there was nothing before him to actually preclude them from arguing it.

Judge Kugler explicitly adopted Judge Sanchez's ruling, even quoted from it and said he disagreed with the defendants' position. And, therefore, it's already been ruled on that Dr. Conti and plaintiffs in this case don't have to account for alternative drugs, and the reason for that is that this isn't -- we're not modeling a but-for world here.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Well, yes.

MS. ALLON: I don't have to respond, if you...

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I'm just going to give you

the benefit of my thinking, and then I want to get to the witness, because I want -- I just -- we have to move on. And, you know, it's -- I don't know how I -- I don't know how I fix this disconnect at this late stage of the game.

But it just seems to me, to the extent that the plaintiffs want to get before the jury and say that these drugs have no value, that they should never have been sold, period, because the FDA says the regulations are that you don't sell adulterated drugs, which no one disputes, it just seems to me that absent evidence of knowledge or scienter on the part of the defendants that they knew they were adulterated and still sold them, the defendants should be permitted to argue that these drugs had therapeutic value. I don't think that they should be prevented from arguing that.

And I don't think the fact that -- that's the case.

And I don't think the fact that the -- I don't accept the argument that, well, the plaintiffs, you know, get zero because they would have had to buy alternative drugs. I don't find that persuasive. I think that just -- you know, then why do we have causes of action? I find that that just totally does violence to the causes of action of warranty.

MS. ALLON: So, Your Honor, with all due respect, I appreciate that you don't find it persuasive. A jury may not find it persuasive. But that doesn't mean it's not an issue for the jury, right?

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1
               The defendants are allowed to submit to the jury that
 2
     the bargain is different than what the plaintiffs are arguing.
 3
     That's what the restatement of torts means when it says the
 4
     nature of the bargain is an issue for the fact finder.
 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh, that is.
 6
               MS. ALLON: Okay. And so --
 7
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And it may very well be that
 8
     there's going to be a roadmap for the jury. What do you find
 9
     the representation to be? If you find it this, then...
10
               Okay. Fair enough.
11
               MS. ALLON: Okay. So --
12
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I mean, but I don't -- I'm not
13
     going to let you present that argument to the jury, because
14
     what I'm hearing you say is, well, no, what they're suing us on
1.5
     is that we said that we -- that the defendants would sell us
16
     low-cost drugs, period. And you're going to get up before the
17
     jury, and the whole trial is going to be about are these
18
     low-cost drugs or are these Cadillac drugs. Because I'm going
19
     to resolve that issue before we even go to a jury because I
     don't -- that's never how I've understood this case in terms of
20
21
     their warranty claim.
                            So that's --
22
               MS. ALLON: That's -- that's fine, Your Honor.
23
     Dr. Stiroh has an opinion -- it's paragraph 32 of her report --
24
     which is about the nature of the bargain. And she -- that's a
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response to the plaintiffs. And so they say the bargain was

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1
     one thing, we say the bargain was another, and the jury will
 2
     assess the credibility.
 3
               And by the way, I --
 4
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. You really want to get up
 5
     before the jury and say that the -- that the only thing that we
     have promised them was that we were going to sell them low-cost
 6
 7
     drugs, and it didn't matter if they had cancer-causing agents
 8
     in them.
 9
               MS. ALLON: What I want to tell them --
10
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Is that what you're going to
11
     arque?
12
               MS. ALLON: What I want to tell them is, and what
13
     Dr. Stiroh is going to testify about tomorrow, is that the
14
     plaintiffs are TPPs. They are not, as we all acknowledge,
15
     ingesting medication. What they are doing is providing a
     benefit to their members. And so what matters to them is can
16
17
     they provide that coverage benefit to their members at the same
18
     or lower cost, right?
19
               And so, therefore, the question we have to ask
     ourselves is, did the defendants' conduct deprive them of the
20
21
     benefit of that bargain?
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm just going to say this:
                                                               I
23
     think that argument is a little specious. Because unless
24
     you've got evidence that the TPPs could care less what they
25
     buy --
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1
               MS. ALLON: We do. We do, Your Honor.
 2
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They don't care what they buy?
 3
               MS. ALLON: We have evidence from TPP testimony.
 4
     This is part of Dr. Stiroh's methodology. Do I think it
 5
     matters to a TPP whether they prescribed valsartan or some
 6
     other ARB? No, I don't think it does. What I think matters to
 7
     the TPP is what is the cost. And so --
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Solely. Solely. They don't care
 9
     if the cost -- if the cost is $2 versus $10, they don't care if
10
     it's adulterated or not?
11
               MS. ALLON: No, but if the question is what is their
12
     injury, if their alternative was providing a higher-cost
13
     medication, then they haven't been injured. That goes to the
14
     question of is there economic injury.
15
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You're losing me on that one.
16
     That's just not an argument I don't think I'm going to allow to
17
     be made.
18
               MS. ALLON: Okay. Well, obviously, we have the
19
     experts here, right.
20
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: We'll flesh it out more with your
21
     experts, because I'm going to be a little shocked that your
22
     expert kind of goes like this and just doesn't, you know, the
23
     TPPs really don't care what kind of a drug it is, as long as
24
     it's $2. That is a big wow.
25
                            No. I can tell you, Judge --
               MR. SLATER:
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1	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's a big wow.
2	MR. SLATER: There's no surprise. There's a
3	formulary for every insurance company, and the formulary is the
4	list of the approved drugs. Every one of them is approved USP
5	Orange Book
6	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
7	MR. SLATER: rated drugs. And that's
8	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's why I say it's a "big wow."
9	Let's find out. We'll figure it out.
10	Okay. Can we get started with the witness?
11	MR. SLATER: Judge, there is one thing that's not on
12	the agenda that will take about three minutes and I think will
13	be welcome news to the Court. If I could maybe
14	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: On the punitives, yeah. You have
15	two weeks to work out the punitive issue. Is that what you
16	want?
17	MR. SLATER: No. I was going to tell Your Honor that
18	Doug Tween is here, the attorney for VivaMed. I wanted to let
19	the Court know that we've settled with VivaMed.
20	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Anybody else? That's awesome.
21	MR. SLATER: We had agreed that we would tell Your
22	Honor at the conference a few days ago we've reached agreement.
23	We're working on the documents, but we thought Your Honor would
24	want to know. So
25	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I applaud you. Thank you.

1	And who may I address?
2	MR. HONIK: Your Honor, I think the witness
3	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Who is the attorney? Who is here?
4	MR. SLATER: I'm sorry. One second, Ruben. It's
5	Douglas Tween, who represents VivaMed in the claims which
6	related only to losartan. We've settled the economic loss
7	class action claims, and we've settled we're aware of one
8	personal injury case, that settled. There may be one other
9	case they're talking about, but we've resolved them.
10	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Counsel, just put your name on the
11	record.
12	MR. TWEEN: Douglas Tween, T-W-E-E-N, Linklaters LLP,
13	for VivaMed Life Sciences, Strides Pharma Science, Limited, and
14	Heritage Pharmaceuticals, Inc., d/b/a Abbott Pharmaceuticals,
15	Inc.
16	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And you concur with what
17	Mr. Slater has represented?
18	MR. TWEEN: I do, Your Honor.
19	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Thank you. And I applaud
20	you for your efforts.
21	MR. TWEEN: Thank you.
22	MR. SLATER: Thank you, Your Honor.
23	Are we starting the Daubert hearing with Dr. Conti
24	now? If you are, I just want to know so I can get out of the
25	way.

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1
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.
 2
               MR. SLATER: I'm going to just move, Your Honor,
 3
     because I'm not going to conduct that.
 4
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
 5
               (Pause.)
 6
               MR. HONIK: Judge, may I from here?
 7
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes. So let me just say this
 8
     before we get started.
 9
               Is the witness here?
10
               MR. DAVIS: Yes.
11
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So I just, because we're going to
12
     go all day, and as you folks know, I want to get as much
13
     resolved as I can because tomorrow I cannot go all day. But I
     would like, and I know there's a lot of helpers out there, I
14
1.5
     would like to know the causes of action and I would like to
     know the elements of the causes of action so that I can
16
17
     continue this colloquy that we've been having. I think that
18
     would be very helpful.
19
               Okay. Dr. Conti, come forward, please.
               (Witness took the stand.)
20
21
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: John, can you administer the oath.
22
               THE COURT REPORTER: Please raise your right hand.
23
            RENA CONTI, Ph.D., called as a witness for the
24
     Plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was examined and
     testified as follows:
25
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Conti - Direct - Honik

1 THE COURT REPORTER: Please state and spell your name 2 for the record. 3 THE WITNESS: Rena Conti, R-E-N-A, C-O-N-T-I. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Welcome. If you could 4 5 bring the microphone closer to you and speak into the 6 microphone. And there's water shortly. 7 Okay. Mr. Honik. 8 MR. HONIK: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE 10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 11 BY MR. HONIK: 12 Good morning, Professor. 0. 13 Good morning. Α. 14 Your name has been the subject of considerable discussion this morning. I'm delighted to be able to put you on the 15 stand. 16 17 Let me begin by asking you this: At my request, did 18 you undertake an economic analysis of the appropriate measure 19 of damages in connection with the manufacture and sale of valsartan-containing drugs, or VCDs, that became the subject of 20 21 FDA recalls commencing in 2018? 22 Α. Yes. 23 And after determining the correct measure of such damages, Q. 24 the exact methodology of which we'll discuss shortly in greater 25 detail, did you actually calculate the amount of those damages

1 for both consumers and end payors, including third-party

- 2 payors, or TPPs?
- $3 \mid A.$ Yes.
- 4 Q. In so doing, were you asked to assume certain facts
- 5 touching upon the liability related to the manufacture and sale
- 6 of those products?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Now, your opinions regarding the calculations and how you
- 9 arrived at them are contained within the several reports or
- 10 declarations that you've authored since the beginning of the
- 11 | case, is that correct?
- 12 A. That's correct.
- 13 Q. I want to take a moment to provide or identify the four
- 14 reports that you've authored so that the record is clear on the
- 15 entirety of the work that you have done in this case.
- 16 The initial report or declaration was in
- 17 | November 2021 in support of our class cert motion; is that
- 18 | correct?
- 19 A. Correct.
- 20 | Q. And very briefly, in that, you calculated, using a
- 21 | methodology we'll discuss in a moment or so, damages as against
- 22 | manufacturers and finished dose suppliers, all of them in this
- 23 | case for all claims, all states, for all relevant times; is
- 24 that correct?
- 25 A. Correct.

- 1 Q. And then subsequent to that, in March of 2022, you
- 2 | supplemented that with an additional calculation of damages for
- 3 certain retailers whose data became available subsequently,
- 4 | correct?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. All right. Now, fast forward to February of 2023, you
- 7 prepared yet another report at that time on MSP, the class rep
- 8 in this case, and their specific damages, correct?
- 9 A. Correct.
- 10 Q. And I hasten to point out that was submitted and it is on
- 11 | the ECF dated as of February 3, 2023, two days before this
- 12 | Court certified the class. Do you remember that?
- 13 | A. I do.
- 14 Q. All right. As a consequence, the MSP-specific damages
- 15 were calculated by you out of a belief that the bellwether MSP
- 16 | trial could be either a class trial or an individual case; is
- 17 | that correct?
- 18 A. That's correct.
- 19 Q. And then finally, in December of last year, 2023, you
- 20 prepared yet another supplemental report on class-wide TPP
- 21 damages that included some fairly recently supplied pharmacy
- 22 defendant sales data, correct?
- 23 A. That's correct.
- $24 \mid Q$. All right. And that now represents the totality of your
- 25 | work in this case, correct?

- 1 A. Correct.
- 2 Q. Is it true that in every instance, in authoring these
- 3 reports and arriving at your damage calculations, that you
- 4 applied the same methodology?
- $5 \mid A.$ Yes.
- 6 Q. Now, among the assumptions that you were asked to make in
- 7 preparing these reports was the identity of the manufacturers
- 8 and sellers of these VCDs, including, among others, the three
- 9 manufacturer/seller defendants in the upcoming bellwether
- 10 | trial, namely, ZHP, Teva, and Torrent; is that correct?
- 11 A. Correct.
- 12 Q. You assumed, did you not, that the relevant sales of these
- 13 VCDs occurred between January 1, 2012, and the dates of recall
- 14 | for each of these three defendants, July 2018 in the case of
- 15 ZHP and Teva and August 2018 for Torrent; is that correct?
- 16 A. That's correct.
- 17 | Q. Now, critically, you were asked to assume that the
- 18 | at-issue VCDs were contaminated with nitrosamines in a manner
- 19 which rendered them adulterated, correct?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 Q. You made no independent evaluation of the liability part
- 22 of this case, correct?
- 23 A. Correct.
- 24 Q. Professor Conti, since earning your Ph.D. in economics
- 25 | from Harvard in 2006, have you largely, if not entirely,

1 confined your work, research, teaching, writing, and consulting 2 in both the government and the private sectors to the economics 3 of the medical care industry? Yes. My Ph.D. is in economics and health policy. 4 Α. 5 And health policy? Q. 6 Α. Correct. 7 Ο. Thank you. 8 Has your work examined the factors that determine 9 spending levels and trends in medical care, including 10 prescription drugs? 11 Α. Yes. 12 You described qualifications in your initial report dating 13 back to November 2021 that, quote, your principal research focus is on the economics of the healthcare industry and the 14 15 markets in particular, evaluating factors that impact the purchase and use of pharmaceuticals, including quality, pricing 16 17 and availability of the pharmaceutical, physician prescribing 18 behaviors and incentives, insurance coverage, and reimbursement 19 and regulation; is that correct? Yes. My expertise is largely in the financing, Α.

20

21 organization, and regulation of the pharmaceutical industry.

22 And specifically almost all of my research has focused on the

23 demand, the supply, and the pricing of prescription drugs.

And has that been true for the -- well, since 2006 at the Ο.

25 least?

 $1 \mid A.$ Yes.

- 2 | Q. In addition, in a resume that I'll mark before you leave
- 3 the stand, did you also indicate that you've testified on the
- 4 economics of prescription drugs in hearings held before the
- 5 U.S. Senate?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Before the U.S. House of Representatives?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Before the Federal Trade Commission?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. And before numerous state legislative houses. Is that all
- 14 correct?
- 15 A. Yes. That's correct.
- 16 Q. Do you serve as the special government advisor or have you
- 17 | served as a special government advisor to the Centers for
- 18 | Medicare & Medicaid Services, or more commonly known as CMS?
- 19 A. Yes. I've done three separate tours of duty in
- 20 | Washington. I have been named special economic advisor to the
- 21 | Food and Drug Administration in the Office of Generic Drugs to
- 22 | focus on drug quality and shortage concerns.
- 23 I've also served in the previous administration in
- 24 | the office of -- the commissioner's office under Commissioner
- 25 | Scott Gottlieb, focused on specifically shortage concerns and

Conti - Direct - Honik

the supply of generic drugs.

In addition, I just came out of Washington serving as 2

3 a special economic advisor to the Centers for Medicare &

Medicaid Services where specifically my focus was on Medicare 4

5 Part D and Part B, both the regulations and also thinking about

reforms to insurance coverage that would improve access for

7 seniors.

1

- 8 Professor, were you the health economist appointed by the Ο.
- 9 State of New Jersey for its Drug Affordability Council?
- 10 I've just been named on the board of the Α.
- 11 Affordability Council for the State of New Jersey.
- 12 addition, I'm currently serving on a board, affordability for
- 13 sickle cell disease for the State of Illinois.
- 14 Professor, suffice to say, you familiarized yourself and
- worked extensively with the regulatory framework that allows 15
- generic drugs to come to market in the U.S.? 16
- 17 Yes. Almost all of my work on prescription drugs has
- 18 focused on competition and specifically the market for generic
- 19 This, by definition, includes the regulation, the drugs.
- financing, and the organization of how patients get access to 20
- 21 these drugs and how much they cost and also what are the
- 22 factors that drive prescription drug companies to enter into
- the U.S. market and to make them. 23
- 24 Professor Conti, what then, in economic terms, is the
- 25 significance of a generic drug being adulterated in coming to

market?

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- 2 A. It goes to the foundation of the U.S. pharmaceutical
- 3 industry as it currently exists. Specifically, a drug label
- 4 | contains the totality of the drug's quality manufacturing, its
- 5 safety, its purity, and its efficacy. And it is that label
- 6 that serves as an attestation that this drug is what it says it
- 7 is; that it reflects, at least a hundred years, since 1906, the
- 8 | rules and regulations that have been put in place to protect
- 9 | the U.S. public from products that are -- that might be
- 10 adulterated.
- 11 Q. Are drugs which meet those requirements that you've just
- 12 | articulated, namely, the legal requirement for safety and that
- 13 | they have the quality, purity, identity, and strength that
- 14 | they're represented to possess in their approved label, are
- 15 those drugs, from an economic perspective, able to be assigned
- 16 | a non-zero economic value by consumers and insurers alike?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Conversely, again, from an economic perspective, can drugs
- 19 | that are adulterated and thus fail to meet those legal
- 20 requirements that we've just articulated, can they be assigned
- 21 | a non-zero economic value?
- 22 A. No, they cannot.
- 23 Q. Can you explain why that is?
- 24 A. Sure, of course.
- 25 Consumers may have demand for many things, and firms

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might be able to meet that demand by supplying products. But there are regulations on what firms can provide to meet consumer demand, and those regulations essentially set up a rule of road that allows for demand to be met by supply. It's only when demand is met by supply can a market price be set for the product.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So if it's the only drug on the market and it's adulterated and the FDA says, well, you're going to have to choose the risk, there would be a value to that?

THE WITNESS: Only --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Correct?

THE WITNESS: Only if the risk is disclosed. And indeed, the foundation of our rules of essentially Congress creating a market for these products is to fundamentally assess, is to fundamentally recognize that there's asymmetric information between consumers and physicians on one hand and suppliers on the other.

Without rules of the road being set, you could imagine that in a market that has so much asymmetric information, you could imagine that some suppliers could cheat and indeed engender kind of picking — as an FDA rule, in FDA language, they say "picking the pockets," but also engendering the health of consumers by doing so.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, and I understand that.

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But I wanted to get back to your opinion that if a drug is adulterated, it is assigned a non-zero economic value. I think that I can take judicial notice of the fact that there have been times in the course of the FDA's history where there are drugs that perhaps are adulterated, but it is the only drug on the market. And the FDA has disclosed that risk, and said, well, you're going to have to pick which risk, you know, is — is one you're willing to undertake.

In that scenario, is it still your opinion that it would be assigned a non-zero economic value?

THE WITNESS: If the risk is disclosed, then, of course, by definition, and the rules allow for supply, then there would be an economic value that could be assigned. And, in fact, the market price should again reflect that additional information about the drug and it should be one indication of the market value.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so how do you then conclude that if the risk is disclosed, there is an economic value? How do you square that with, they have no economic value?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It seems to me that in that —
that that is inconsistent, because if the risk is disclosed and
it has a value, it's inconsistent with saying that they have no
economic value if they're adulterated. Those two seem to not
be reconcilable to me.

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1 THE WITNESS: So I completely disagree, and let me 2 tell you why. 3 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. THE WITNESS: Again, it is in the U.S. Congress' 4 5 interest to facilitate the pharmaceutical industry for patients 6 to have demand and for firms to be able to meet that demand. 7 The rules of the road require that the firms disclose what the 8 risks of that product are in their totality. 9 So the squaring is that in order to make this market, allow supply to meet demand, the risks have to be disclosed, 10 11 then there could be a market, and then there can be a product. 12 Then products can enter into the U.S. course of trade, and then 13 a price can be assigned to that. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. And then just one last 14 15 question and then I'll let you go. 16 You agree with me, though, that you can only disclose 17 the risk if you know the risk? 18 THE WITNESS: Well, by definition, it is the firm's responsibility, it's their obligation to know what the risks 19 are and to disclose them on their label to the U.S. population. 20 21 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 22 BY MR. HONIK: 23 If I may, I'd like to unpack that a bit more with you, 24 Professor. 25 We've used two terms here seemingly synonymously,

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- 1 but, in fact, they're not. Risk -- risks can be associated
- 2 with any number of drugs that enter the marketplace. We all
- 3 know that, correct?
- 4 Α. Correct.
- 5 And your essential point in response to the Court's
- 6 question is that when those risks are revealed, consumers and
- 7 insurers alike can weigh the risk and determine its value to
- them, correct? Yes or no? 8
- Yes. If --9 Α.
- By contrast, something that's adulterated is in a 10
- different category, isn't it? 11
- 12 Isn't it true that the FDA prohibits by statute the
- 13 sale of adulterated drugs, whereas it does not prohibit by
- 14 statute or otherwise drugs that may carry a risk that's
- 1.5 revealed?
- 16 That's correct. And, again, it goes to the 1938 rules,
- 17 which acknowledge that fundamental to the sale of these
- 18 products and to having a U.S. prescription drug market was that
- 19 the firms -- was that quality was inherent to the product. And
- indeed in this specific case, it is the FDA's perspective that 20
- 21 between 2012 and 2018 that no amount of nitrosamine
- 22 contamination was allowable into the U.S. market.
- 23 Has the FDA ever said that a drug manufacturer can sell Q.
- 24 adulterated VCDs?
- 25 Α. No.

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- 1 Q. In fact, has the FDA ever permitted, in a hypothetical or
- 2 other situation, the sale of adulterated drugs into the U.S.
- 3 market?
- 4 A. No.
- 5 Q. So that the Judge's hypothetical about revealing the risk
- 6 associated with the adulteration can't happen in the real world
- 7 because the FDA wouldn't permit it to be sold at all, correct?
- 8 A. Correct. Correct.
- 9 Q. And just to carry this out --
- 10 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I thought they did in this
- 11 | case, didn't they? When there was a recall, they advised the
- 12 patients to go ahead and decide what the risk is.
- 13 MR. HONIK: There was a temporary threshold limit
- 14 | permitted during a period of acute shortage in the marketplace.
- 15 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. So I think that -- I think,
- 16 | you know, I think we have to be fair to what the record is
- 17 here.
- 18 MR. HONIK: I agree, Your Honor, but it's immutable.
- 19 BY MR. HONIK:
- 20 | Q. Do you know the United States code that covers the
- 21 | prescription against placing adulterated drugs into the U.S.
- 22 market?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 | CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, I don't want to quarrel about
- 25 | that. I think it's -- I think it's undisputable that the code

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says and FDA says you cannot market adulterated drugs. I don't think anybody's going to dispute that, and we shouldn't spend a whole lot of time on that.

MR. HONIK: Thank you, Judge.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. We really shouldn't. But I do think that it's probative, and I don't think it's a fact that should be ignored that it cannot be said in a vacuum that at no time can adulterated drugs be sold.

Because in this case, the facts as I understand them and the evidence will show that the FDA permitted it. That's all I'm saying. So I think we have to be a little careful about making these black-and-white statements.

Go ahead.

14 BY MR. HONIK:

- Q. Nonetheless, professor, is the pharmaceutical manufacturer's compliance with cGMP the foundation upon which prescription drugs are sold and purchased in the U.S.?
- 18 A. Yes. Again, quality is foundational to the sale of these products.
- Q. And do you know whether these rules in any way benefit the drug companies as well?
 - A. Of course they do. In fact, it was the pharmaceutical industry that wanted these rules to be in place to protect them from unscrupulous firms undercutting them and stealing market share using drugs that potentially were contaminated and also

1 | were cheaper that didn't meet the evidentiary standard.

- 2 Q. And so that the record is clear and we'll move on, the
- 3 prohibition in the United States Code that prohibits the sale
- of adulterated drugs is found at 21 U.S.C. 331(a) through (c),
- 5 | correct?
- 6 A. That's correct.
- 7 Q. And you're familiar with its operation, correct?
- 8 A. Correct.
- 9 Q. Are the oversight activities by U.S. regulators predicated
- 10 | upon the accuracy of information produced by the manufacturers
- 11 | and their ongoing assurances of the safety, quality, and
- 12 efficacy of their products?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 | Q. Do the FDA rules reaffirm the ongoing nature of it in that
- 15 | manufacturers have to provide ongoing assurance of the safety
- 16 and efficacy according to cGMP?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Does the FDA recognize the public's need to rely on
- 19 | prescription drug manufacturers' ongoing compliance with those
- 20 regulatory requirements and manufacturers' representations of
- 21 | such compliance?
- 22 A. Yes. Yes.
- 23 | Q. As a consequence of this regulatory scheme and its
- 24 | specific requirements, which we've now discussed, if a
- 25 | prescription drug is available for sale in the U.S. market, do

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1 consumers and payors alike from an economic perspective expect 2 these drugs to meet or exceed minimum safety and quality 3 standards? 4 Yes, by definition. 5 Now, in determining that a drug is economically worthless 6 in the way you've just laid out, that is, where supply and 7 demand curves do not meet, does that mean that the drug in 8 question can't have or retain some therapeutic or clinical value? 9 10 The drug may contain therapeutic value. It does not have 11 economic value. There is no legitimate supplier. 12 Can you expand a bit on that difference in the way it's 13 impacted your economic damage modeling in this case? 14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I didn't hear the last sentence. 15 The drug may contain therapeutic value? It does not have 16 economic value what? 17 THE WITNESS: It does not have economic value. 18 I'll -- let me just be -- let me explain. 19 So consumers may have -- may demand many different types of products, but that doesn't mean in the U.S. market 20 21 that suppliers can supply all of the products that consumers 22 may demand. 23 In this model, consumers might view that these 24 products have some therapeutic value, but suppliers cannot

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supply products that might have that therapeutic value and are

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1 contaminated and are adulterated. That is not allowed. 2 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Unless the FDA says so? 3 THE WITNESS: Unless the regulator says so, allows 4 the commerce to trade like that. 5 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And in cases where they have not 6 yet said that, do they have an economic value? 7 THE WITNESS: They have authority -- so the FDA has 8 authority to determine what is allowable to enter into the U.S. 9 course of trade for pharmaceutical products. 10 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so when you say they have no 11 economic value, that begins when the FDA declares them 12 adulterated? 13 THE WITNESS: No. It begins when the FDA allows a 14 product to be on the market. By definition, each one of generic manufacturers have to show to the FDA and annually 15 16 attest that the products are manufactured according to cGMP, 17 and are pure, safe, and efficacious. And they need to attest 18 that label as well. So think of it this way: The FDA's allowance of that 19 market to exist occurs when the FDA approves the label that the 20 21 manufacturer states here is the circumstances in which this 22 product has been manufactured and here are the economic -- or 23 here are the clinical benefits that might be provided. 24 Every single year that that drug has been on the

market, the manufacturer has to attest that that label is

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1 accurate and that these products are not adulterated. 2 the course of trade, that allows for this market to clear. 3 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So it sounds like what you're saying is unless and until the FDA declares them adulterated, 4 5 they have some economic value? THE WITNESS: Unless and until -- well, it's 6 7 really -- it's on the manufacturer, actually, to inform the 8 Food and Drug Administration that there has been contamination and adulteration. That's part of their obligations. And once 9 10 that occurs, there's a period of determination by the regulator 11 on whether and how to either shut down the market for these 12 products or to allow them and under what circumstances. 13 indeed that is what happened in this case. 14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And up until that point, they have an economic value? 15 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 17 BY MR. HONIK: 18 Professor Conti, let me ask you the question this way. 0. 19 Let me get at it this way. Between 2012 and 2018, did the FDA 20 ever express or permit the introduction of 21 nitrosamine-contaminated ARBs in the United States? 22 Α. No. 23 And to your knowledge, it was impermissible to have the Q. 24 nitrosamine-contaminated ARB sold in the United States during 25 that period, correct?

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- 1 Α. Correct. During the period that I was assessing damages,
- 2 it was impermissible. The acceptable level was zero.
- 3 Okay. And so the fact, the very fact of its sale has an Ο.
- economic impact in terms of its value, correct? 4
- 5 Α. Correct. You can think of this, again, from the FDA's
- 6 very colorful language, these are manufacturers that are
- 7 picking the pocket of American consumers and payors by selling
- 8 products into the market that should not have been.
- 9 And during the same period in time, that is, from 2012 to
- 2018, there were non-contaminated, non-nitrosamine-containing 10
- 11 ARBs that were in the marketplace competing with these
- contaminated or adulterated drugs, correct? 12
- 13 Of course. Α.
- 14 And those had value, economically speaking, and under
- your -- or in your opinion, the others could not economically 15
- 16 because of the prescription by law, correct?
- 17 Α. Correct.
- 18 Ο. Now, let me hand you, if I may, your 2021 report.
- 19 Thank you.
- 20 MR. HONIK: Your Honor, may I approach?
- 21 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.
- 22 BY MR. HONIK:
- 23 Professor Conti, this is your initial report, the one
- 24 that's supported -- may I, Your Honor?
- 25 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

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1 MS. BROWN: Do you have a copy?

MR. HONIK: 2 Do you have another one?

3 MS. BROWN: Thank you.

> MR. HONIK: Thank you.

> > MS. BROWN: You can take mine. Thanks.

6 BY MR. HONIK:

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- 7 This is your expert declaration date dated November of
- 8 2021, in which, as we've already established, you had prepared
- 9 calculations showing damages as against all the manufacturer
- and finished dose suppliers as to all claims during all 10
- 11 relevant periods by state, correct?
- 12 Α. Correct.
- 13 And I've tabbed for you and the Court the pages that 0.
- 14 correspond to the calculations that you arrived at for each of
- the defendants. Do you see the tabs on there? 15
- 16 I do. This print is small, so apologies. I'm going to
- 17 put my glasses on.
- 18 Well, let's go slow just so the record is clear and Ο.
- 19 everybody can follow. At Appendix C2, Cat 2, you provide
- damage calculations for express warranty by defendant and by 20
- 21 state, correct?
- 22 Α. Correct.
- 23 And at Appendix E2, Edward 2, you provide similar Q.
- 24 calculations by defendant and state as to common law fraud,
- 25 correct?

A. Correct.

- 2 Q. And at Appendix F, as in Frank, 2, you calculate damages
- 3 again by defendant and state for Consumer Protection Law,
- 4 | correct?

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- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 | Q. And the formula, I don't think there's much dispute about
- 7 | this, is you determined the price at the point of sale and the
- 8 quantity at the point of sale, correct?
- 9 A. Correct.
- 10 Q. Second half step back. What is the significance of the
- 11 | point of sale in your damage analysis?
- 12 A. Sure.
- 13 So it is at the pharmacy counter where patients are
- 14 | picking up a dispensed product and potentially handing over
- 15 cash, if they have some sort of out-of-pocket cost, but also
- 16 | that that claim is being adjudicated by the pharmacy. And the
- 17 | pharmacy is calculating the amount that the consumer is going
- 18 | to have to pay, if any, and the insurer is going to have to
- 19 pay. That is the point of the transaction from an economic
- 20 perspective.
- 21 It is that exchange of goods, money, if you will, for
- 22 the product where the benefit-of-the-bargain is struck and
- 23 | where -- and it's that market price, what the patient pays and
- 24 what the insurer pays, that is the basis of economic damages in
- 25 | this setting.

1 Q. And clearly, I think we all understand that when that 2 adjudication -- well, let me back up.

Can the -- does the pharmacist release the valsartan to the patient unless that adjudication occurs?

Α. No.

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- 6 So the pharmacist, if I've understood you, is assured that 7 on the one hand they're getting the consumer payment, it may be cash, it may be a credit card?
- 9 Α. Uh-huh.
- And a promise to pay, are they not, from the insurer or 10 11 the TPP, correct?
- 12 I mean, from my perspective, it's an obligation to Yes. 13 pay by the insurer and by the patient for that product.

In addition, it's very important that, again, the label is the promise by the manufacturer to the patient that what this thing is is what it says it is on its label.

And, in fact, when you go -- when you leave a pharmacy with a prescription drug, you will notice that patients get that label stapled to their -- to their prescription in order to reinforce here is what you have bought, and this is what you as the manufacturer have promised the consumer and to the payor what you have received.

- And that label from 2012 to 2018 never once revealed that Q. there was nitrosamine or any carcinogen in these VCDs, did it?
- Correct. During the period of damages, it was not Α.

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revealed.

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- Q. The Judge -- the Court has alluded to certain allowances by the FDA after the recall for certain of these drugs at certain levels. Were the manufacturers required to test and
- 5 reveal the levels?
- 6 A. They were. And the issue that I wanted to raise with you
- 7 is that there's a difference between drugs that already exist
- 8 in the normal class of trade and drugs that could enter the
- 9 market with contamination. What the FDA was trying to address
- 10 | is that there are going to be drugs already delivered to
- 11 | pharmacies all across America. There are 50,000 pharmacies all
- 12 across America. And that recall was going to take time to
- 13 gather all of the contaminated products.
- And so essentially what they were allowing was that,
- 15 | listen, we know that there are going to be products that are
- 16 going to be already entered into the normal class of trade, and
- we're going to warn people that if you're going to buy these
- 18 | products at the pharmacy counter or, physician, if you're going
- 19 to recommend these products, you should know that they are
- 20 | contaminated.
- 21 Q. Professor Conti, how did you arrive at the price and the
- 22 | quantity for the calculations that we are looking at in these
- 23 appendices?
- 24 | A. I used the gold standard employed by the industry for the
- 25 | past 60 years to evaluate the sales, quantities, and prices of

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prescription drugs in the pharmacy trade.

- Q. And what's the name of the dataset that you relied upon for that purpose?
- A. It goes by a number of names because there's been a number of mergers and acquisitions of the companies, but the dataset specifically I used was IQVIA Xponent data.
 - Q. And why do you consider IQVIA Xponent data reliable for use in calculating damages in this case? And if you will, detail how the data is collected, the size and scope and its use.
 - A. Sure.

There are 9 billion, with a B, prescriptions dispensed into the U.S. market every year. IQVIA goes out and creates a census of the 50,000 pharmacies in the United States selling these products. It also surveys all of the manufacturers selling their products — I think there are over 10,000 different prescription drugs sold in the United States currently — and asks both the pharmacies and the manufacturers, what do you sell and how much did you sell it for?

They then "hoover" up all of that data across the entire nation and harmonize it. They clean it. They make standard fields for quantities, for prices, for sales for every single drug sold, and then they do a fair amount of cleaning with that information, and then they finally start to analyze

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it. They look for potential discrepancies in, let's say, what the manufacturer says that they are selling into the U.S. and what the pharmacies are saying that they're actually selling into the U.S. They look for those sort of discrepancies and seek to try to correct them, if you will.

And then finally they create a clean dataset that is sold into the U.S. market, and their biggest customers are prescription drug companies themselves that are trying to assess what is the market for these products both in a given point in time but also over time.

One other thing I should say is that the way that — the reason that IQVIA can do this is because the U.S. pharmaceutical market is a closed system. Under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, there has been rules called track and trace where every single dispensed product in America and actually every single drug sold into the wholesale class of trade is literally barcoded. And so they can follow it all the way through the system from the warehouse where the manufacturer has finished that dose and sold it into the U.S. class of trade all the way to the pharmacy that takes possession of that drug and finally to the actual individual patient that is picking that product up from the pharmacy.

Q. And so as a result of this tracking and traceable -traceability that you've described, can we know the patient who
picks up the drug?

- 1 Α. Absolutely.
- 2 Can we know the quantity that was in the prescription
- 3 picked up?
- Α. Yes. 4
- 5 Do we know the price that the consumer as well as the
- 6 consumer's insurer paid?
- 7 Α. Yes.
- 8 Do we know as well when the insurer paid it and where the Ο.
- 9 insurer paid it?
- 10 Correct. There is a --Α.
- 11 Do we know the amount the insurer paid?
- 12 There is a full and complete record. It is uniquely
- 13 identified by unique codes.
- And even if the payment is somewhat circuitous going 14
- through potentially a PBM or some other agent on behalf of the 15
- 16 insurer, are those facts knowable?
- 17 Α. Yes.
- 18 Now, you mentioned there are some 9 billion prescriptions Q.
- 19 annually in the United States. What percentage of those
- 20 9 billion are captured in the IQVIA dataset that you used in
- 21 this case?
- 22 So across all drugs sold in the United States, their
- 23 census is 93 percent. We believe their census is higher for
- 24 small molecule drugs, such as the ones at issue here. IQVIA
- 25 has a little bit of blindness in drugs that are -- there's a

1 little bit of "missingness" in drugs that are dispensed in the 2 inpatient setting because of how those products are purchased and tracked to patients but not for these particular drugs 3 where they are largely dispensed to patients in the pharmacy 4 5 counter. 6 But in using IQVIA for this case for VCDs in question, 7 were you satisfied that you were picking up 93 percent or north 8 of 93 percent of all drug sales during the relevant class 9 period? 10 Yes. You should think of these data as being a census of 11 the prescription drugs at issue in this case being sold into 12 the U.S. market. 13 You --Ο. 14 And paid for in the U.S. market. You've used the term "census" a couple of times. Is there 15 16 a difference definitionally in economics or statistics that 17 relate to economics between census and sample? 18 Α. Yes. A census is when a researcher or government agency 19 literally goes and tries and ascertains economic features of 20 whatever the phenomena is of interest for every single person 21 or firm that is participating in the market. Think of the U.S. 22 census as a census, a true census. 23 A sample is different. A sample is when you go out

and ask a handful of people or a handful of firms what they are doing, what the economic phenomena is of interest. They are

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1 fundamentally different concepts. 2 By the way, you mentioned industry, that is, 3 pharmaceutical industry's use of IQVIA. Is it used in 4 research? 5 Α. Yes. So IQVIA does sell their data largely to 6 pharmaceutical firms for market intelligence, but they also 7 will enter into contracts with researchers, such as myself, and 8 with government agencies, such as the Centers for Medicare & 9 Medicaid Services. The Food and Drug Administration uses IQVIA 10 data. There are various other government agencies that rely on 11 the data to assess market sales and quantity and prices of 12 prescription drugs sold in the United States. 13 Again, it is the census. It is the one thing that 14 we -- it is the data that allows us to ascertain all 15 prescription drugs sold in the United States across payor, 16 across drug, across manufacturer within state. 17 And implicit in your last response, is it therefore relied 18 upon to establish U.S. drug policy? Absolutely. In every -- in my role as a researcher, in my 19 Α. 20 role as a special government advisor, and in my interactions 21 with government agencies throughout the federal government, 22 whether it be in health and human services or in other parts of 23 the agency, IQVIA is considered to be a gold standard for

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evaluating the market for prescription drugs in the United

Q. Professor Conti, you were, in fact, the expert retained in the Blue Cross Blue Shield/GSK case about which the Court heard earlier in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, were you not?

- 4 A. Yes.
 - Q. Did you use IQVIA data there to model damages?
- 6 A. Yes.

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- Q. Now, did you model damages in this case employing a subset of other data that came into your possession?
- 9 | A. Yes.

So it is important for scientific inquiry to be thorough and to evaluate all of the financing, organization, and regulations that govern a particular economic phenomena of study.

In the course of doing my work in this case, I evaluated a number of other datasets that were given to me to assess their reliability and to judge it against the gold standard, which is IQVIA data.

- Q. And, in particular, did you analyze a data subset consisting of some nine big box or large grocery-store-type drug dispensers in the country?
- 21 A. I did.
 - Q. And so the Court has some relative idea of how much was captured in that data in comparison to some 9 billion that you mentioned earlier, give us a sense of the number of prescriptions captured in this smaller data subset that you

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1 analyzed.

- 2 A. So for the drugs at issue, it was quite incomplete. To
- 3 give you an example, the -- the -- some of the drugs had only
- 4 a -- the sample contained only 14 percent relative to the IQVIA
- 5 census, whereas some of the drugs at issue were more
- 6 representative in the sample than in comparison to the IQVIA
- 7 data.
- 8 Q. So let's unpack that a little bit. When you say that in
- 9 this subset that you looked at in the sample seeing only
- 10 | 14 percent, do you mean 14 percent of total sales in question?
- 11 A. Correct, of total quantity sold.
- 12 Q. And that would be in contrast to the 93 percent or higher
- 13 | captured in IQVIA?
- 14 A. Correct.
- 15 | 0. Is that fair?
- 16 A. Correct.
- 17 | Q. Did you observe whether or not there was a convergence in
- 18 | price point, the larger the share was or the larger the
- 19 percentage, reflected in the smaller subset?
- 20 So in other words, looking at the subset that had
- 21 | roughly 70 percent, did that more closely approximate the
- 22 | pricing that you saw in IQVIA in comparison to the capture at
- 23 | 14 or 17 percent?
- 24 A. Yes, of course. So the economic principle here is that as
- 25 | a sample converges on the census, the true estimate or the

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1 estimate in the sample converges on the true estimate in the 2 census. 3 0. When you --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Counsel, I don't think there's a 4 5 dispute about this. I think the dispute really is her conclusion that they were rendered worthless and the unjust 6 7 enrichment theory. So to the extent you can hone your 8 examination as to those two objections, I would appreciate it. 9 MR. HONIK: I will, Your Honor. 10 And for the benefit of the Court, the reason we're 11 bringing this up is that this was very specifically in the 12 Daubert motion that the defendants filed; that there was some 13 impropriety in using IQVIA as opposed to pricing that was 14 revealed in the smaller --15 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So my ruling will be -- I'll shortcut it -- that goes to the weight of the opinion. It does 16 17 not go to reliability. 18 MR. HONIK: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate 19 that. I appreciate that. 20 BY MR. HONIK: 21 Are you familiar in the drug industry with the use of 22 rebates and post-sale offsets? 23 Well, there are a number of different changes to the list Α. price of the drug in the U.S. There are discounts that are 24

applied at the point of sale. Those are already reflected in

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IQVIA data. There are also post-sale adjustments, and they can include rebates largely and then a handful of other adjustments as well. Those rebates are usually paid by -- or those adjustments are paid by the manufacturer to either the insurer, to the patient itself or their self, or to the pharmacy. With respect to post-sale offsets of the kind that you just described, you were certainly aware of them, as you've just stated. Did you calculate them and reduce the point of sale harm? Again, the discounts that exist in the U.S. market and that are part of the dispensed prescription price are already in the IQVIA data. It's one of the advantages of using the IQVIA data. The rebates that might be available from manufacturers to insurers, other parts of the trade, were not captured, and that's because generic drug manufacturers do not

provide rebates to consumers or to third-party payors.

So, professor, if we turn now to your actual calculations of TPP damages, would a fact finder be able to use the appendices that we went through earlier, the three in particular, which show the calculated damages that we discussed by defendant, by state, and by claim to answer damage questions about the three defendants in the upcoming bellwether trial?

Α. Yes.

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Q. And let me show you, if I may --

2 MR. HONIK: Your Honor, may I approach again?

3 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

4 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Thank you for the larger

5 print.

- 6 BY MR. HONIK:
- 7 Q. Professor Conti, this is a composite exhibit, basically an
- 8 Excel spreadsheet. Do you have it in front of you?
- 9 A. I do.
- 10 Q. And the composite exhibit reflects the claims asserted
- 11 | against the bellwether defendants, namely, ZHP, Teva, and
- 12 Torrent, by state groupings that have been certified by this
- 13 | Court and assigned for the upcoming trial and by claim, namely,
- 14 express warranty, fraud, and consumer protection.
- 15 Did you at my request take the values from your
- 16 | appendices and then input the specific damage as they would
- 17 relate to this upcoming trial?
- 18 A. Yes, correct. All of the damages that are in my opening
- 19 report, attachment C2, E2, and F2, are just summarized in this
- 20 document.
- 21 Q. And the composite exhibit consists of three different
- 22 | tabs, if you will, from an Excel spreadsheet as to each of the
- 23 defendants, correct?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 Q. And there are no unjust enrichment calculations in this

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1 exhibit, correct?

- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 Q. Now, in much the same way, based on your testimony,
- 4 developed testimony, obviously, could a fact finder look to
- 5 your appendices and the calculations there, the basis for it,
- 6 and subject, of course, to the Court's instructions, then take
- 7 the damages from one and put it on a verdict sheet similar to
- 8 | the composite exhibit I've placed in front of you?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. And can -- if you would, let's just take a minute and look
- 11 at a couple of examples so that we understand some concepts
- 12 that are here.
- So with respect to ZHP damages, for example, if we
- 14 | look at the very first state alphabetically, we see Alabama,
- 15 correct?
- 16 A. Correct.
- 17 Q. And the first column for damages would be under express
- 18 | warranty, and there's a non-zero value there, correct?
- 19 A. Correct.
- $20 \mid Q$. And you see where it says common law fraud NA?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 | Q. Okay. And that would correspond to the unavailability of
- 23 | a particular claim in a particular state, correct?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 | Q. Same thing with respect to Alabama, the example we're

using, for Consumer Protection Law, correct?

- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 | Q. And then you've got a column that says "deduplicated state
- 4 total." Do you see that?
- $5 \mid A. \quad Yes.$

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- 6 Q. For states and claims, like, for example, Florida, which
- 7 has values for both -- for all three, express warranty, common
- 8 law fraud, and Consumer Protection Law, what do you mean by a
- 9 deduplicated state total?
- 10 A. Sure.
- So as you can see, some of these states have laws
- 12 | that allow for claims of express warranty but not the others,
- while some of the states have allowed for claims of express
- 14 | warranty and some of the others.
- 15 All the deduplicated state total does is say, okay,
- 16 | you only get credit or only are -- were only a sum of damages
- 17 | for you for one of the damage categories, not all.
- 18 Q. So in plain English, there's no double-dipping here,
- 19 | correct?
- 20 A. There's no double counting here, correct.
- 21 O. And --
- 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And am I correct that this is
- 23 | not -- that you are not making an opinion as to whether or not
- 24 | the elements of each of these theories has been satisfied?
- 25 THE WITNESS: Correct.

1 BY MR. HONIK:

- 2 Q. Right. You have no opinions one way or the other about
- 3 any of the elements of the liability in this case, correct?
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 Q. You've simply calculated the damages?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 MR. HONIK: Your Honor, if I may, the last thing for 8 the benefit of the Court.
- 9 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
- 10 MR. HONIK: I'd like to show Professor Conti and have
- 11 her confirm that this is her most recent CV.
- 12 BY MR. HONIK:
- 13 | Q. Dr. Conti, is this your most recent biography and CV?
- 14 A. I think I've had -- so the address is accurate, employment
- 15 | is accurate.
- 16 | Q. It may help you to know that your assistant sent it to me
- 17 | this week.
- 18 A. Yeah. Thank you.
- 19 I think there are a handful of additional
- 20 | publications that are not listed here. So, for example, I just
- 21 | published a paper in the New England Journal of Medicine on the
- 22 | market for prescription drugs that's not listed here.
- 23 But it looks pretty complete.
- 24 | Q. You have in excess of a hundred publications in your area
- 25 of expertise, correct?

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1 Α. I do. 2 And we may be missing a few? Ο. 3 Yes. Α. 4 MR. HONIK: Thank you. That's it, Your Honor. 5 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Cross. We'll go till about 12:30. 6 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, may I be heard just a minute 7 before we start? 8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 9 MS. BROWN: The bulk of what I intended to talk to Dr. Conti about today is actually an issue I thought I heard 10 the Court just rule on, so I want to be mindful about 11 12 retreading ground if the Court has ruled. 13 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I think that she's testified that this is the standard in the industry, this is what she 14 uses, and to the extent that the defendants quarrel with the 15 16 IQVIA analysis, that goes to the weight. 17 MS. BROWN: I understand the Court's position. 18 I would push back just a little bit, if I could. think the new advisory committee notes from December of 2023 19 about Rule 702 make clear that it is the application of the 20 21 methodology that is, of course, as this Court well knows, 22 within the purview of the Court's gatekeeping role. And I would submit to the Court that in this instance 23 24 we have an issue with the reliability of the IQVIA Xponent

data. And here Dr. Conti actually did two different damage

Conti - Direct - Honik

1 calculations, Your Honor, and they differ by one billion. 2 I believe that the difference is because, and we argued in our 3 papers, the unreliability of using IQVIA data, which is not transaction data, Your Honor, it's an aggregate. It's based on 4 5 a survey. There's a number of different issues with that. 6 And so I don't think, Your Honor, in this instance it 7 is a weight issue. It's a reliability issue that I think the 8 advisory committee note makes clear that at this point is 9 within the gatekeeping 702. 10 And so, Your Honor, if the Court would permit me, I would like to --11 12 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If you want to make your record, 13 make your record. I don't know. I think it goes to the weight 14 of the evidence. 15 Can I just ask a question? You just assumed that the entire data were all losses, right? You didn't make a 16 17 calculation as to -- you just assumed there was no economic --18 they were all economic losses? 19 Like, I didn't hear any questioning about how you get to these numbers other than you just -- you looked at the data, 20 21 you saw how many prescriptions were written, and you assumed 22 that they all had no value, right? 23 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct. 24 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You just made that assumption? THE WITNESS: That's correct, based on the -- based 25

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Conti - Direct - Honik

1 on what I was asked to assume. 2 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. You were told let's just 3 assume that these -- that the drug has no value, and you were 4 told to go back and see how much -- how many prescriptions 5 were --6 MR. HONIK: Your Honor, respectfully, we did not ask 7 her to assume it had no value. We asked her to assume one 8 thing. 9 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What? 10 MR. HONIK: That the drugs were adulterated. And we 11 asked her, based on her expertise, what is the economic 12 significance of the adulterated drug? 13 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But then how did she --14 MR. HONIK: She then opined, under 21 U.S.C., 331, those drugs are impermissibly -- are not permitted to be in the 15 16 U.S. market. She then explained that there needs to be a 17 convergence of a supply-and-demand chain from an economic 18 standpoint. So there is a foundation, and she made no 19 assumption of zero value. She arrived at zero value based on 20 an economist's very sound foundation. So there is a difference 21 here. 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, unless -- unless I was

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missing something, her testimony -- this is how I heard her

testimony. And I don't know how -- this is how I heard her

testimony, which is, a drug that has been deemed adulterated by

1 the FDA has no economic value, and up until that point, an argument can be made that it has an economic value. 2 3 The record in this case reflects that from day one it was not recalled. And so wherein, in that range, the drug has 4 5 value or doesn't have value is disputed, and that's what the 6 jury will have to decide. That's how I heard the testimony. 7 And so whether it was an assumption that they had no 8 value from day one when they were put into the market, it 9 doesn't comport with the testimony I heard today. I heard 10 something entirely different. But we get back to the same conversation that I have been having, which is the dispute is 11 12 going to center on whether or not they had a value, the drug 13 had a value. 14 I did not hear this witness say that they have no 15 value from the minute -- from the minute they were 16 manufactured. I did not hear her say that. 17 MR. HONIK: Your Honor, you're correct in part, if I 18 may. 19 It's on us to demonstrate adulteration in 2012. 20 We're going to do that. 21 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 22 MR. HONIK: We're going to show to this jury through 23

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extremely competent, extensive testimony from defendants and others that by reason of how they manufactured these drugs, that they were, in fact, adulterated. That is, if I may --

1	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I understand that.
2	MR. HONIK: That they contained nitrosamine
3	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
4	MR. HONIK: from 2012 all the way forward.
5	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
6	MR. HONIK: So as a matter of fact, they were
7	adulterated.
8	And so what Professor Conti did we asked her, what
9	is the significance of that fact once we establish it,
10	obviously that the drugs were adulterated within the meaning
11	of the FDA regulations in 21 U.S.C.? What is the economic
12	significance of that?
13	And her response is, they have zero value because
14	they can't be placed into the stream of commerce. And as an
15	economist, that imputes that there's no supply and demand curve
16	that meets. No equilibrium of pricing can be established.
17	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I think that that
18	MR. HONIK: So on her own, through her economic
19	analysis, the ascribed value, remember, benefit-of-the-bargain,
20	what was the objective value of the drug at the time it was
21	dispensed and what was paid. That became the delta for
22	damages.
23	So it's there are at least these couple of
24	important steps, and we concede absolutely that we've got to
25	demonstrate adulteration.

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that when a drug is recalled, it has no economic value. But up

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And what I heard the testimony to be is that when a drug is -- I will be generally speaking -- is

4 until that point, there is an economic value.

The witness assumed in her analysis that there is —
there should be ascribed no economic value to a drug where the
evidence will show that it was adulterated from day one. That
will then be, and that's an assumption she made and it's an
assumption she is more than permitted to assume. It's a
hypothetical and she's presuming it. She's presuming that
these drugs were adulterated from day one and had no economic
value.

She will -- she's not qualified to say, it seems to me, in a vacuum that they had no economic value because she herself has testified today that up until the point that they're recalled, they have some economic value.

MR. HONIK: I --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What that value is, whether they're worthless from day one or not, is up to the jury to decide.

MR. HONIK: Respectfully, Judge, I don't think Professor Conti testified that way at all.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I specifically said to her up until the point --

MR. HONIK: If I may, there is a difference between a

Conti - Direct - Honik

1	drug that contains a risk and a drug that is adulterated, and
2	she distinguished between the two. She said that if a drug has
3	a revealed risk, that has and can be assigned a value, and
4	the reason for that is that the asymmetry between what a
5	consumer knows and what a drug manufacturer knows is
6	alleviated.
7	But when that doesn't exist and when there is a
8	contamination that is not revealed, i.e., it's adulterated, it
9	can never have a value even before recall.
10	The trigger here is not recall. It's not when the
11	FDA and I'm going to find, before the day's over, Judge
12	Kugler absolutely addressed this point.
13	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's not what she said.
14	THE WITNESS: If respectfully
15	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It's no, no.
16	THE WITNESS: Respectfully, that is not that is
17	not what I said. That is not my testimony.
18	Again, there is no
19	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Lunch break.
20	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
21	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: We'll see you back in 45 minutes.
22	(Recess was taken at 12:21 p.m. until 1:45 p.m.)
23	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
24	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Sorry for the delay. You
25	can have a seat. Thank you.

Conti - Cross - Brown

1	Is Dr. Conti here?
2	Resume the stand, please.
3	(Witness resumed the stand.)
4	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Please remember you're
5	still under oath.
6	Cross.
7	MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
8	And, Your Honor, we certainly heard the Court on the
9	IQVIA issue, and so we'll just rest on the argument we made in
10	the papers, understanding that the Court views that as an issue
11	of weight.
12	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
13	MS. BROWN: And if I could, Your Honor, proceed with
14	just a few questions on another topic that we briefed, which
15	was the "fit," Your Honor, whether or not the damages model
16	particularly as it relates to the state damages fits the theory
17	of liability and how the classes were certified.
18	May I proceed with just a few questions on that?
19	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes. Yes.
20	MS. BROWN: Thank you.
21	<u>CROSS-EXAMINATION</u>
22	BY MS. BROWN:
23	Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Conti.
24	A. Good afternoon.
25	Q. How are you?

- 1 A. I'm great. How are you?
- 2 Q. Good.
- A couple of questions for you on this exhibit that
- 4 | counsel marked with your state-specific calculations.
- 5 A. Just give me a second, please.
- 6 0. Sure.
- 7 And if it's helpful, I can approach with my copy,
- 8 Dr. Conti.
- 9 A. I've got it. Thank you.
- 10 Q. Okay. Perfect.
- 11 A. If you could just give me one second so that I have the
- 12 reference as well.
- 13 Q. Sure.
- 14 A. Thank you.
- 15 Okay.
- 16 Q. You're all set?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Okay. Great.
- 19 When we look at this exhibit that counsel marked, it
- 20 contains your calculations of damages broken down by state and
- 21 by damages category, correct, Doctor?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Okay.
- 24 A. Professor.
- 25 Q. I'm sorry?

- 1 A. Professor.
- 2 Q. Professor.
- 3 A. Yes. I'm not a physician.
- 4 0. Sure.
- 5 And I understand, Professor, that this state data
- 6 | comes from the IQVIA data, correct?
- 7 A. I don't know what you mean by "deck"?
- 8 Q. Excuse me?
- 9 A. What do you mean by "deck"?
- 10 Q. Sure.
- 11 A. Do you mean data?
- 12 Q. Data. I say data. Do you say data?
- 13 A. You said "deck." That's what I heard.
- 14 | Q. Oh, sorry. I said the word "data."
- 15 Can you hear me?
- 16 A. I can now, yes.
- 17 Q. Okay. The state damages data comes from IQVIA data,
- 18 | correct?
- 19 A. Correct.
- 20 Q. Okay. And that data is based on, you told us at your
- 21 deposition, the state of the pharmacy where the transaction for
- 22 | the medicine occurred, correct?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 | Q. Okay. But in a different proceeding, you testified that
- 25 | IQVIA data is based on the state where the prescriber writes

Conti - Cross - Brown

1 the prescription. 2 Α. Correct. 3 Do you know that? Q. It's the same. 4 Α. 5 Well, the state where the prescriber is, is not 6 necessarily the state where the consumer goes to fill the 7 prescription, correct? 8 No, that's not correct. Indeed, there has been a fair Α. amount of research on this. Healthcare is a local good where 9 people go to the doctor in their local community and go to 10 11 their pharmacy in their local community just like they go to 12 their hospital in their local community. 13 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, you just made the assumption 14 that they were both the same. I mean, it doesn't always happen 15 in that case, but for purposes of your report, you assumed that 16 the state where the prescriber was is the same where it was 17 filled; you just made that assumption? 18 THE WITNESS: Right. So --19 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 20 THE WITNESS: I mean, generally, the state of the 21 pharmacy and the state of the prescriber are the same. 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's --23 THE WITNESS: But, yes, there can be discrepancies as well. 24 25 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So it was an assumption

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Conti - Cross - Brown

1 that was made. Okay. 2 MS. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 BY MS. BROWN: And one of the things that you've actually written about 4 5 is that the location of a pharmacy where a prescription is filled might be different from the location where a person or a 6 7 patient lives, right? 8 So, again, healthcare consumption, in the U.S., the most Α. commonly consumed medical care product are pharmaceuticals, and 9 10 healthcare consumption generally of medical care goods are a In other words, patients go to their local 11 local concern. 12 doctor, patients go to their local pharmacy for care. 13 Can people cross the border into different 14 communities to fill a prescription? Absolutely. But generally that is contained within their state. 15 16 And one of the things you would agree with is that in many 17 urban and rural areas, the location of a pharmacy where a 18 prescription is filled may be discordant with the patient's residence, correct? 19 But, again, all -- all within the same state. 20 Α. 21 In other words, I lived in the south side of Chicago 22

In other words, I lived in the south side of Chicago when I was faculty at the University of Chicago for 15 years.

I would get my prescription filled in multiple pharmacies, some of which were in the south side of Chicago and some of which were in the north side of Chicago.

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Conti - Cross - Brown

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Is this material? It seemed to be a little nitpicky. Can we just assume that what --MS. BROWN: Yeah, I think it is. Well, I think here's the issue, Your Honor, and I'll move on. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. MS. BROWN: Whether it -- and I don't think Dr. Conti knows whether it's the prescriber or whether it's the pharmacy. What it's not is the state where the TPP paid. And that was what Judge Kugler identified as a mismatch. And that's the area of questioning I just want to ask a few questions on and argue to the Court that we have a "fit" problem as a result of that. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, assume we do, then how does that -- I mean, so do you just throw the entire opinion out? MS. BROWN: Well, what Judge Kugler said, Your Honor, and it was, I believe, April of 2024, it was the Decertification Opinion, and what he identified was this mismatch, as the Court is clearly aware of, between the point of sale damages as calculated by Dr. Conti and the point of payment as certified in the classes. And what Judge Kugler said, because it was raised obviously in the context of ascertainability, and what he said

obviously in the context of ascertainability, and what he said is this is not going to be a problem because plaintiffs will have to put forward a "translating mechanism," some way to get from the point of sale damages that are on the exhibit that

counsel reviewed to the way that the classes were certified, and that wasn't done, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So the witness has said she didn't do that. So what's the defendants' argument? The whole thing goes out?

MS. BROWN: Well, it's, yes, a 702 argument, Your Honor. Now we don't have a fit. Now we have state-specific damages that do not match the state-specific classes.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Or we have: Goes to the weight because the assumptions were made that they were one and the same. And so it just seems to me somewhat unrealistic to have this witness then go and look at, I don't know how many, you know, millions of prescriptions and determine who was the physician and where was it filled. That seems to be -- you know, I used the word "nitpicky," but it does seem to be -- I don't think that that's what 702 requires.

Isn't she not permitted in the course of her experience, this is what they do in the health industry; that there can be some crossing of borders as she said? But she can make that assumption.

MS. BROWN: Well, I think the fit though, the lack of connection between how the damages were calculated here --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.

MS. BROWN: -- and how the classes were certified is a 702 issue, Your Honor. Because what the jury -- this will

Conti - Cross - Brown

not assist the jury who is going to be asked to say in the state of Alabama, did Defendant Teva pay for, you know, or did plaintiff pay for a certain amount of valsartan. That's not what these calculations tell us. And so it is an excludable opinion, Your Honor, because it doesn't fit the theory that they —

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. You don't throw it out entirely. She's already testified that she's made that assumption, and the jury can look at the figure for Alabama and say, well, it's 16,441, so, you know, there might be, I don't know, 5 percent, so let's make it, I don't know, 12. I don't know.

MS. BROWN: Well, but, Your Honor, I don't believe it's a situation where we don't know if it's the prescriber, we don't know if it's the patient. Maybe at the margins, as the Court is suggesting, you take a little discount. It's something different entirely.

It's where -- the classes were certified based on did the TPP pay in the state of Alabama, Georgia, you know, fill in the blanks. And so it's not something as the Court is proposing. And it does seem reasonable perhaps in another context, but it's not a situation where you could say, sure, it goes to weight. I'll discount 5 or 10 percent because maybe somebody lived in Philly and came to Camden to fill a prescription. It's actually a complete mismatch, as Judge

Conti - Cross - Brown

Kugler said.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What's the mismatch?

MS. BROWN: The mismatch is Dr. Conti has calculated damages at the point of sale. So that's the pharmacy, right?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MS. BROWN: Where somebody goes in, CVS, fills a prescription, that's the prices Dr. Conti has used. We can talk about whether that's pharmacy or prescriber, as the Court, I think, rightly identifies. It's probably a marginal difference. The problem here is the classes were certified based on where the TPP -- if the TPP paid in that state.

And so, Your Honor, that has nothing to do with where a prescription was filled. These TPPs pay in almost all instances through PBMs that could be located in completely different states.

And this really does tie, Your Honor, and I know the Court's already ruled on this, but is why the IQVIA data is unreliable. What would have been more reliable and what Dr. Conti had access to for the two Named Plaintiffs is the actual claims data from the TPPs. That would tell you actually where these payments were happening, what was actually paid.

The data she's relying on is aggregated data at the pharmacy at best. Maybe prescriber at worst. But what we know it's not is a calculation of where the TPP -- whether or not the TPP paid.

question?

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Conti - Cross - Brown

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why didn't you just use the actual claims data that she's referring to? Can you answer that

THE WITNESS: I don't -- it's not comprehensive. don't have it all. Whereas IQVIA has the entire U.S. national sales of all prescription drugs in the United States.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What would make it comprehensive? THE WITNESS: So, for example, there is no public dataset for all of Medicare claims at this point in time that I can look at. I would have to get that data. I don't have that data now, nor does Mr. Gibson.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How do you get the data?

MR. HONIK: Your Honor, if I may, this is a legal argument now. And there's a fundamental mistake I think that Ms. Brown made.

Judge Kugler -- so Ms. Brown started by saying I want to ask questions about "fit."

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Uh-huh.

MR. HONIK: And indeed in the decertification motion, because the Supreme Court ruled in Comcast that the damage model has to fit the claims. That's what Comcast is about. And they served an extensive brief on this issue.

And Judge Kugler wrote the following: "The Comcast situation is exactly what the parties do not have here." He determined that there is fit. Because the benefit of the

Conti - Cross - Brown

bargain is at the point of sale. Separately, in summary judgment, he reinforced that idea, in summary judgment. They challenged statute of limitations, and the Court again said, "The harm occurs at the point of sale."

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But the point of sale is the claims data, the actual claims data. Isn't that the point of sale?

MR. HONIK: Exactly.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But she didn't look at that.

MR. HONIK: No. No. She looked at, at the point where the pharmacy dispenses it, and that's what these damages are. And what the Court said after determining the fit is established as a matter of law is the Court was concerned that there might be double-dipping or under-awarding on the administration of the award itself and said there may need to be a translating mechanism to cross-reference. And the Court cited to an antitrust decision called RealPage. And that was a Fair Credit Reporting Act case where a class of would-be persons were injured reputationally by an improper credit reporting, and the data was anonymized except it was located elsewhere.

And so what the Court was pointing to is that in administering the damages in this case, not a matter for the jury, but when this case gets administered, when the damages need to be allocated fairly so as not to have, for example,

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Conti - Cross - Brown

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double-dipping, you have a prescription filled in New Jersey and the payor is in Pennsylvania, we don't want them taking from two buckets.

And so all the Court was saying is do what they did in RealPage, and look at the available data to cross-check. That's it. Fit has been established as a matter of law under Comcast.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know how fit can be established because the Daubert hearing is occurring today. And so to say that Judge Kugler, who did not hold a Daubert hearing which this Court is holding, must find the element of fit. So to stand before me and say that fit has been established, that's why we're here. So either I'm missing something or somebody -- I --

MR. HONIK: So I misspoke. It may not be But the Court wrote in its Decertification established. Opinion, in response to the very argument that Ms. Brown is espousing now, that the Comcast situation, which is the fit requirement, is exactly what the parties do not have here.

And so there's a conflation, that's all I'm trying to suggest, Your Honor, between 702 and the Comcast requirement of There is fit enough to go to a jury. What there may not be yet is a translating mechanism, to the extent one is needed, and we don't think it is required, to cross-check to make sure the allocation of entitlement of an award is properly

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1 allocated. But that has nothing to do with Dr. -- Professor 2 3 Conti's ability to say harm occurs at the point of sale. took the value of these prescription drugs when they were sold 4 at the pharmacy counter by looking at gold standard data, 5 6 period, the end. 7 MS. BROWN: May I approach with the actual Order and 8 just direct Your Honor to the language I'm referring to? 9 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 10 MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, for the record --11 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm starting to believe that we 12 need to start all over. 13 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I just turned to page 6. 14 That's the paragraph. 15 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And maybe we will. 16 MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, may I proceed? 17 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. 18 MS. BROWN: Okay. 19 (Pause.) 20 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know that this says what, 21 Mr. Honik, you say it says. 22 What's the point you're trying to make? 23 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I think the point is that the 24 translating mechanism that would make these damages fit the 25 facts of the case and make them useful to the jury, reliable

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Conti - Cross - Brown

1 and helpful and relevant, has not been accomplished here. 2 These are damages that were calculated, as Judge 3 Kugler points out, based on the point of sale. That is mismatched, to use the Court's term, with the way the classes 4 5 were certified, which is point of payment. 6 Dr. Conti, since the date of this decision, did not 7 disclose, nor, frankly, Your Honor, do I believe it's even 8 possible based on the data she used, a translating mechanism 9 that the Court said would be required to bridge this mismatch 10 such that her damages would fit the way the classes were 11 certified. 12 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: The class was certified by point 13 of payment? 14 MS. BROWN: Correct, Your Honor. And that's, if you look at page 6, what Judge Kugler says what is needed is what 15 the Third Circuit allows -- a translating mechanism that aligns 16 17 the missed match point of sale jurisdictions to the point of 18 payment locations. 19 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So if the class was certified by 20 point of payment, this witness has testified about the point of 21 sale. What am I to do with that? 22 MR. HONIK: Your Honor --23 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. 24 MR. HONIK: -- the class was certified on the basis

of point of sale, period, not the point of payment.

Conti - Cross - Brown

1	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Can someone help me resolve
2	that issue?
3	You folks have such a divergent view of what this
4	case is all about. It's quite remarkable.
5	Can I see what the class certified was?
6	MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I'm still waiting to see what
8	the causes of action are in this case.
9	I've never seen such a disconnect for a case as old
10	as it is.
11	MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, if I could approach,
12	what I have available here for the Court was what was on
13	Dr. Conti's reliance list, which was as of 2021, the proposed
14	classes, and it has that point of payment.
15	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, where is Judge Kugler's
16	Order certifying the class?
17	MS. BROWN: I'll have to get that for Your Honor. I
18	don't have it in my materials.
19	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Mr. Honik, do you have it?
20	Because if the class was certified as to the point of
21	payment and this witness is testifying about the point of sale,
22	their argument is very well taken.
23	MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, it was. And we need to
24	just have the ability to print it out. These were the
25	proposals that were then adopted. And the relevant language

Conti - Cross - Brown

1	is, it's these subclasses.
2	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: May I see it?
3	Are you representing that this was what was signed by
4	Judge Kugler?
5	MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. This was, I think,
6	proposed by the plaintiffs in 2021. And it's just this "paid
7	any money in the particular state" language that when the
8	ultimate classes were certified, the language remained.
9	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What do you want me to look at?
10	MS. BROWN: So, Your Honor, if you where I
11	underlined for each for our purposes of this discussion.
12	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I see it.
13	MS. BROWN: Okay.
14	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It says, "Paid any amount of money
15	in: Alaska."
16	MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
17	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Arizona, California. That to me
18	says point of payment.
19	MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, may I address?
20	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If you folks are not even agreeing
21	on what was certified, I think I may have to take another
22	break.
23	Go ahead.
24	MR. DAVIS: So I think Dr. Conti, Professor Conti
25	testified that the TPPs at the point of sale, at the pharmacy

pay.

Conti - Cross - Brown

with a credit card usually. The amount that the TPP is obliged to pay legally is set and determined at the point of sale.

There is — this is case law that goes back to the foundations of the —

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You might be right. But that's not how Judge Kugler certified the class. What am I to do with that?

MR. DAVIS: Well, the consideration, the promise to pay is the same thing as a payment. Our legal system has always recognized that. And so the TPPs have made a promise to pay at that pharmacy counter when that live adjudication happens. And that's the consideration, that's where they're bound to pay, and that's where they're effectively deemed to

And I think Judge Kugler in his Summary Judgment
Opinion, if you look at page 40 of it, he wrote -- and this is
with respect to the defendants' statute of limitations
argument -- he wrote that for TPP's economic loss claims for
breach of express warranty, tender of delivery occurs when the
TPP paid for or reimbursed their consumers' VCDs. This date
occurs when the consumer paid the pharmacy or dispensary for
the VCD script because at that time the dispenser will also
charge the TPP for its portion of the reimbursement, thus the
date of VCD script purchase serves as the trigger date for the

Conti - Cross - Brown

express warranty statute of limitations.

I think that's a recognition that at the point of sale, that obligation to pay, which is the same thing as a payment legally, and under our -- and I can cite to you 18th Century Supreme Court case law on this, the promise to pay is the same thing under our legal system.

And so the place of payment is the point of sale here, even if like some wire banking transfer --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You're saying they're one and the same?

MR. DAVIS: Yes. If -- and it's all -- I mean, think about it like a credit card.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But your witness just said something contrary. They can be different she said.

MR. DAVIS: Think about a credit card transaction, like the consumer goes and pays with a credit card, they later settle their bill a month later. It's a similar situation. I don't think anyone would say that the consumer who like, you know, in Ms. Brown's example traveled here from Philadelphia and then went home to Pennsylvania to pay their credit card bill, I don't think anyone would say that their cause of action arises in Pennsylvania. It's the same — the same situation here.

The TPP is incurring the financial obligation to pay at the pharmacy counter, and that's deemed to be where they

pharmacy counter.

Conti - Cross - Brown

1 paid. 2 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You're saying they're one and the 3 same? 4 MR. DAVIS: Yeah. Yes, Your Honor. Yes. 5 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, what do you do about a 6 witness who just said the contrary; that they are not 7 necessarily the same? Unless we're talking about something 8 different. 9 MR. DAVIS: Well, I think she might have been 10 referring to something different. 11 THE WITNESS: I think we were talking about something 12 different. 13 MR. DAVIS: Yeah. I think she might have been 14 referring to the situation where a consumer travels across 15 state lines and that the pharmacy -- the place of that the 16 doctor is writing the script might not be the same thing as the 17 same place as where the consumer -- I'll let you speak to that, 18 if I've got it wrong. THE WITNESS: No, that's exactly -- that's exactly 19 20 right. 21 So if I see a doctor in Philadelphia, he writes me a 22 script and then I fill that prescription in New Jersey, that 23 filling of that prescription is recorded in New Jersey, or it 24 might -- so, but -- and the payment occurs in New Jersey at the

Conti - Cross - Brown

1 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And what did you use, point of 2 payment? 3 THE WITNESS: I used point of payment -- no. I used 4 point of sale which generally is exactly the same thing as 5 point of payment. Why? Because when the pharmacy counter --6 when the patient is getting the prescription, the pharmacy 7 actually runs the patient's insurance. It tells the patient 8 exactly how much they have to pay at the pharmacy counter, and 9 it also sends a claim to the insurer for how much that payment 10 has to be made. It's at that point in time that the payor, the 11 TPP in this case, is obliged to pay. So that all gets 12 generated at the pharmacy counter at the time or at the place 13 where the purchase -- where the patient picked up their 14 prescription. 15 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And you looked at the point of 16 sale? 17 THE WITNESS: I looked at the point of sale, correct. 18 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, two points on that, if I 19 could. 20 21 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. But, Mr. Honik, you kept 22 saying "point of payment." 23 MR. HONIK: Your Honor, they're one and the same. 24 think you got it right. The class as certified refers to 25 payment, and the point we're trying to drive maybe inartfully,

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Conti - Cross - Brown

1 and I apologize, is that that occurs at the point of the sale. 2 That coincides with payment. 3 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. MR. HONIK: They're not different. 4 5 What the Judge, I think, acknowledged, because he 6 said there's fit. Comcast -- he said Comcast doesn't apply 7 here. What he did acknowledge is that we don't want to see, in terms of allocation of an award, any mismatch there or 8 9 double-dipping. That's really what the Court was interested 10 in. And that's strictly an administrative function on the back 11 end. 12 It's not for this jury to determine whether it should 13 come from this bucket or that bucket. That's what RealPage was 14 about. And that's all I meant to convey is that it's -- I 15 think it's settled in terms of Comcast that there is 16 constitutional fit, and there's no -- there is nothing that 17 undermines the Rule 23 finding. 18 And our position is that POP and POS are the same in 19 this case, and that's what IQVIA gives us.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, I would respectfully disagree and point the Court to the February 26, '24 Decertification Order that the Court has at page 6, because Judge Kugler made a finding that they are different. That is the law of this case. His finding is that there is a mismatch

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Conti - Cross - Brown

1 between damages based on IQVIA at the point of sale and the TPP 2 point of payment. 3 The choice of law decision, Your Honor, was that the TPP's home state's law would apply. The classes were 4 5 certified, and I now, Your Honor, have the case management --6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So go ahead and -- go ahead 7 and conduct your cross-examination on IQVIA. 8 MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. 9 And as it relates to Dr. Conti, I am pretty much 10 done. I'll just wrap up with two questions. 11 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I'm going to permit you. 12 don't know that it goes to the weight of the evidence. You may 13 have a valid point that it's not a -- it's a 702 problem, so 14 I'll hear you. 15 MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. I appreciate it. Thank 16 you very much. 17 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 18 BY MS. BROWN: 19 And, Dr. Conti, you have not disclosed in any of your four reports that counsel went through with you this morning a 20 21 translating mechanism that would allow you to translate the 22 damages that you calculated at the point of sale to the TPP 23 point of payment as contemplated by Judge Kugler in his Order

> United States District Court District of New Jersey

So this issue was just raised with me approximately two

identifying those two things as different?

BY MS. BROWN:

Conti - Cross - Brown

1 weeks ago. And in my view, again, the U.S. pharmaceutical system is completely closed. So it is possible or it is 2 3 possible to ascertain the location of payment and location of service. In my view, they are generally one and the same, and 4 that's because when patients go to the pharmacy counter, they 5 6 are -- the claim is being generated. That patient can't walk 7 out of the pharmacy without the pharmacy saying how much the 8 patient has to pay and how much the payor has to pay. So that 9 obligation exists and that happens at the point of sale. 10 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But can you answer her question? 11 THE WITNESS: I did. 12 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So you didn't do that analysis? 13 THE WITNESS: I was -- this issue was raised to me two weeks ago. And, again, in my view, the point of sale and 14 15 point of payment are the same. And that's because the 16 obligation to pay for the payor and for the patient occurs at 17 the point of sale. 18 Now, this is an industry that is completely awash in So there can be claims, individual claims that could 19 data. determine the overlap. But I have not been asked to do that at 20 21 this time, and nor do I have the data to do that at this time. 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 23 MS. BROWN: May I follow up on that, Your Honor? 24 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

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Conti - Cross - Brown

Ο. When you say you don't have the data to do that, what data are you referring to, Professor?

So, again, this is a closed system, and so from the time Α. the prescription or the drug leaves the manufacturer's warehouse all the way to the time the pharmacy dispenses the product, there are checks, there are checks that determine where that product goes. And therefore, exactly when it leaves the warehouse and exactly when it is delivered at the pharmacy counter is knowable. I don't have that data, but it is knowable.

Similarly, exactly when the patient pays and where the patient pays and exactly when the payor faces the obligation to pay is knowable. That is what is in the IQVIA data. That is what is available in claims data as well.

- And in terms of the claims data you're referring to, that would come from the TPP itself, correct?
- Well, again, I have aggregated all sales of all products in the United States for the at-issue products. That's what the IQVIA data summarizes for us.

Could you in another version look at claims to ascertain how much the -- I mean, it's kind of tautological in some way because the time of when the patient is dispensed the product and walks out of the store, we already know what the patient had to pay and what the TPP is obligated to pay.

And in terms of -- I thought I heard you earlier, Q.

Conti - Cross - Brown

- 1 Professor, and maybe you just misspoke, say that in the
- 2 Blue Cross Blue Shield case you used Xponent IQVIA data like
- 3 | the one you were talking about here. Do you recall that
- 4 testimony this morning?
- $5 \mid A$. I recall it, yes.
- 6 Q. Yeah. But actually your expert report from the Blue Cross
- 7 | Blue Shield case discloses that you used claims data from the
- 8 | plaintiffs in that case, right?
- 9 A. In another part of the case, yes, I did that.
- 10 Q. Right.
- 11 A. So I calculated damages using Xponent data, and I also
- 12 | calculated damages using claims. That was done later on.
- 13 Q. And in terms of claims data in this case, you only had
- 14 | claims data for Emblem and SummaCare, correct?
- 15 A. I don't know. I don't recall.
- 16 Q. You don't remember how many TPPs you had claims data for?
- 17 A. I don't recall off the top of my head, no.
- 18 Q. All right. You did not do a class-wide economic damages
- 19 | estimate based on TPP claims data, correct?
- 20 A. Well, I calculated pharmacy claims as one and the same.
- 21 | So the pharmacy is generating -- the point is, is that the
- 22 | pharmacy is generating the claim which is then being
- 23 | transmitted to the TPP. So it's actually, again, the claim is
- 24 | being generated at the point of sale. So I had nine defendant
- 25 | retailer pharmacy data which I calculated damages for.

Conti - Cross - Brown

1 Q. Right. And when you did that, the number you got was 2 3 approximately 1 billion, with a B, dollars less than the number you got when you calculated using the IQVIA data, correct? 4 5 But, again, that's because the nine retailer pharmacies 6 are a small subsample and a biased subsample of the entirety of 7 the sales of these products into the U.S. market during the 8 class period. And just to answer my question, though, so we can wrap up, 9 when you did that calculation with the pharmacy data you just 10 11 referred to, the number you got was a billion dollars less than 12 the number you got when you used the IQVIA data? 13 Correct. And that's because the prices in the pharmacy Α. 14 claims are biased towards lower priced pharmacies, largely mail order pharmacies. It also doesn't -- it's not comprehensive. 15 There are many pharmacies that paid -- that charge much higher 16 17 prices for these products that are not in the pharmacy claims. 18 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I have no further questions for Dr. Conti. 19 I think it's a legal issue that if the Court would 20 21 allow us to further discuss, I'd be happy to. 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I want to hear argument on 23 it. 24 Any other questions?

MR. HONIK: Briefly, Your Honor, if I may.

Conti - Redirect - Honik

1 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 3 BY MR. HONIK: Professor Conti, you heard or I think it was part of a 4 5 question the definition of the class as certified. Do you 6 remember that discussion earlier? 7 Α. Yes. 8 And I'm looking at the language here which says, "Paid any Ο. 9 amount of money. Paid any amount of money." 10 From an economic standpoint, do you have an opinion that you can express with reasonable economic certainty what in 11 12 economic terms in this supply chain of generic drugs, where and 13 when does payment of any money occur? At the pharmacy counter, at the point of sale. 14 15 And is that for the various reasons that you've described 16 where the consumer parts with his or her money or puts a credit 17 card down and where the affirmative nondelegable, nonnegotiable 18 obligation to pay arises on behalf of the insurers? 19 Α. Correct. 20 Is a patient permitted to walk away with their valsartan 21 given to them by the pharmacist without assurance that payment 22 and the obligation to pay is complete? 23 Correct. What the issues are in this case are Α. 24 prescriptions that were insured by an insurer. A patient comes

into a pharmacy to get a drug, they are going to show their

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Conti - Redirect - Honik

1 insurance card. It's the insurance card that generates the 2 claim that the pharmacy creates. That claim is going to detail 3 what the patient has to pay and what the payor has to pay. That is the source or that is the location of the obligation. 4 5 This Court wrote in its Summary Judgment Opinion the Q. following, and I want to ask you from an economic standpoint if 6 7 you agree with this. 8 "For TPP's economic loss claims of breach of express 9 warranty, tender of delivery occurs when the TPP paid for or 10 reimbursed their consumers' VCDs." 11 Agree or disagree? 12 Α. I agree. 13 Do you agree that that date occurs when the consumer paid Q. the pharmacy or dispensary for the VCD script because at that 14 15 time the dispenser will also charge the TPP for its portion of 16 the reimbursement? 17 Do you agree or disagree? 18 Α. I agree. 19 Do you agree with the statement that the date of VCD 20 script purchase serves as the trigger date for express warranty 21 statute of limitations, that is, when the harm arises and the 22 clock runs on the claim? Do you agree with that? 23 I do. Α. And is that in every instance because the point of sale 24

coincides economically with the point of payment?

1 Α. Correct. The point of sale is when the obligation is 2 made. 3 And did you rely on data that revealed to you from an Ο. economist standpoint the values at both the point of sale and 4 5 the point of payment applying the definitions you just gave us? 6 Α. Yes. 7 MR. HONIK: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. You can step down. 9 you. 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: All right. Let me hear argument. 12 (Witness left the stand.) 13 MS. BROWN: May I proceed, Your Honor, or should I 14 wait a second? 15 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes. Go ahead. 16 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I'll be brief. We spoke 17 earlier today, of course, about Rule 702 and how the advisory 18 committee has now reinforced what this Court and other courts 19 have always already known, which is that you, Your Honor, are 20 the gatekeeper, and it is the Court's responsibility to

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22 of an expert's methodology. And the advisory committee made

determine the sufficiency of an expert's basis and application

23 clear, as this Court knows, those are not questions of weight.

Those are questions of admissibility.

And in fact, the advisory committee noted that the

reason they were highlighting and underlining and making clear of this gate-keeping responsibility is because issues like that were going to the jury under a misinterpretation of 702 that these were issues of weight, and the advisory committee made clear with the amendment to 702 that these are issues of admissibility, as this Court knows.

And so, Your Honor, the issues that we briefed and that I want to briefly discuss here today are issues of reliability and issues of fit.

I'll start with fit, which is where we left off.

Professor Conti's class-wide calculations simply do not fit the way these classes were certified. And we just heard it, Your Honor, from the witness stand. Dr. Conti has calculated these state damages at a point of sale. And she explained in her own testimony, that's where the consumer makes a payment and the TPP gets a charge or gets an obligation. That's critical, Your Honor, because the classes were not certified by the state in which a TPP became obligated to pay a claim or the state in which a TPP was charged to ultimately pay a claim. That's not how these classes were certified.

The classes were certified by the state in which a TPP paid any amount of money. And that is simply not the basis of these state-specific damages by this witness's own testimony and, frankly, by the data that is available from IQVIA.

The Court in the 2024 decertification memorandum

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makes clear that this is a problem for which plaintiffs had to disclose a solution so that this damages model could survive 702 and Daubert. And they simply didn't, Your Honor. Court said there's a mismatch. We have point of sale damages calculations and we have classes that are certified based on point of payment, and the Court said it's okay, because what plaintiffs could do is come back to us and give us -- he called it a computer subroutine, a formula, something to translate damages from where she's calculated them to where the classes were certified. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, how do I get around her testimony that they're one and of the same, except for maybe in a few instances? MS. BROWN: Well, Your Honor, the Court found they're I mean, the Court has simply found these are two different -- this is the law. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, let's assume I agree with But that was before the Court had the benefit of the you. testimony. When you say point of sale and you say point of payment in a vacuum, they sound different. MS. BROWN: Sure. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But I now have a witness who will opine that for the most part, and I don't know what that is, but for the most part they are one and the same. A jury is

1 entitled to weigh that. MS. BROWN: Well, two issues, if I could respond, 2 3 Your Honor. One, I think what Professor Conti is talking about is the point of the prescription, the state of the prescription 4 5 and the state of the fill is often one and the same. And 6 that's why she said she was actually talking about a different 7 issue. 8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But that's the point of sale. 9 MS. BROWN: That is the point of sale. But that's 10 entirely different from where a TPP pays. 11 So the testimony and the facts and the truth are that 12 almost all of these TPPs pay money through a PBM, a pharmacy 13 benefit manager. 14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Do you have evidence that you're 15 going to introduce to dispute that? 16 MS. BROWN: Oh, 100 percent, Your Honor. 17 you'll hear from Mr. Gibson who will explain to you how these 18 payments actually get made here. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Who will dispute that the point of 19 sale and the point of payment are different? 20 21 MS. BROWN: Yes, 100 percent, Your Honor. 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 23 MS. BROWN: And I would suggest why it's not an issue of weight is because the Judge knew that. This opinion --24 25 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I think that you're giving

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Judge Kugler -- I think you're being somewhat unfair to Judge
Kugler in the following sense: He didn't have the benefit of
the testimony that I am hearing now. As I said, just generally
speaking, when someone says "point of sale" and someone says
"point of payment," they sound entirely different. But when
you have an expert testify that they usually are one and the
same, then perhaps had Judge Kugler had the benefit of that
testimony, he would not have ruled the way he had.
                                                    I mean,
this was in the context of what? Certification?
         MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, okay. But we're past that
now.
         MS. BROWN: Well, I would submit two things, Your
Honor. First of all --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And you're not prejudiced because
you're going to introduce a witness that says, yeah, they're
not one and the same, and the damages calculations are
incorrect.
         MS. BROWN: But here's why I think it's a 702 issue,
Your Honor, is she's not disclosed on that, right?
disclosed on these state-specific damages that unquestionably
she admits to this Court and in her report are coming from the
pharmacy counter, right? This is the place where these are
created.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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MS. BROWN: And unquestionably, that's not how the TPPs pay, and that's not how the TPPs were certified. So whether she's now going to say, well, I think it's the same or not, that's a gatekeeping issue. Based on what? Based on what analysis that was disclosed to this Court? Nothing. Based on what scientific support, based on what data in IQVIA? That's the reliability issue. And that's the fit issue, is that if she now having learned about this issue two weeks ago now says, oh, it's not a problem because, you know, I in my head think it's the same, she has to have disclosed that opinion and she has to be able to support it.

What she disclosed was a point of sale opinion for which there was no translating mechanism that was disclosed, no scientific evidence to support it.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But she's saying today that in the industry point of sale is usually or whatever word she used the point of payment.

MS. BROWN: But --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that's where the TPPs, you know, you can look at the point of sale, you can look at the point of payment. They're one and the same. Are there instances where they're not? Sure. But for the most part, in the industry, this is what I rely upon and this is how it's calculated.

MS. BROWN: Well, Your Honor, again, I think that was

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     her testimony as to prescriber and pharmacy.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.
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               MS. BROWN: Which is wholly different from where the
     TPP pays, right? The mismatch is point of sale --
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 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What was her testimony about where
 6
     the TPP pays?
 7
               MS. BROWN: There is data that would allow you to
 8
     know that and I only learned about this issue two weeks ago and
 9
     mine is point of sale. That's her testimony, Your Honor.
10
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Was that her testimony?
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               MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, where she said
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     it's one and the same --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Is she still here?
14
               Could you come back up and let me ask that question.
15
     I didn't understand that that way.
16
               (Witness resumed the stand.)
17
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Could you tell me what your
18
     testimony is as to in your expert opinion where it is that the
19
     TPP is paid?
20
               THE WITNESS: The obligation to pay for both patient
21
     and the payor is at the point of sale. They are one and the
22
     same.
23
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I thought that's what she said.
               MS. BROWN: But, Your Honor, she just said the
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25
     obligation. We're not -- the class is not the obligation. The
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Conti - Further Exam - Brown

1 class is payment. 2 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Do you see a distinction between 3 the obligation to pay and where it was paid? 4 THE WITNESS: I do not. 5 MS. BROWN: May I follow up on that, Your Honor? 6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Sure. 7 FURTHER EXAMINATION 8 BY MS. BROWN: 9 In terms of -- you have assumed for purposes of your calculation that where a TPP is charged or is obligated to pay 10 11 is where a TPP pays, correct? 12 Again, patients can't walk out of a pharmacy without 13 payment being assessed. That is what the claims generation is in this market. 14 So a patient is told how much they're going to pay 15 16 and the plan is told how much they are going to pay. The plan 17 is obligated to pay that amount. 18 0. I understand the obligation. 19 In terms of the payment, like how and when and by what method money transpires, that's not part of your analysis? 20 21 Of course it is. Α. 22 Your analysis is where the obligation arises, correct? 23 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Which is the same -- she said and 24 where the obligation arises is where the claim was paid.

mean, that's what she said. I mean, your expert will dispute

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     that, but that's what she said.
               MS. BROWN: I understand, Your Honor. But I would
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     suggest to the Court that's not the class. The class is not
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     obligation. It's payment.
 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. But they're one and the
 6
     same, in her testimony. You may not agree with it.
 7
               MS. BROWN: I understand, Your Honor. I understand.
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
 9
               MS. BROWN: And --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Go ahead, anything else for the
11
     witness?
12
               MS. BROWN: Nothing else for this witness, Your
13
     Honor.
14
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You can step down.
15
               THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16
               (Witness left the stand.)
17
               MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, I would continue to
18
     suggest, Your Honor, is that there is not a scientific basis
19
     for that. She didn't review any claims data aside from two of
     the TPPs that would permit an evaluation of where and through
20
21
     whom and, importantly, in what state that payment occurs.
22
               So on this issue, Your Honor, on this mismatch/fit
23
     issue, I do not believe this opinion could possibly survive 702
24
     or, frankly, reliability for that point, because the question
25
     is going to go to the jury on a state-by-state basis.
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And if the state-by-state numbers that they are given are not appropriate to a liability question, then that's not helpful. That's not relevant to the jury, and it doesn't fit the theory of liability.

And so, Your Honor, respectfully on that score, these state-specific damages do not survive 702 or Daubert. And we have moved in the papers, as Your Honor will see, on this very issue. And I would submit to the Court, and I know the Court's reviewed them, there was no response.

On this state mismatch issue, I think there was one sentence in the opposition at the very end. So there has been a striking silence on the other side of the aisle on this issue that I believe is dispositive.

Briefly, Your Honor, the other issues we raised in our briefing are issues of reliability, particularly as it relates to the IQVIA data, and I know the Court has ruled so I'll just make a record very quickly.

Dr. Conti did two different calculations. One based on the IQVIA data, and she arrived at a damage number of approximately 1.3 billion. And then she did one based on the available pharmacy data which is actual transaction data, and she arrived at a number of approximately 300 million. There's a billion dollar disconnect, Your Honor.

IQVIA itself, and we cited it in our papers, cautions people who buy their data not to rely on it in a legal

proceeding to establish any fact or any evidence.

IQVIA in correspondence says one of the reasons we do that is because our data is based on surveys and estimates, and pharmacies often when they're answering the survey, they tell us the list price, you know, the rack rate as opposed to the amounts they actually collect. And so IQVIA themselves says we tell everyone who uses our data to use that data with caution. There's a whole list, and we cited it, Your Honor, in the briefing of statements by IQVIA itself that this data is not reliable for the purposes which she used it.

And so, Your Honor, for that reason I don't believe it's an issue of weight. We -- the Court as gatekeeper is deciding -- has to decide before this gets to a jury that this was reliably applied, and the source of this data says don't use it for this purpose.

You'll hear, Your Honor, from Mr. Gibson who actually took the claims data from the two TPPs for which we have information and compared it to IQVIA to see, like, let's double-check this. Can we repeat this? Can this, you know, is this reliable? And you'll hear that it unsurprisingly resulted in numbers from IQVIA that were 60 or 70 percent higher than the actual number from the TPP plaintiffs.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why didn't you cross her on that?

MS. BROWN: Well, I -- I should have, I guess, Your

Honor. I understood the Court to have already ruled on that

1 this was --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. 2 I said I was changing my mind 3 and you could go forward. MS. BROWN: I apologize, Your Honor. 4 5 Then you'll hear from Mr. Gibson on this, Your Honor. 6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: When? 7 MS. BROWN: I think he's scheduled to testify next --8 MR. OSTFELD: Next Tuesday, Your Honor. 9 MS. BROWN: And that's a check, right, Your Honor? I 10 mean, that's a way you could check, hey, I got the claims data 11 from the pharmacy and it's a billion dollars less, what could I 12 possibly -- you know, let me check this out. There's a way 13 that could have been done. Dr. Conti didn't do that, and I 14 think it further establishes that when IQVIA says don't use 1.5 this data for direct evidence in a legal proceeding, we know 16 Because when we look at the actual data, we see that it 17 is unsurprisingly overinflated. 18 And, Your Honor, we heard extensive testimony earlier 19 in the day on Dr. Conti's worthlessness opinion, and I'm going 20 to leave that record where it is, and --21 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I have a question on that. 22 But let me ask your adversary the question. 23 MS. BROWN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 24 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: On what basis does she rely -- I 25 really wasn't following the testimony. What is the basis by

1 which she can opine that the drugs were worthless? 2 MR. HONIK: Your Honor --3 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: She can assume that they were worthless and do her calculation. 4 5 MR. HONIK: Respectfully, Your Honor, I --6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How can she opine that they were 7 worthless? That's a jury question. 8 MR. HONIK: I agree it's a jury question. 9 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. 10 MR. HONIK: And I believe that the jury has to 11 evaluate the foundation for Professor Conti's opinion that they 12 were worthless. And she didn't assume it in the least, Your 13 She built it on a foundation based on two things: Honor. 14 Economic principle, her years of experience, and FDA 1.5 regulations. 16 The syllogism goes like this. And it was recognized 17 by Judge Kugler in his Class Cert Opinion in which is he 18 endorsed her methodology of getting to zero. The syllogism 19 goes like this. No one disputes that a drug which is 20 adulterated cannot be sold lawfully in the United States. 21 The economic implication of being unable to sell a 22 drug in the marketplace from an economist standpoint is that it 23 cannot be assigned a nonzero value, has zero value, merely because it can't be sold because it's adulterated. 24 And it's

adulterated and prescribed from being sold by law in the United

States.

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Any economist will tell you that if something is illegal to sell, it is ascribed a zero value. That's how Professor Conti got to zero, as --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But she cannot opine -- she cannot opine that these drugs were worthless from day one. That is a jury question. If there were a recall on day one and they were prohibited from being sold, she can. But from day one, she cannot make that opinion, because that is a jury question.

MR. HONIK: I --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And because it crosses over into your warranty claims. Your warranty claims are, they had no value. The defendants' response is they had some value. So how can an economist who's looking strictly at damages where there's been no recall and no finding of adulteration, because that's what the jury's got to do, how can Professor Conti make that opinion? That's for a jury to decide.

MR. HONIK: I -- I agree with the latter statement. The jury has to -- in order for all of our damages to be assessed in our favor --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

MR. HONIK: -- a jury would have to conclude that the defendants' drugs were adulterated as of 1/1/2012.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Fine.

MR. HONIK: And we will demonstrate that. What --

1	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But she can't say that.
2	MR. HONIK: I agree.
3	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
4	MR. HONIK: I agree. And so if she assumed and she
5	was asked to assume that they were in fact adulterated, what
6	are the damages that flow from that. That's what she did. She
7	didn't assume zero value. She assumed adulteration, and
8	there's a difference.
9	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. But you're trying to
10	back-door in the jury's job.
11	She can't testify that they were adulterated and
12	therefore they had no value. She can testify that they were
13	adulterated and I assumed for purposes of my analysis that they
14	had no value.
15	A jury can determine that they were adulterated but
16	nonetheless had a value.
17	MR. HONIK: I don't know how the jury can do the
18	latter, Your Honor, because
19	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't either.
20	MR. HONIK: Because
21	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: This is where I was this morning.
22	I don't know how a jury determines, but then I'm told that
23	there are experts that will testify to it.
24	I do not know how the parties are going to present a
25	case to the jury that on what evidence can a jury find that

I think everyone continues to ignore is that for many years these drugs were sold. For many years they served their therapeutic -- I'm saying just generally speaking. I'm not taking either side. I'm just saying this is the arguments. For many years they had a therapeutic value. There then came a recall. They could not be sold. Clearly they had no value once they could no longer be sold.

But up until that point, what value did that drug have? Putting aside whether or not the defendants mislead, fraudulently induced, et cetera, whatever the fraud claim is, putting that all aside. But there has to be some measure by

because it saved lives, et cetera. Then we get into, this is where the big dispute between the parties is, but then aren't

which a jury can say, yes, there was some value to these drugs

we really getting into the issue of causation? Shouldn't we,

the defendants, be permitted to say these drugs were totally

18 | fine, they don't cause cancer?

And this Court has resisted going there because it was satisfied that that issue could be avoided in this upcoming trial, and now I sit before you all and say I'm not so sure about that.

MR. HONIK: Your Honor, the defendants who put a carcinogen in the drug for years and years and infected it into the U.S. drug supply cannot go scot-free. Let me start there.

1	There has to
2	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I think we all agree on that.
3	MR. HONIK: And so therefore the law imposes a
4	consequence. And we have asserted the consequence sounds in
5	breach of warranty
6	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.
7	MR. HONIK: based on benefit of the bargain.
8	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
9	MR. HONIK: It is black letter law that the delta or
10	difference between the value of the drug at the moment you
11	acquired it or paid for it and its actual value are your
12	damages.
13	In that way, coupled with the FDA's absolutely
14	profound interest in protecting our drug supply, it's not a
15	small thing that there was a carcinogen in there. We have
16	charts that show zero sales the minute the minute that the
17	adulteration was revealed.
18	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. Of course.
19	MR. HONIK: And that's the way it should have been
20	from the beginning.
21	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
22	MR. HONIK: And what it falls to us to prove to this
23	jury is that that was known or knowable going all the way back
24	to 2012.
25	Remember, this was a process change. ZHP was making

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uncontaminated valsartan before this all happened.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I am not disagreeing with anything you're saying thus far.

If the proofs are that the plaintiffs will stand before the jury and they will prove that the defendants knew from day one or day 30 or whatever day that they were putting carcinogens in, in a drug, okay, that is the element of scienter, that's the element of fraud, and the plaintiffs have every right to pursue those damages, right?

But I think where we keep going back and forth is, it seems to me that the plaintiffs are presenting to the Court a cause of action that I -- I can't -- it's this -- it's the plaintiffs' theory, and the cause of action I can't -- I can't put a round peg in a square hole kind of a concept. Because the plaintiffs wanted to present a case that says that because they were adulterated from day one, ipsi dixit, they were worthless. What is that cause of action? It can't be the common law fraud one, because that has a scienter element into it. It can't be the breach of warranty because that has -they are entitled -- they, the defendants, are entitled to say, no, they weren't worthless. They had value. What is that cause of action that says on day one because they were adulterated they had zero value and we're entitled to damages from day one moving forward? What is that cause of action? Because that sounds like it's strict liability to me, and

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     that's the problem I'm having.
               What is that cause of action?
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               MR. HONIK: Your Honor, the question is this:
     January 2, 2012, when a patient hoping to control their blood
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     pressure walked into a New Jersey pharmacy and bought valsartan
     which we'll show had a carcinogen in it, what is that patient
 6
 7
     entitled to? And I don't say that rhetorically.
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               The answer is abundantly clear in the law, in
     every -- in all 50 states. They are entitled to the benefit of
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10
     their bargain, which is measured between the value that they
11
     got and the value that they should have gotten.
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               Now --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so to --
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               MR. HONIK: -- presumably --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so --
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               MR. HONIK: And you have yet to hear this.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, hang on a second.
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               MR. HONIK: The defendants --
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And so they, the defendants, are
20
     presented with just because the plaintiffs say that there was a
21
     carcinogen in it does not mean per se that it had no value.
22
     They are entitled to say, yes, it had nitrosamine in it, but it
23
     didn't affect the therapeutic value. It didn't cause, and
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     here's that word "cause," it didn't cause injury, et cetera.
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     That's the problem.
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               MR. HONIK: And we say no.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. On what theory?
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               MR. SLATER: Can I --
               MR. HONIK: Because under the United States Code, the
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     sale of that drug on January 2, 2012 should not have occurred.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Agreed.
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               MR. HONIK: Must not have occurred.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What's the cause of action? Don't
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     quote the U.S. code to me, and don't quote the CFRs to me.
10
     What's the cause of action?
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               MR. HONIK: Breach of express warranty.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Not every CFR, not every U.S. code
13
     creates a private cause of action.
14
               MR. HONIK:
                           I agree.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MR. HONIK: It's a breach of express warranty, which
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     has been certified. It's also a fraud, and it's also a
18
     violation of the Consumer Protection Law, in that -- in that
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     when that patient got the label and it said valsartan, it was
20
     by design not permitted to contain a nitrosamine in it, which
21
     is a highly genotoxic carcinogen. And that creates a warranty
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     which in terms of the TPPs, this Court, Judge Kugler has
23
     determined has been established. That warranty was there.
24
     we say that we're going to demonstrate that it was breached;
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     that there are a set of incredible regulations in this country
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     to protect all of us from these drugs reaching the marketplace.
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     And the consequence of those drugs coming in is that that
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     individual is entitled to his or her money back.
                                                       That is the
 4
     bottom line. That is black letter law of warranty law.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Fine.
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               MR. HONIK: The bargain wasn't made.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Fine. You're going to present
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     your case that it was breached because it had -- for whatever
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     theory it is, it had nitrosamine in it. They're going to
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     present their case that said, no, it did not. You're going to
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     then say here's our damages. We get zero.
                                                 They're going to
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     say, no, because you got the benefit of the bargain, it was a
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     health -- it was a blood pressure medicine that worked.
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     that will be for what the jury will decide.
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               MR. HONIK: Well, respectfully, I think --
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Ruben, may I?
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Mr. Slater, you've been patient.
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               MR. SLATER: For the first time in my life.
19
     you.
20
               I want to give a little bit of context and hopefully
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     help to deconstruct this. I'm not going to take a long time.
22
               Hai Wang is a 30(b)(6) corporate representative for
23
     ZHP and the U.S. representatives, the U.S. subsidiaries.
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     testified that every single person who paid for the drugs did
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     so based on a warranty that the drugs were AB rated and USP
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     compliant. That was the warranty that was provided to anyone
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     who bought them.
                       That's his testimony. That's already been
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     locked down.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            So I wanted to give that to Your Honor
 6
     just to give you context of what the actual testimony will be.
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               That warranty was not correct.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's right.
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               MR. SLATER: Because the drugs from day one that are
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     at issue in this case were not AB rated and were not USP
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     compliant, because AB rated means therapeutically equivalent,
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     which means has the same quality and purity, and it did not.
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               The warranty claim has no scienter or knowledge
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     element.
               We obviously talked about that earlier today. And
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     I'm hoping that as we go through this, I know it's a lot, that
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     the cGMP element of it, we thought we should, one, essentially
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     should win on essentially a strict liability basis. Judge
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     Kugler and Your Honor have disagreed and said, no, we're going
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     to let the defense argue, well, it wasn't adulterated.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
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               MR. SLATER: At least at this point. And that's
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     fine. We understand the ruling.
23
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right.
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               MR. SLATER: And they're going to argue whatever they
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     can argue, but that's --
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. I think they're saying the
same thing.
            They're representing that it's therapeutically
equivalent and that the drug does what it was supposed to do.
You're saying, no, it didn't. They're saying, yes, they did.
         MR. SLATER: Well, they're saying they want --
they're -- I guess in general they're taking the position
they're not liable. But unfortunately their witnesses under
oath who represented the company said we could never have sold
it ever with this in it --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
         MR. SLATER: -- and we never would have. And the day
we found out we stopped selling it.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
         MR. SLATER: So I don't think there's going to be an
argument that they actually say, you know, it was fine to sell
it all along.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. But I think that the parties
keep conflating there is a distinction, a material distinction
between saying we could never have sold it versus it was
therapeutically effective. And I think that everyone keeps
conflating those two -- those two arguments.
         MR. SLATER: Yes.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And you can't.
         MR. SLATER:
                      Right.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It's adulterated. Once it's
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adulterated, it cannot be sold. No one knew that it was adulterated until well many years later.

It does not mean that because it's adulterated it's

not therapeutically effective, and that's the defense they want to put on. And that's the defense that they can put on.

MR. SLATER: Understood.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Getting back to Professor Conti's testimony, I don't find that she's competent to say that just because a drug is adulterated it is worthless. That is for a jury to decide.

She's competent to say that once it's rendered adulterated by the FDA, everyone agrees no one should be selling the drug unless the FDA, as it did in this case, gave permission for a little while. But I don't know how she is competent to testify that the drug is worthless once it's adulterated. That is a jury question. So I'm not going to permit that part of the testimony.

MR. SLATER: Can I?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm going to reserve on the IQVIA analysis until I hear from Gibson.

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I did not want to interrupt you.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

MR. SLATER: I was going to get to what you just talked about. If I could just talk to you about it.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: Dr. Conti, this whole discussion that started with her cross I think has confused a tremendous amount of this argument today, where she was asked about the place where the prescription occurred versus where someone went to the pharmacy, which --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't think that's relevant.

MR. SLATER: It doesn't. It has nothing to do with the case, but I think it confused a lot of the discussion.

She's testifying, and I think she really is fully competent and qualified to say under the regulations in this country, if a product is adulterated, there is no legal right to sell it.

We asked for a finding as a matter of summary judgment that because the pills were the same from day one till the end, if they were adulterated at the end, they were adulterated on day one. It's just that the FDA didn't know until the end. Saying that her finding can only go forward from the point of the recall is really not helpful because that's when everyone found out and they stopped selling it.

But the factual reason why it was adulterated existed on day one. Lack of a competent risk assessment. I'm paraphrasing the entire cGMP findings. But that's really going to be the core thing. They didn't do the right risk assessment, and it didn't comply with the USP.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: So those are the reasons it's adulterated. So her opinion is not — she's not going to give the opinion it was adulterated. But she absolutely can say if it was adulterated, and she assumes it was, then it had no value because you're not legally allowed to sell an adulterated drug.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No.

MR. SLATER: And the defense --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh, well, she can say that. She can say that you're not legally entitled to sell adulterated drugs. No one's going to dispute that.

MR. SLATER: And --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But in this case, she can't say that from day one, because we have to focus on the facts of this case, she can't say that from day one these drugs had no value. They can come forward and say that they did have a value.

MR. SLATER: Ah. And the way the trial is constructed, they can say -- Your Honor is going to allow them to say there was value. And the flip side is she can say there is no value and the jury decides what the value is. So the expert, Dr. Conti, can say, in my opinion, just like if it was a personal injury case where there's economic numbers going on the board and says this person got hurt and has a million

1.5

dollars of future medical care needed and puts that on the board and the defense says, well, no, the numbers should be \$50,000, that's all the person needs, and the jury decides what's the final number.

Here, Dr. Conti says the value was zero. The defense wants to say there was a value, and we have the issue -- you held an opinion earlier -- and then the jury decides what the value was. But certainly the experts can give opinions on what the value was, and the jury then makes the ultimate finding. This is not usurping the jury. This is giving valid, reliable opinion from Dr. Conti that there was no value. The jury can accept that or not accept it. They can accept or not accept the defense testimony, but there's an absolute right for the economic expert to give that opinion on what the value was, whether it's no value or the value was 2 cents or --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But I just think it distorts the record, the facts, the facts that the jury is going to hear.

No one in this courtroom will dispute that adulterated drugs declared adulterated by the FDA have no value because you can't sell them. No one can dispute that. But there have been many cases where adulterated drugs unknowingly have been on the market and have had value.

So on what basis can Professor Conti say that adulterated, generally speaking, adulterated drugs have no value?

MR. SLATER: Well, she's going to speak to -- she can give that general opinion, but in this courtroom she would give the opinion -- she's going to talk about the valsartan drugs under these circumstances, and she can testify certainly to that, these drugs, I'm assuming, were adulterated from day one would meet the definition of adulteration, because that's what we're left to argue, because otherwise we would have won summary judgment. If the finding of adulteration, Your Honor said look --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: She can testify that on day one if these drugs were adulterated and had the FDA known, et cetera, et cetera, they would be rendered zero, she can say that.

MR. SLATER: Okay. And I understand.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But there's a lot of ifs in there. But she cannot say that just because they were adulterated means they had no value. Because unless the testimony comes in differently, my understanding of the record thus far is the reason a drug automatically has zero value is the FDA says there's a recall, because I think indisputably there's no sales. Parties can't sell the drug. That's it.

But up until that time, and that's when I asked the witness, I said up until that point in time, is there an economic value, and she said yeah. I mean, I was very clear in my question to her, which proves my point; that adulterated drugs have a value up until the point when the FDA says you can

no longer sell them legally, or you can no longer sell them.

Because legally, because we're conflating two issues. Of

course a company can't sell an adulterated drug. But it's not

deemed adulterated until -- you know, there's a point in time

when let's just -- let's just play devil's advocate for a

second.

There's been plenty of cases where adulterated drugs have been sold and no one realized that they were adulterated.

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, I think the problem with what we're saying here is what Dr. Conti said, she did not -- and I thought we got it cleared up, and I think there was just a misspeak. She did not say that until the finding of adulteration, a product that is ultimately deemed to have been adulterated has value.

She said a product -- a drug that has risks has value. And she also agreed with Your Honor, reasonably, was do you agree that it had therapeutic value in a clinical sense to the patient, meaning did it help to control the blood pressure. And she said yeah. If it helped, I'm not going to dispute that people's blood pressure was controlled. But she did not concede that that gave it economic value. She drew the distinction between a person getting help physically versus whether it has economic value. And from the perspective of economics, there's no value for the reasons that I'm not going to repeat again because, wow, if it did that again --

1 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: She can testify that adulterated 2 drugs deemed adulterated by the FDA have no value because you 3 can't sell them. 4 She can testify that she assumes on day one because 5 these drugs were adulterated they had no value and based on 6 that assumption, she did her analysis. 7 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SLATER: 8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I will reserve on the IQVIA 9 analysis. 10 MR. HONIK: I only wanted to add one additional 11 thing. 12 I was reminded during the lunch break that when we 13 appeared before you on the 23rd of July, that this hypothetical 14 was posed, and you and I discussed it. I looked at the 15 transcript. The recall occurred on July 18th of 2018. And under 16 17 the rubric that Your Honor just laid out, the valsartan on the 18 18th had no value. It was declared adulterated. 19 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. 20 MR. HONIK: And I posited, well, on the 17th, if the 21 defendants are arguing that it had value then, can they do 22 that? And you said, oh, no, we're not going to have that. 23 And so that's the slippery slope that we're on here, 24 is that you can't -- and just --25 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, it had only a little value.

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I mean, perhaps I didn't appreciate the question.

But the FDA said go ahead and, you know, now that the risks are disclosed, you may sell it, but, you know.

MR. HONIK: Your Honor, Judge Kugler has written on multiple occasions in the *Daubert* for Expert Williams, in summary judgment, that fact finders make determinations like adulteration and zero value all the time, and that he actually said it was sophistry to say only as of the date of the recall can that occur.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Here's what you're going to have to do for me, because I keep going round and round on it, you're going to have to persuade me, and with case law, that a drug that is adulterated, not declared adulterated, but in hindsight found to have been adulterated, is ipsi dixit zero value.

Because I know of no case that says that a party can go back in time when the -- and I'm just saying what the evidence may show hypothetically. Whether the defendants knew or didn't know is another issue. So I'm going to presume they did not know, and everyone was going about their way. The drugs were doing what they were supposed to do, and then years later there is something found in it that no longer makes it marketable.

You'll have to find cases for me that say the fact that for all of those years the drug did what it was supposed

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     to do says it has no value, and then you'll persuade me to
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     reverse course.
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               MR. HONIK: Respectfully, I think the Blue Cross Blue
     Shield case is exactly on point --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Didn't read it that way.
               MR. HONIK: -- as is Debernardis.
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 7
               Thank you.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But then you're going to have to
     tie it into the cause of actions here. And that's where I keep
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     coming back to, the cause of actions here. Because if they're
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     sounding in strict liability, then -- I don't see common law
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     fraud is strict liability. Certainly express warranty is not a
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     strict liability claim. What is the cause of action? Maybe I
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     have to go back and revisit the pleadings.
15
               But you're going to have to tie all of that in to
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     your cause of action, because otherwise it just sounds like
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     it's strict liability. Yep, yep, it was adulterated so they
18
     owe us from day one. But what is that cause of action?
19
     don't know. I mean, you might be right. But I am having a
20
     hard time tying that in.
21
               Am I missing anything from this side?
22
               MS. BROWN: No, Your Honor.
                                            Thank you.
23
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So I'll reserve in part on
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     Conti.
             I'll have to hear from other witnesses on that.
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               So can we now go back to some of these issues?
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     want to give you rulings on some of these issues.
               There was a -- I mean -- well, let me focus on Conti
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     for a moment, the unjust enrichment claim.
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               MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, that's not a claim that's
 5
     part of this trial.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. There was a motion to
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     exclude on that, and I wasn't clear on that.
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               (Counsel conferring.)
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: The sanctions issue, has that been
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     resolved? You folks have worked that out?
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               Has a check been written?
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               MR. SLATER: I -- we are agreeable. I think they
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     said they need till the 24th to make payment. Obviously that's
     fine.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So that's taken care of.
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               Let me go through and just give some of my rulings
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     that I don't need argument on.
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               We'll talk about witnesses. I know the plaintiff is
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     concerned that this trial can't be done in the time that the
     Court's allotted. And if today is any indication, I
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21
     regrettably agree. But I'll come back to that.
22
               Let's see, punitive damages we talked about. I'm
23
     looking at -- whose letter am I looking at? Okay. I'm looking
24
     at the defendants' letter.
25
               Okay. ZHP requests to add new expert.
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Denied. We're not going to go there.

The issue is, is that an expert would testify about the data security laws. I reread Judge Vanaskie's Opinion. They weren't even — that new law wasn't even in effect at the time that the plaintiffs were attempting to secure this information. And I think the time to present expert testimony on this issue is long gone. So that is denied.

Could we -- has the issue on the MSP assignment been resolved? Because I'll resolve it right here and now.

MR. SLATER: Judge, I think that we're going to get it done.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: Myself and Mr. Ostfeld have had some very productive discussions over the last several weeks where we actually talked it through and figured out where did they — where are their real concerns.

The bottom line is, I think that we have a process that we talked through last night. I have to get some information to Mr. Ostfeld that he asked for, which I've already checked with MSP's counsel, and it sounds like it's not going to be a problem. It's just maybe how it gets explained or what it is. And apparently it's a lot of data and things like that. But it sounds like it's going to be satisfactory to the defense.

The only issue that may remain once we're done

talking may be whether or to what extent the consideration paid for the assignments is told to the jury and what, if anything, Your Honor would tell the jury.

I don't think you need to get to that yet because I would think you'd want to know what, if any, dispute remains. I'm very optimistic and confident that will be potentially the only issue that remains from this assignment issue when we're done.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, let me just shortcut it. So I think there should be a stipulation that, you know, once the parties are satisfied that there was consideration paid, I think the amount of consideration paid is not relevant to the jury. I think it's relevant to this Court's finding of standing. I'm not going to let it go to the jury even if you folks agree to it, because what I'm not going to have, you know, is argument by the defendants like can you believe it, I mean they bought the claim for this amount of money. I'm just not going to do that.

MR. SLATER: Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So you folks either work it out or I'll work it out for you.

MR. SLATER: No, that's helpful. And I think the rest of it we're going to be able to talk through and figure out.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. All right. Let's see.

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     That's that issue.
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               Okay. The next one I think Judge Vanaskie's working
 3
     on.
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               So the plaintiffs are requesting to add a breach of
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     express warranty subclass. I am, you know...
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               MR. SLATER: Probably not the right day to ask.
 7
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. Denied. I am not adding
 8
     any more, no. The time has long passed. I mean, we are where
     we are, folks, and that's it. There's just no way. I think
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10
     it's -- no, not doing it.
11
               Okay.
                     In limines. Let's see, deposition
12
     designations, sanctions we talked about.
13
               I don't understand what this introducing testimony of
14
     the corporate pharmacy and wholesaler witness is. What is all
1.5
     of that about?
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               MR. STANOCH: Your Honor, David Stanoch for
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     plaintiffs.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. STANOCH: We want to introduce fact testimony
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     from the retailers, very short testimony that we took in this
21
     case of their 30(b)(6) witnesses, fact testimony.
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Uh-huh.
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               MR. STANOCH: And our position is that because the
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     retailers are not defendants in this trial, they don't really
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     have any basis to object to designations that we have of their
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     clients which they say cannot appear, that they're outside
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     subpoena power, et cetera, et cetera.
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               So number one is, this shouldn't be a hard issue,
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     Judge, that we deposed nonparties to this trial, the pharmacy
 5
     people, right?
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
 7
               MR. STANOCH: We want to play very concise
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     designations of them at trial, you know, we're talking a few
 9
     minutes each.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What would they say?
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               MR. STANOCH: They're going to say they don't
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     knowingly sell unadulterated drugs.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                  They what?
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               MR. STANOCH: That they do not knowingly sell
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     adulterated drugs, which I know, I know, Your Honor. But to
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     have all the same defendants saying that they have value and we
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     could have sold it and TPPs might have paid some amount of
18
     money for a contaminated drug, this goes to that very point.
19
     And the testimony was largely unobjected to when we took it.
20
     It's not like Your Honor is going to have to go through a
21
     spreadsheet.
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Don't you all just insult the
23
     intelligence of a jury? I mean, honestly, is there anyone who
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     in any format would say, yeah, we knowingly sell adulterated
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drugs? Is there anyone would who would ever testify to that?

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MR. STANOCH: That's not my argument, Your Honor.
For years, and I'm not being pejorative, for years I've been
hearing argument back from the defendants about the value of
these drugs, it was just a little carcinogen --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But they've never admitted to
knowingly selling adulterated drugs, at least I don't know that
they have.
         MR. STANOCH: But the point is, you can't have it in
the stream of commerce. And we'll get into this a --
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. Everyone knows that.
         MR. STANOCH: Well, they don't.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Just call two witnesses. They'll
ask three minutes. That's it.
         MR. STANOCH:
                      Okay.
         MS. LOCKARD: Your Honor, if I may be heard on that
on behalf of the defense.
          So the defendants in this trial case have also moved
to exclude these witnesses in total for a number of reasons.
         First of all, they've identified eight witnesses.
The testimony goes far beyond they never would have knowingly
sold this. They are asking them about adulteration.
asking them about cGMPs. They are asking the witnesses about
it being worthless.
         CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I just ruled, he can call --
two sentences, three sentences. Would you knowingly sell
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adulterated drugs? "No."

MS. LOCKARD: We would stipulate to that. We don't need to take up more time of this Court and the jury to have videos played of these extraneous witnesses. The testimony, which is going to be cumulative, it's also going to be — it's going to be misrepresentative. It's going to be confusing. There is no place in this courtroom to have pharmacy witnesses from CVS or Rite Aid or Optum come in and talk about their interpretation of what drugs were recalled. It just doesn't belong here. We can work on a stipulation that says the pharmacies would not have knowingly sold adulterated product.

MR. STANOCH: Judge, this is an interesting -- CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Mr. Slater said yes.

MR. STANOCH: This is an interesting offer. We could discuss it perhaps in a meet and confer and report back to you.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If not, then Judge Vanaskie's listening, and you will work with him to have a stipulation, or you will show him the deposition designations, and they will be about as brief as they are.

MR. STANOCH: Very good, Your Honor.

MR. SLATER: And they will only go -- I'm not sure.

Maybe there's an old version, but we were only planning to play
the part about the adulteration, so maybe there's a
miscommunication. We can talk before this stipulation.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

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MS. LOCKARD: I'm just talking about what was provided in the pretrial order, which is the most recent that's been submitted to us. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. I think it got resolved. Let me go to -- is Maggie Kong and Lin, are you intending to call them? MS. DAVIDSON: Yes, Your Honor, we are. And if I may say, Your Honor, I just want to note that we designated them as expert -- as fact witnesses and told plaintiffs they were available for depositions in February. Plaintiffs never asked us for deposition dates. So it's now been seven months since we've informed plaintiffs that we want to bring these two fact witnesses to trial. MR. SLATER: Well --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They don't really seem to be adding anything to the case. What? Yeah. I mean, I'm not -- I didn't MR. SLATER: really want to get sidetracked on that question because we objected to the testimony altogether, and we certainly were not going to do a solid for the defense and go take their depositions so they could then say, oh, now they're unavailable

We, I think, have very compelling arguments why neither of these witnesses should be allowed to testify.

these witnesses out of their hat.

and now we can use their deposition testimony when they pulled

Maggie Kong, as we laid out in our brief, the defense took the position when they were opposing our request to get her custodial file that she basically knows nothing, did nothing. Now they say, well, we want to bring her in to talk about the recall and a bunch of really vague areas that they listed. And from our perspective, they should live with what they said and not do what we think they're trying to do, which is to bring her in and say, well, I'm the assistant chief of staff to Baohua Chen and let me tell you he didn't know anything, he wasn't involved, he didn't do this.

My guess is that's where it's going, because I can't figure out why else they would try to call a witness who they told the Court in trying to get Judge Vanaskie to deny our request for a custodial file that she did nothing relevant in this case and knew nothing. So injecting her into the case at this point when they took that position, we think she should not be allowed to testify in this case.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. And what about Lin?

MR. SLATER: Lin has a very interesting issue as well. Number one, his custodial file is vastly, vastly inadequate, as we laid out in the brief.

His email -- his email which is a very important document in this case wasn't even in his custodial file. He had worked at the company for many years. The documents didn't predate 2017. So that's number one; that they want to take a

witness for whom we have an obviously inadequate and incomplete custodial file, put him on the stand, and then we don't have the ability to actually know everything that he knew, and it would be very prejudicial, number one.

Number two, the only reason that I could think of that they would want to call him, because we know what Jucai Ge said, she wanted to testify, and Your Honor's barred the hearsay testimony, that he said, oh, you know, it was a poorly written email, I didn't really mean that. So we're going to now bring this witness in who has an absolutely inadequate custodial file to come in and say that when the 30(b)(6) witnesses who spoke for the company, including Min Li, his boss, who received the email and went through the email during his deposition and Min Li said this is what it says, you're going to have Jinsheng Lin now say it doesn't say what our corporate rep says it said. That would be very, very prejudicial and I don't think should be allowed at all because for obvious reasons.

Now the jury is going to say, wait, the company who Min Li spoke for says it says this. And ZHP's own translation of the email says what we are focused on, which is there's NDMA in valsartan which is caused by the sodium nitrate quenching, which is the root cause.

So for those reasons, it would be inappropriate to let Jinsheng Lin now contradict their own translation, their

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     own 30(b)(6) testimony with an inadequate custodial file where
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     we would never have a fair opportunity to cross-examine him.
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               MS. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, plaintiffs want to make
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     this entire case about an email by Mr. Lin --
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               (Court reporter clarification.)
 6
               MS. DAVIDSON: Plaintiffs want to make this entire
 7
     case about an email by Mr. Lin. Plaintiffs made a choice not
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     to depose him. We don't know why. But he is the man who wrote
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     the email that they think is the "center" document in this
     case. Obviously it's highly relevant to have that person here.
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     We offered him for deposition. No idea why plaintiffs refused.
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     But by refusing to take someone's deposition, plaintiffs can't
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     decide who we can bring to trial.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. But if you misled them and
     said that he doesn't have any custodial files or you misled
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     them and said Kong has no knowledge --
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               MS. DAVIDSON:
                              There was no misleading, Your Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'll let Judge Vanaskie decide it.
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               MR. SLATER: Fair enough.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Refer it to him and he'll resolve
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21
     the dispute.
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               But my preliminary view is, is that if somehow the
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     defendants lulled the plaintiffs or misled them or whatever,
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     they're not going to profit from that. So we'll see.
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     Judge Vanaskie will sort that out.
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               MS. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, I do just want to say, if
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     I may --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.
               MS. DAVIDSON: -- that there was no accusation of any
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     lulling or any misrepresenting. Ms. Kong's files were
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     produced --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No; there is an accusation of
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     that.
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               MS. DAVIDSON: Well, it's not on the record, Your
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     Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, that's what their brief
12
     said.
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               MR. SLATER: Yeah.
                                   That was the -- ZHP's brief,
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     August 13, 2021, said that as a member of the president's
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     staff -- I'm reading from their brief -- she has no direct role
     in the development, manufacturing, testing or sale of
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17
     valsartan, nor does she have any regulatory responsibilities at
18
     the company.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Right. That's what I'm
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     remembering. And that's on the basis why you don't want the
21
     testimony to come in. Yeah.
22
               MS. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, Judge Vanaskie ordered
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     that Ms. Kong's files be produced. Her files were produced.
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     And therefore plaintiffs' argument, to the extent they tried to
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     argue in their briefing that it's a judicial estoppel issue,
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judicial estoppel only applies if you actually win an argument.

We did not win the argument.

MR. SLATER: That's not true.

MS. DAVIDSON: Her custodial files were produced.

And so there's no reason why she shouldn't be allowed to testify at trial. Like, the company has a right to bring to trial witnesses that the company chooses. The plaintiffs don't get to choose which witnesses a defendant brings to trial from his corporation.

So we informed plaintiffs in February that these two witnesses, we would like to bring them to trial, offered them for deposition. Judge Vanaskie also found no spoliation or any inappropriate -- any inappropriate conduct with respect to Mr. Lin's custodial files.

Mr. Lin did not work directly on valsartan, and that's why there weren't valsartan documents, but it's -
CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You folks are not agreeing on what

MR. SLATER: Fair enough, Your Honor. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: All right. I'm just going down the plaintiffs'. The punitive we've discussed. Number four has been worked out.

transpired. Judge Vanaskie will lay it out.

Five, six, seven. Retailer defendants should not be permitted to object to testimony as they are not parties to the trial. That's what we just discussed?

1 MR. SLATER: Correct. 2 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Nine, plaintiffs... 3 MR. SLATER: This is an issue that's --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: For the trial? 4 5 MR. SLATER: That we've discussed and that's tied up 6 in the trial length issue that Your Honor wanted to put to the 7 side. 8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: All right. I'll come back to 9 that. 10 Number 10, Dr. Hecht and other experts should not be 11 subjected to unreasonable questioning on cross-examination. 12 I don't know. Is there any court that would say that 13 you can have unreasonable questioning on cross-examination? 14 MR. SLATER: No. I mean, the context -- the 15 substance of it, as laid out in our brief, is that we were 16 really focused on two issues. One was more generic, and I'm 17 not sure what Your Honor's process is at trial. Judge Kugler's 18 process was that we would actually read the qualifications to 19 the jury because the witnesses had already been found qualified 20 and then we would go into the substantive testimony. So it was 21 our sense that even despite that, the defense was still going 22 to seek to cross on qualifications. So it didn't seem to make 23 sense. 24 But more specifically with Dr. Hecht, as we laid out 25 in our brief, he worked at a place called the American Health

1 Foundation and did some very important research there in the 2 1970s and then left. After he left, people that were there 3 were indicted apparently for stealing research funds or something. I'm paraphrasing. I don't have the exact -- it's 4 5 in the brief. So we just want to make sure they're not going 6 to start to cross Dr. Hecht because he was questioned in his 7 deposition about this and spill out to the jury, well, that 8 foundation you worked at in the '70s, weren't people indicted 9 there, to try to make him look like he worked at a criminal 10 organization, which would be completely obviously unfair, 11 irrelevant, and a 403 issue. 12 MS. ROSE: I did not want to interrupt Mr. Slater, 13 but we do not intend to enter any of that evidence. We wrote a 14 brief actually explaining that in response to plaintiffs' trial 15 brief. And Judge Kugler decided at the time that he didn't 16 want to see any more briefing, so I don't think that brief was 17 considered. I'm not sure if it's even still on the docket. 18 But we had filed the brief which Mr. Slater received. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: See how reasonable they are. 19 20 MR. SLATER: The more that -- hey, you know, Judge, 21 when you talk, you work things out, so... 22 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Exactly. 23 MR. SLATER: That's great. 24 MS. ROSE: But, Your Honor, may I be heard on the 25 overall issue of the questioning of the qualifications?

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Plaintiffs seem to be requesting or suggesting that because the Court did not exclude Dr. Hecht on a qualifications argument, it therefore found that he is eminently qualified and can't be questioned on his qualifications, which is not the law anywhere. A finding on Daubert that an expert meets the threshold qualifications does not mean that they can't be cross-examined. And in fact, it's to the opposite. I believe in plaintiffs' brief where we were briefing the issue of Dr. Hecht they said over and over again this is an issue for cross-examination, like these Daubert arguments --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So there's not going to be a stipulation as to the qualifications on these witnesses? there are, some there aren't. Is that what you're saying to me? Yeah. I can say from our perspective MR. SLATER: this brief was based on our understanding of how Judge Kugler was going to conduct the trial. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, I'll tell you how I will conduct it. MR. SLATER: Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But are you saying to me that there's not going to be a stipulation or you're going to want an opportunity to voir dire? MS. ROSE: Yeah. We would like an opportunity to cross any expert on any issue that --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: On qualifications. It's a voir dire.

MS. ROSE: Oh, yes, Your Honor, we would like to.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So the way it will work is you'll introduce the qualifications, you'll move him or her as an expert, and if there is any voir dire at that time for the qualifications, they'll voir dire then. And then I'll make a ruling that the witness is or isn't qualified.

MR. SLATER: Fair enough.

Will we question the witness on their qualifications or will we read a statement in the court?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It would be my preference that you just sort of, you know, not take a whole lot of time on these qualifications, that, you know, I presume that all of your experts, just like Professor Conti, are eminently qualified.

And in my experience of, you know, being here a million years, jurors just don't want to hear about every publication the expert wrote.

MR. SLATER: Fair enough.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: They just don't. And so, you know, if there's a stipulation that their CVs can go into evidence, that's how I prefer it, because I think that helps move things along. If there's not a stipulation, I can't force it, but I would just ask that the parties not spend a ton of time on the qualifications. But I'm not going to prevent the

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     defendants from voir diring on qualifications and then I'll
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     make my ruling.
 3
               MR. SLATER: Understood.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
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               MS. ROSE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Translating mechanism we talked
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     about.
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               MSP assignment we talked about.
 9
               Okay. Judge Vanaskie's working on the deposition
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     designations.
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               We worked on number 14, to preclude the testimony of
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     wholesaler and retailer witnesses, and then the next issue.
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               All right. Travel plans, trial scheduling and
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     planning and jury selection is where we're at.
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               MR. SLATER: Yes, Your Honor. This is --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Wait. Hang on one second, because
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     you have more here. Let me just make sure. Because I think
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     that might be -- yeah, I think we've covered everything except
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     for trial management.
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               Can we take a five-minute break and we'll be back?
21
     Yeah?
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               MR. SLATER: Of course.
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               THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
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               (Recess was taken at 3:25 p.m. until 3:43 p.m.)
               THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. You can have a seat. Thank you.

So before we get to the trial, because my brain won't stop thinking, I just need better briefing from the parties on the issue of the damages, because I feel like I'm going around in circles sometimes. Maybe you all feel the same way about it, but — and maybe it's because it's in the pharmaceutical context and that matters, but I just don't understand why it should be. And I'm going to pose some hypotheticals and then you folks are going to brief the issue.

The plaintiffs take the position that from day one these drugs were adulterated and therefore they had no value. The defendants take the position of -- well, let me back up for a second.

The first thing I want to pin the parties down is, what are the express warranties that the plaintiff is suing on? Because there's a disconnect, it seems to me, between what the express warranty is. The plaintiffs are saying you sold -- you said that you would -- that you would sell us an Orange Book drug. And the defendants I'm hearing are saying, no, the warranty to the TPPs was we will sell you a drug at a reduced cost. So there's even a disconnect amongst the parties as to what warranties, warranty or warranties are you suing on. So let's clear that up.

Then the second issue is, assuming that the warranty

is that the drug that is being sold is valsartan, Orange Book drug, et cetera, compliant, what are the damages?

The defendants want to say, well, you know, it was therapeutically effective and so the damages should be reduced. But I can go through, you know, an analogy where that argument falls. You know, if I -- if I -- if I buy a Coach bag, I think it's a Coach bag and I keep it for ten years and then it turns out I learned that it's not a Coach bag and it's bogus, I mean is the argument from the defendant: Well, so what? You had a pocketbook. That doesn't sound right to me.

But then I get, in the case that I gave earlier, if the defendants are selling placebos and it turns out that it was a placebo, the defendants aren't going to make the argument, well, so what? You got a value. At least you thought you were getting a good drug. I mean, they're not going to make that argument. I don't think you are.

So you folks are going to have to do some work to help me or walk through this. So the first is, what are the warranties that the plaintiff is suing on. Let's hear from that, okay, number one.

And number two, case law that tells me that if that express warranty is violated, then the damages are from the beginning to the end and that the defendants should not be permitted to say, well, you got the benefit of the bargain because...

1 You know, I would be very curious, and, you know, I 2 often think about the Volkswagen case. I mean it was a settlement, there was no issue. But there the car drove fine. 3 There the car got 50 miles to the gallon or whatever it was. 4 5 It just wasn't something clean. Clean something. And I think 6 the Court found that that was an express warranty violation. 7 So I just need you folks to do some more work on 8 that, because I just -- I'm going around in circles about it, 9 okay. Five pages. And the sooner you can get them to me, the 10 better because it will help inform my decisions on these 11 experts. 12 MS. ALLON: Your Honor, can I just ask a question 13 about that? 14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Five pages. 1.5 MS. ALLON: And it's about the hearing tomorrow. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: 16 Yeah. 17 MS. ALLON: So tomorrow we're supposed to hear from 18 Dr. Stiroh. CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. 19 20 MS. ALLON: We're supposed to have argument on the 21 Daubert and on Motion in Limine 16, right, which is about this 22 alternative drugs issue. And so I'm just trying to understand 23 how that will interact with the briefing. The plaintiffs 24 essentially are going to make more arguments about more things 25 from Dr. Stiroh that should be excluded. I'd certainly like to

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     have the benefit of seeing those papers, but we can also
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     proceed based on the papers we do have tomorrow.
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     would be most helpful to the Court.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, you already have Dr. Stiroh.
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     I can only sit until 12:30 tomorrow, so we have to get Dr.
 6
     Stiroh on and off. And you have -- him, right. It's a him?
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               MS. ALLON:
                           Her.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
                                 Her?
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               MS. ALLON: Yeah.
               MR. SLATER: Is she still here? She was here all
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11
     day.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You have her available.
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               MS. ALLON: Yeah, no. She's available tomorrow.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It just seems to me we should
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     proceed.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            We would like to proceed.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I do sort of -- well, I don't
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            Maybe this is -- I just sort of feel everything is a
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     moving target here, and there's just not a whole lot of
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     clarity. And I'm --
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               MS. ALLON: Well, maybe we should do this, Your
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     Honor: I think Dr. Stiroh is available, so we should have her
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     examination. I'm just wondering about the argument. We're
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     prepared to argue it. It's not a question, but I don't want to
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     just --
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PageID: 105001

1 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I need to see case law on this, 2 because --3 MS. ALLON: Right. So should we defer --4 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Excuse me. 5 Because the arguments appeal to me from both sides. 6 But I don't have good clarity on what the law is. And if at 7 the end of the day you all come back and say in a 8 pharmaceutical context this is the first case of its kind, then 9 so be it. I'll make the call as I see it. I just find that 10 very hard to believe that there are not analogous cases out 11 there where courts have struggled with this issue, or maybe not 12 struggled like I am. 13 You had a question. 14 MS. ALLON: I was going to ask if we should defer 15 argument on the -- we will have the testimony from Dr. Stiroh. 16 But do you want to hear argument on the 702 and on MIL 16, or 17 should we defer that until we have the supplemental briefing? 18 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: MIL 16 is what? 19 MS. ALLON: Alternative products. 20 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh, yeah. 21 MR. SLATER: We'd like to proceed as scheduled. 22 Obviously if Your Honor hears the argument, you'll have the 23 briefing, you'll see the law and --24 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I really want the briefing, 25 I mean, I could be up here creating error.

1 MR. SLATER: We do have --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Wouldn't that be awful? 2 3 MR. SLATER: We do have briefs on this issue, though, 4 we just filed, right? 5 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm sorry. I don't find them -- I did not find them to be helpful. 6 7 MR. DAVIS: We'll go --8 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And it's not meant to be a 9 criticism. It's just you folks have got to drill down more. 10 You have to drill down more into these cases. You have to 11 drill down and help me understand your arguments. 12 I did not find -- you know, I found the RICO cases to 13 be distinguishable and some of the other cases to be distinguishable. I'm not sure the Blue Cross case helped me. 14 15 And I may want to take another look at my -- what 16 I've said about doctor -- professor. I thought Ph.D.s were 17 doctors, but I'll remember that, Professor Conti's, not 18 physicians, but doctors, whatever. 19 I may have to revisit that, too. 20 Okay. All right. Talk about trial. So the sooner 21 you folks can get that to me, I would very much appreciate it, 22 since I'm not going to stop thinking about it until I resolve 23 it in my head. 24 Trial. 25 The bottom line, Your Honor, is that we MR. SLATER:

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     don't -- we've been through the witnesses. We've been cutting
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     video for the witnesses that definitely are not being brought
     live. We've been cutting video for the witnesses that the
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     defense has offered to bring live, and we've looked at all our
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     experts and looked at all the witnesses we have to call, and
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     the bottom line analysis that we have is that to try this case
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     for the plaintiffs, if we start November 4, we will get done
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     somewhere between I believe, if I have it right that the
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     26th is a Wednesday, somewhere between the 24th and the 26th of
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     November. That's with the 9:00 to 2:00, with the 30 minutes of
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     breaks, taking everything into account.
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               That's how long we would need. I could go through
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     all this with Your Honor. I can tell you I have an analysis
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     witness by witness.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So what do you want me to do,
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     because some of you have conflicts in December you say?
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               MR. SLATER: Well, we're -- the plaintiffs are ready
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     to try the case from when Your Honor says to start --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. SLATER: -- until we finish like any other trial.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
22
               MR. SLATER: We understand the defense has some
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     conflicts and some other issues where it's up in the air.
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               I can say, for example --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, if it's not witness
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conflicts, then counsel can be, you know, interchanged. I'm not going to not do a case because counsel is not available. They'll have to -- you all -- you know, you all have ten lawyers for one.

MR. SLATER: So if that's -- and understanding that, then I don't see any reason why we shouldn't be able to. We're not sure how much time the defense has. Certainly not trying to stick that on the defense right now to say maybe they're ready or not for how long they need. But we have three defendants. We obviously have to put in a case against three large companies. They're all going to want their opportunity to defend. I don't know how long they need, but from our perspective, if we can start November 4, try the case to conclusion in December and obviously we need to talk about that and understand how much time each of the three defendants needs, then that's probably the most feasible thing.

My guess is Your Honor doesn't want to move the trial to start earlier in October because I think Your Honor said you had other things in October. So obviously it's Your Honor's discretion. But the easiest --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If I don't try this case in November, I'm not available until next summer.

MR. SLATER: We would like to start November 4, and we would like to finish in December when the case finishes and get it done in December. And that's, to us, the best way to do

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it. The plaintiffs were available. We have multiple counsel here. We'll get our case in before Thanksgiving. The defense would pick up right after Thanksgiving, it looks like, or maybe even a few days before depending on how things flow and some decisions that may get made and some things we can work out, and the defense can finish their case and we get done in December.

And because of the gravity of what this case means to this litigation after all these years, we think that's probably the most reasonable and efficient way to do it so each of the parties can put on the case that they think they need to put on and Your Honor can get a fulsome look at the facts and we can try the case to conclusion.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Well, we will.

MS. ALLON: Your Honor, I've had two conversations with the plaintiffs about this topic, and on both of those occasions I asked them how many witnesses do you have? What are the hours? What are we talking about, right? Because we can all once we know what the hours look like, then the Court can either set time limits or not, but we can accommodate them. I've got no feedback from them. So at no point were they willing to engage on these are the actual witnesses. We've emailed them, these are the witnesses we're bringing live. Do you want them in your case-in-chief? No response.

> CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why?

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               MS. ALLON: So instead what we have is --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Why?
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               MR. SLATER: That's -- I'll be happy --
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               MS. ALLON: Can I just finish?
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               MR. SLATER: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you were
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     asking me a question.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, no, I don't want you to
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     finish.
              I want to know why.
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               MR. SLATER: My understanding is the only counsel
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     that Ms. Allon has spoken to is counsel who is handling the
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     Torrent part of the case. I've never had a --
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               MS. ALLON: I spoke to your colleague who said she
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     was calling on your behalf.
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               MR. SLATER: I'm sorry.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Listen, you're not going to
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     leave today until you folks have mapped out the witnesses
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     today.
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               MR. SLATER: Yeah. I have the whole list here.
                                                                 But
     I've never been asked, and I'm running the ZHP part of the
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     case. Mr. Stanoch and Mr. Honik have been doing the Teva part.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Here's where I -- you
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     ready.
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               After today you will all sit down and work it
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     through. But what's your --
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               MR. SLATER: I can also say --
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MS. ALLON: Well, so my concern is --

MR. SLATER: I thought it was agreed that it was going to be the two witnesses you proposed.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let her finish.

MS. ALLON: So my concern is that a year ago we all told Judge Kugler how long we thought this case was going to take, and then several months ago we talked to Your Honor about how long this case was going to take. And at no point in any of those time periods did the plaintiffs say that 80 hours I think is what we ended up with is not enough time.

I have a conflict. I can't try the case through

December. And I have been counsel to Torrent for four years,

since this case was filed, and I would like to try this case to

verdict. And I had no question that I would be able to do that

until I saw the letter from Mr. Slater saying, all of a sudden,

that he couldn't try the case in the time that was allotted by

the Court.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, here's what I'm going to say, is that I want you folks to sit and meet. My experience is when attorneys, and for those of you who have tried cases in front of me, and there are some of you out there, that when attorneys tell me it's a four-week trial, I cut it in half and I'm usually right. And so I always feel as if it's never as long as the parties say it is, particularly not in my courtroom where I run a pretty — a pretty, you know, stay on schedule.

MS. ALLON: Well, so I'm happy to meet and confer with the plaintiffs. What I thought would happen is, we have an amount of hours. By the way, there's a disagreement between the parties about how those hours will be allocated. So the Court has to resolve that. Is it equal or is it not equal? And then once we know the hours, that's it, you get your time; and when your time is up, the trial is up.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: How can I best be of assistance?

Do you folks want me to sit here and go through each witness and map it all out? I'm -- I was going to say I'm happy to do that. I'm not happy to do it, but I will do it. You folks should be able to work this out.

I will say that this should not be more than a four-week trial. I don't see the issues to be that complicated. But, again, I said that yesterday, I take the bench this morning and you folks can't even agree what the claims are.

So I will say that if I have another day like today where you can't even agree what the claims are and you can't even agree that the law is what the law is or whatever, I will adjourn the trial and we'll try it next summer. Because I'm just not going to have this back and forth during the trial. It will be so unmanageable, and it won't get done in four weeks. So that's why I'm asking for this five-page submission. I'm going to just try to start honing it in and figuring it out

what the claims are. It just -- it doesn't to me seem to be that complicated of a trial.

MR. SLATER: Can I tell you where I think a lot of the trial length is coming from?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MR. SLATER: When we spoke to Judge Kugler way back about the length of the trial, we didn't agree to three and a half, four weeks. It was four weeks that Judge Kugler said. We said if you rule in certain ways on certain of these motions, the dispositive motions on adulteration, cGMP, and those issues don't have to be tried and some other things, and we also were assuming we were going to use the videos, which then we know exactly how long the videos take as opposed to how long is it going to take to do a live presentation where it always takes longer, then there's three crosses from the defense, et cetera. That was not factored into our analysis, but we said this is subject to what else may happen.

Now that we've learned what we've learned, we do have a list of witnesses. And, again, I told Your Honor we've cut down videos enormously in order to try to convince Your Honor to let us use some of the videos for some of the witnesses, because we took to heart what you said, and we understand what you're looking to do. But in terms of getting the case done, the video -- I can give you an example.

We have Min Li. Min Li is a very important 30(b)(6)

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witness for ZHP. I have his video now cut down, and it's being sent over to my friend, Ms. Rose, very shortly, an hour and 38 That is a very important witness who covers an enormous amount. If he goes on -- that's an hour and 38 minutes, give or take, depending on where we end up with some objections. goes on live, he's going to be at least a day to two days because it's going to take a lot of time to get through with You're going to have all the defendants questioning him. him. There's going to be the cross that's going to go back and So that's an example of how the video --CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So if you present -- sorry to interrupt. MR. SLATER: You never have to apologize to me,

Judge.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If you present the video deposition or that's what your ask is, then I'm going to spend, you know, two, three days going back and forth about the objections and the cross-designations, right?

MR. SLATER: I don't think so because of this: way that we have things stacked up right now, we have I think one witness we're ready to talk to Judge Vanaskie and another one I think we're very close to, and there could be a few others that could be put in. We've actually worked very well. Myself and Ms. Rose have been hammering this out for a long

time now. There are certain systemic objections, like the one that you saw before about whether or not when you ask a witness isn't it true that this was contaminated with NDMA and the witness says yes, but nobody knew and the FDA didn't know, et cetera, et cetera, once Judge Vanaskie rules whether or not the answer stops at the yes and the talking point is in or out, then we're going to know. We're going to go back to all the other videos and we're going to know, okay, we're not going to keep bringing Judge Vanaskie the same issue, and so on and so forth because that's what we would have to do. So I don't think it's going to be that kind of battle.

I can tell you in the trials I've done with a lot of video, we do this in advance, we act reasonably, once we get the guidance from the Court on a number of objections, everybody knows, okay, the same thing is going to apply here, the same thing is going to apply there. And we work through it.

There's not an unmanageable amount of objections. A lot of them you've already resolved, frankly, Your Honor, with your MIL rulings. There's a few that we obviously have to figure out what a few of them are, but they're being held to the side, so I don't really think that's going to be a major problem.

In terms of time-saving for the Court, it's so much more efficient, and that's how we, frankly, prepared this case

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from years ago when we were taking these depositions. And I could go through.

I can tell you, some of the other witnesses that the defense has said, well, we have them ready to bring live, I can give you some of the names. John Iozzia, his video is 24 minutes. Linda Lin, with a translator, is 20 minutes now. Lijie Wang, who is also available, 16-minute videos.

So what we've -- we understand what Your Honor wants, and we understand that if we're going to play video, we're not going to play days of video for each witness. Nobody wants to do that.

And I could go through this. I have witnesses five minutes, eight minutes, three minutes, 25 minutes. I mean, we're cutting these down to the point where boom, boom.

There's a few witnesses that are a little longer.

Hai Wang, I mentioned him earlier. Hai Wang, as of right now, and it's not done being cut, is an hour-and-43-minute video. We may decide to bring him live anyway. But if we play an hour, let's say it's an hour and 30, hour and 40 minutes, again, he's another witness that will be longer on the stand. So, again, we can make this more efficient.

And I don't think the objections frankly, I understand the reticence of the Court, but it's a necessary part. We're obviously going to have to work as efficiently as

possible.

I can't imagine anyone's going to bring Judge

Vanaskie the same objection six or seven times and try to say,

well, you know, have you changed your mind on that issue.

We're going to take the guidance and we're going to follow the

guidance, and all of a sudden the amount of disputes is going

to go like this. And some of them are real, legitimate

disputes. And think about it, the witness is on the stand, you

have to have a sidebar, you have to talk about it, you have to

deal with a translating issue. You have to deal with all this.

That takes time, and the Court has to deal with it as opposed

to it's done in advance. And when we're opening for witnesses

where the videos are done, everybody knows exactly what the

testimony is going to be, they know exactly which exhibits are

coming in, everybody has exchanged the exhibits. We know

what's being admitted.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You're making your point.

Do you agree? Does that help you?

MS. ALLON: I agree that in the instances where deposition video will be played, that will be a smooth process. I do not agree that it will help the efficiency of this trial to allow the plaintiffs to play video for witnesses who are coming live. That would double the time, not half it.

So I agree with Mr. Slater that there will be video testimony for unavailable witnesses that the parties agree on,

and that will be a smooth process.

But to the extent Mr. Slater is suggesting --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, here's my ruling: Try to work it out so that this case can be tried in four weeks, as we originally planned.

To the extent that means that you would be playing videotape depositions instead of bringing the live witness, then so be it.

If the defendants -- so you're going to work that out. If the defendants still want to call a live witness, then they control the length of the trial because they will be extending it by calling a live witness that has already been played by video. That's the only fair way that I think that I can handle it, okay?

So try to work it out. Try to work it out with videotape witnesses. But what I'm not going to do is say, well, I'm going to force the parties to now all present live witnesses because that might extend the trial unnecessarily. And so but I'm not going to preclude the defendants from calling live witnesses. They have that right. But they'll have to tailor it in a limited fashion because the videotape deposition's already been played.

MS. ALLON: But, Your Honor, we did talk about this at the last hearing, and so there are witnesses that the defense has offered to make available in Mr. Slater's case.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah, right. But now he's telling me that if he does that, it will unnecessarily delay the trial, go into December. You're not available. I'm trying to balance the equities.

MS. ALLON: Well, but, Your Honor, I don't see how having a witness once will delay a trial more than having a video and then a witness live.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because he's representing to me that the reason he needs that witness is very limited, 24 minutes, 8 minutes' long, 10 minutes' long. That's his case. And so what I'm saying is if the plaintiff can get their case in in two weeks, I'll turn it over to the defense to get their case in. And if it gets extended into December, I can't do anything about it. We're going to go to conclusion.

MS. ALLON: Well, but --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't -- I don't think it's fair to say, well, we have to get this trial done in four weeks and Mr. Slater says he's trying to accommodate and get that done and then the defendants say, yeah, but if you force him to call a live witness when he's telling me, but that's just going to extend the trial.

MS. ALLON: Well, Your Honor, two things. That time wouldn't -- like what I think the easiest way to resolve this difficulty is, Mr. Slater has represented to the Court many times that at the outside, the longest this trial will take is

1 100 hours. That's five weeks. That's what he told the Court. 2 For a year we've all been operating under that assumption. 3 Now he's telling the Court that he needs that 100 hours for his case-in-chief. So that is a dramatic departure 4 5 from everything he's ever told us. 6 What I think would be helpful is for the Court to 7 give us a number of hours and then each party has the hours 8 they have. If he wants to play video in his hours, fine. If I 9 want to bring live witnesses in my hours, fine. But the 10 defense doesn't have to sit around worrying that he's going to 11 take up two-thirds of the trial time because we have a chess 12 clock. 13 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No; I can do that. 14 MS. ALLON: So that I think would help the parties 15 It would ensure that we stay on track. And frankly, it most. would ensure that all three lead counsel for the defendants who 16 17 all have conflicts in December could accommodate this trial. I 18 think that's all we need and then we won't have a problem. 19 MR. SLATER: I'm not --20 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And that way if you want to 21 proceed by video, proceed by video. 22 MR. SLATER: Thank you. 23 And I'm not sure when I said 100 hours. All I can 24 reflect back is when we talked about the length of the trial

last time, it was a different world. And what I was going to

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start to say before, and I sidetracked myself, is the reason that it's a lot longer than it otherwise would be and Your Honor looks at the claims and I think fairly said, well, these sound straightforward, the litigation over the cGMP issues which is one of the bases to establish adulteration, if you violate cGMPs, it's adulterated, is a huge chunk of the testimony that's going to be coming in.

If we had won that issue and either adulteration and/or cGMP had been found as a matter of law, the violations, you're talking about a much narrower trial. And also there were summary judgment motions, et cetera, MILs on that, so it was all subject to what happens later, and it didn't pan out. We didn't win summary judgment on those issues. So now there's a lot of testimony about what are the cGMP obligations, what are the quidances, what are the regulations, what did your SOPs say, who was responsible to do what, because we have to make sure we cover that base. Even though we feel very confident that the FDA findings is very persuasive, we also have to -- we want to show the jury -- because we know a lot more than the FDA did. We have a lot more information about why cGMP was violated than they did.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: So I just wanted you to know, that's where a big part of the time is going to go.

> CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So you folks come up,

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you'll each have a limited number of hours. Work it out.
You'll each monitor it. And if you want to present by video,
present by video in a way that this case is tried to conclusion
in the time frame that I've allotted, which is, what, four
weeks, five weeks? I don't remember.
          MS. ALLON:
                     It was 80 hours. It was four weeks.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. Eighty hours.
          MS. LOCKARD: If I may speak up on this issue with
the deposition designations, I understand from the Court's
ruling at the last CMC that if there were witnesses who would
be played by video, that those witnesses' videos would be
played one time. And so we would be entitled, the defense, to
put on our affirmative designations following plaintiffs'
designations; that they would be played in chronological order
so we have a video of a witness done and we don't then have to
replay a second video.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That's how it's going to go.
that time will count towards your time. And the jury will be
instructed that this is now part of the defendant's case.
          MS. LOCKARD: Thank you.
                      I'm not sure what -- I think there was a
          MR. SLATER:
little nuance there.
          CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If you're going to call Mr. Smith,
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okay, and you're going to play Mr. Smith's video deposition

testimony by -- this is how I've done it in other cases.

you're going to play the videotape testimony of Mr. Smith, you're going to play it; then if the defendants want to then play their affirmative part of the case of Mr. Smith, they're going to hear Mr. Smith right then and there.

Sometimes the way I've done it is that, because the jury follows along, sometimes the way I've done it is everything that he says that's plaintiff's part of the case is in yellow. If it's defendant's part of the case, it's in purple so that the jury can then know, and then when they go back and review the testimony, they have the transcripts, even though they have to rely upon the video itself as the evidence. That has worked very effectively, I think, in some of my cases, because then it's just Mr. Smith testifying and it's not this up and down and now we're going to play him again and they're like didn't we just hear from him like two weeks ago. It's so much more helpful to the jury. And so — but that time gets allocated to each party.

MR. SLATER: My experience is this, and I've done it with some of the lawyers here and tried cases to conclusion, first of all, we think it's very prejudicial because our designations are done where we focus on what we want to ask about, and then the defense would like to put in their testimony because then it mixes in and the jury loses the flow because they don't know what we're actually trying to impart to them. That's what happens.

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What you do find out is this, again, my experience and it's rock solid experience with some counsel here, and I don't blame them for doing it, we go to trial, we're at this stage and the defense says we got all this video we want to play at the same time the plaintiffs play theirs, and the judge in some cases that I'm thinking of said no, these are trials that we had in New Jersey, said no, this is the most recent examples, said the plaintiff has the right to play their designations and then I will tell the jury at that time look, the defense has a case also. In their case they have the right to play other testimony from their witness, so don't make any final decisions on this witness, leave a space in your notes, and then in their case they can play the video they want to play. And what always happens is however much time they said they really wanted to play in our case, when they actually do it in their case, when it's not going to completely disrupt the flow of our case, goes down to this, goes down much smaller, because there was never an intent to actually put those witnesses in the case unless it was going to be injected into our case and destroy our ability to give a coherent and focused presentation of our case, which we have the right to put on. So I would suggest that, for example, I would suggest that Your Honor at least think about that or give us a little

we have and see what it really looks like.

time to go back and forth and see how long the videos are that

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: There has to be so many witnesses that it's just not that big of a deal. And just out of fairness to the jury, just one time play the video and then, you know, maybe there's certain witnesses you'll persuade me, Judge, don't do that because it's too prejudicial because their part of the case goes two hours and mine only goes five minutes, fine. You might persuade me. But there should be — most witnesses should only be played once and not this back and forth.

I mean, I get it. But if the witness were live, then the defendants would cross-examine that witness and get their case out.

MR. SLATER: Ah. Ah. But if we put the witness on live and let's say that the witness is relevant to four or five different topics, but we say, you know what, we're just putting this witness on, we're going to only question on these two areas because that's the part that we want to put in our case and we don't want to go into these two other areas where the cross is going to let them put their entire trial theme in and their whole case and just lay it all out. So we said we're just going to make a strategic decision to limit it to this.

If the defense is allowed after we do that, because normally they would be limited to the scope of direct, and then they have the right in their case if they want to do their own thing. And that's what usually has happened in my trials, they

then could put the witness on in their case, and the Judge instructs the jury and says, look, they both have a case, certain witnesses may appear more than once.

And, again, what you always find is there's this huge need for them to get this testimony in until then they have to do it in their case and then they don't play, because it doesn't really do anything substantively helpful other than completely obscure the important admissions that we obtain that we're trying to present to the jury and it's enormously prejudicial, whereas — I understand what you're saying, but maybe just have an open mind to the idea that if you tell the jury, look, this witness is going to be played for 20 minutes, the defense has the right to bring that witness back, so understand that's not the end of the story and just keep your notes set, you'll see that witness again and then you could put it together, usually the witness never comes back anyway.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me see what it all looks like when you folks are mapping it out.

MR. SLATER: Thank you. And we'll start to talk, I think.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Probably comes under the category of we're talking about one or two witnesses, so let's just see what it looks like when you all map it out.

District of New Jersey

MR. SLATER: Probably.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Uh-huh.

MR. SLATER: And we can commit to start to talk -- I mean, like, I have a list. I actually can tell you right now, our trial team spent about three or four hours the other day, went through every witness in the case, and we put it all together, and we're right now at about 75 hours to put -- and That's assuming cross-examination, all the things with the defense is going to want to do also.

Because, for example, like Dr. Hecht, we've allocated a day for him. We assume he'll go on the stand, the direct will be around two hours or so, and then the defense will cross and hopefully we get him done in a day.

MS. ALLON: So your 75 hours is for both sides?

MR. SLATER: No. It's for our case. Remember, we're trying a case against three multi-national corporations. We have to make the case against ZHP. We have to make the case against Teva. We have to make the case against Torrent. If we were just trying the case against ZHP, four weeks we could do it, we'd get it done. But we have to also put on the Teva case, the Torrent case.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I thought you told me that this was a four- or five-week trial.

MR. SLATER: I never said that, except when Judge
Kugler spoke to us and said how long could it be done, he said
I want to get it done in four weeks, and I said I don't know if
we can do that. We can do it if you rule certain ways on

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     certain motions. Like if he ruled for us on summary judgment
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     that the drugs were adulterated as a matter of law because cGMP
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     violations were committed as a matter of law --
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let me just see, map it all out.
 4
 5
     You folks map it all out and the witnesses. But I don't see
 6
     why this trial can't be done in four weeks.
 7
               MR. SLATER:
                            Okay.
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It probably is overkill.
 9
               MR. SLATER: And we're sharpening our pencil every
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     day, I can promise you, cutting these down.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I do not see this as a four- to
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     five-week trial; I just don't. I just don't.
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               MS. LOCKARD: And, Your Honor --
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               MR. SLATER:
                            There's an easy way to do it. If you
     just will revisit and grant us summary judgment on cGMP and
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     adulteration, four weeks is easy.
17
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. If you folks would go talk
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     settlement, that would even be easier.
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               MR. SLATER: I'm here ready to talk.
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               MS. ALLON: So, Your Honor, I just want to be clear
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     because I think all of us would prefer not to live with an
     overhang of uncertainty about this trial. So if the mandate is
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     the Court thinks we can do it in X amount of time, the parties
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     should go negotiate how that time is going to be divided.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
                                         I mean --
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MS. ALLON: Is that the best --

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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You're going to work -- if you work till midnight tonight and present something to me in the morning, even better. You're going to present a map to me. I'm going to look at it with Judge Vanaskie. He has a much better handle on the players. And if I look and see that this looks reasonable or looks unreasonable, and if I say it looks reasonable, but it's a ten-week trial, then we're going to try it in the summer. I don't know what else to say.

MR. SLATER: We'll work hard with the defense to try to work it out, because we're not sure how long they need to try their case also.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. So you'll sit down and try to map it all out.

MR. SLATER: Fair enough.

MS. ALLON: We have been crystal clear about how long we need. 80 hours for this trial. We think it can be done. We think the time should be split 50/50. So we can present this case in 40 hours. We've said that to Judge Kugler. We've said that to this Court. Our position has never changed on that topic.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I want to see why that can't be the case. Let's see.

MR. SLATER: Okay. Thank you very much.

MS. ALLON: Thank you, Your Honor.

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MS. ROSE: Your Honor, can I ask for a clarification on one issue related to the deposition designations?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MS. ROSE: Mr. Slater made a number of representations about deposition designations and what witnesses have said, and I just wanted to clarify, he made a comment saying that we could take -- he could take his deposition designations for, for example, I believe there's 15 ZHP witnesses that he could take those deposition designations and take a couple of them to Judge Vanaskie to present objections and then apply them to the rest of the depositions. I fundamentally disagree with that, because a lot of our objections are based on plaintiffs' very carefully selecting portions of a witness's answer that it's a very individualized circumstance. So you can't -- even if Judge Vanaskie finds in this particular circumstance the rest of the answer was nonresponsive, that's not necessarily the case with respect to every witness. And I'm concerned about getting into a situation where now if they are presenting deposition clips from witnesses that we've offered to bring live, that then if he's going to get, you know, a ruling from Judge Vanaskie on maybe one or two witnesses and say that applies to everyone else and then there will be very misleading testimony presented.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. If you folks want to arque

about every sentence, then go for it.

MR. SLATER: I was not saying that, though. What I was saying is as officers of the court, and at a level of trial practice we're at, if we can't understand when Judge Vanaskie makes a handful of rulings how that would likely apply to other designations and work things out, then we shouldn't be doing what we're doing. I wasn't saying they don't have a right to object still, but I would think that we all take the guidance and reduce the disputes down to really the ones that have to be argued. I was not saying decide two and everything else is done. I was not suggesting that.

MS. ROSE: I just want to make the point that I feel that there are going to be more disagreements on deposition designations. I know that --

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No.

MS. ROSE: I know that Your Honor very much did not want that. We do not want that, but that is just the case.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, you folks will keep plugging along. And if you folks just can't get into an agreement, then, you know, I don't know. We'll try the case next year.

MR. SLATER: I'm confident that we can present to Your Honor something that you'll be able to look at and say reasonably we could start November 4.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.

MR. SLATER: I think it's very likely that when the

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     rubber hits the road, it's going to need to go into December,
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     because the defense is also going to need enough time to put
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     their case on. But I have no doubt that we're going to be able
     to present a reasonable trial to Your Honor, and you're going
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     to understand why we're saying how long it needs to take.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: When am I picking a jury?
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               MS. ALLON: The last week of October, Your Honor.
 8
     think is what we had talked about.
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               MR. HONIK: The Wednesday before.
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               MR. SLATER: Yeah. I think you said October 30th.
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     31st.
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               MR. HONIK: 28th.
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               MR. SLATER: I assume no Halloween costumes allowed
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     during jury selection.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. Have you folks worked on the
16
     questionnaire?
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               MR. SLATER: I can't hear you.
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               MS. LOCKARD: Yes, Your Honor. We have worked on it.
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     It has been submitted. It was attached as an exhibit to --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I have it?
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               MS. LOCKARD: It is attached as an exhibit to
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     Mr. Slater's agenda submissions for this.
23
               It was Exhibit --
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Two?
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               Yeah. It's in here somewhere.
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1	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So are there objections?
2	MS. LOCKARD: There are a few points of disagreement
3	that are mapped out in redline with notations.
4	MR. SLATER: Can I suggest, we probably don't need to
5	do that today.
6	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, when are we going to do it?
7	MR. SLATER: I just was it's a short thing. I was
8	just saying if Your Honor hadn't seen it yet, it's probably
9	something we could do either tomorrow or next week when we're
10	in court because it's getting late.
11	MS. LOCKARD: It is an exhibit to Mr. Slater's
12	submission.
13	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I have it here. I'm just
14	looking.
15	MS. LOCKARD: I think you could probably make rulings
16	without argument on those. They're very discreet.
17	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: There's only one, right? Oh, no.
18	MR. SLATER: I think there's like five or six, right?
19	We did a good job of narrowing them down.
20	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It's so small, I have to put on my
21	glasses.
22	Do you have the claim in here?
23	MR. SLATER: Yes.
24	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That would be interesting to read
25	what you all are saying, because you couldn't agree on it this

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     morning.
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               MR. SLATER: Yeah. It's at the bottom of page 1,
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     Your Honor, the description of the case.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Let's see, the plaintiff...
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               (Court reading.)
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. I can't rule on that until
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     I get that further briefing from you folks. That's what we
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     were discussing earlier. So I'll have to wait on that one.
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     Make a note.
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               I'm not going to -- I don't ask any such questions as
     number 3 -- I mean 30. I won't ask them.
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               I won't ask 31. I don't. Well, I won't ask 32.
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               MS. LOCKARD: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear Your Honor.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I will not ask 30, 31, 32, 33, or
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     34.
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               I don't find them to be probative.
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               If it's in pink, what does that mean; that there's an
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     objection by the plaintiff; is that -- am I right about that?
     Mr. Slater.
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               MR. SLATER: You said A3, Your Honor?
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: If it's in pink.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            Oh.
                                 No. The pink describes both sides'
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     positions, Your Honor, because some of them the defense
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     proposed something, the plaintiffs object and they propose an
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     alternative.
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CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Oh, I see.

Okay. 40 I'm not going to ask. And 38 and 39 you folks will have to come up with another question that somehow elicits a bias. That's what you're looking for. But not in a way that you're asking it.

I just find the questions to be inflammatory. "Do you think a pharmaceutical company would misrepresent the ingredients in their medication to make a profit?" Obviously if someone answers yes, you've elicited the bias. But you're going to -- it's just an inflammatory question. I want it to be reworked.

MS. LOCKARD: For 38 and 39?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes.

You can get to a bias in a different way, such as generically do you have any opinions about pharmaceutical companies that you think would, you know, you know, that the Court should know or whatever. And you're probably going to get things at sidebar which is they make too much money, that kind of thing, okay. Is that going to be helpful? I don't know. So you're going to have to come up with a -- whatever -- a better...

Same is true for 51.

I don't -- all of 51 I have a problem with.

MS. LOCKARD: So just for clarification.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

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               MS. LOCKARD: 51, the parties did not object to the
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     question itself.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I know. But I don't like the
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     questions.
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               MS. LOCKARD: Understood. Okay.
 6
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I just don't like the questions.
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               MS. LOCKARD: So we'll rework A, B and C at 51.
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               Like, do you think any juror -- let's just, for
     example, 51C, do you think any juror, any rational juror, would
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     say anything other than "agree strongly"?
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               I don't know. Same is true for 58 and 60.
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               MR. SLATER: Are you saying, Your Honor, 58, 59 and
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     60 are out or --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I mean, I understand what
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     you're trying to get at.
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               MR. SLATER: Or rework them.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I mean, I don't know. What do you
19
     expect jurors to say?
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               MR. SLATER: Oh, they're not our -- the plaintiffs
21
     are objecting to those questions.
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No, I know. But by the same
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     token, I mean, parties are entitled to ferret out biases.
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     I just -- some of these questions are, you know, they're just
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     too inflammatory. I just -- I want -- I just tried a whole --
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a criminal case, for example, and the defendants -- it was an illegal immigration case, and the defendants wanted me to ask all kinds of questions about our former president. I mean they're just, you know. You can get to positions that jurors might hold, but you don't have to ask them an inflammatory question in a way. So propose something alternative. MS. LOCKARD: But Your Honor doesn't have an objection to us seeking or asking questions seeking bias related to Chinese, Israeli, or Indian companies? But I do have a problem with CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes. I don't know what that means, about the ethics of ethics. Chinese companies. I mean, I don't know that a juror is even going to know what that means. It should be something more like do you hold any strongly held beliefs about companies who do business with the United States, including Chinese, Israeli or Indian companies that might affect your ability to be fair and impartial? And if they answer yes, then we'll go to sidebar and figure out what that is. Yeah. Fifty-two is a question I always ask. I always ask

Fifty-two is a question I always ask. I always ask that. And it's an instruction I always give that they have to.

So 52 is fine.

MS. LOCKARD: I believe that's it, other than the first --

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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. So try to rework those.
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     I'm glad I looked at them.
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               MR. SLATER: We'll get it done.
 4
               MS. LOCKARD:
                             Okay.
 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: One of the other things, so I'm
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     going to have, our IT people are working on it, so all the
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     jurors will have iPads. So I don't know what that means in
 8
     terms of what you folks all have to do. But all of the
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     documents will be downloaded on their iPads, and I think that
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     will be very helpful. And then we have to figure out a way --
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     have any of you tried cases where the jurors have had iPads?
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               (No response.)
13
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No? All right. So then I'll have
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     to figure out and sort of explore all of the procedures with
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     you, like how we prevent them from looking forward to documents
     that aren't -- I'll have to figure that out and I'll have to
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     talk to the IT people. I think that would be very helpful and
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     help streamline the case so it's not, you know, all the --
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     everything will be computerized. I think that will be very
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     helpful.
21
               Sidebars I'm going to have -- you'll all have phones
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     at your desk as opposed to having 15 of you meet me over at
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     sidebar.
               I'll just hear you on the phone and there will be
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     white noise. The jury won't hear. So we can have a
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     conversation. You'll get my ruling. So that will go a little
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quicker, too. And I'm trying to come up with some other ways to kind of streamline it.

MR. SLATER: So we'll be sitting at counsel table arguing the objections right from here?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes, arguing here, yes. But the jury won't hear it because they'll hear the white noise.

MR. SLATER: Never done that.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. I think it will be more effective.

MR. SLATER: Judge, can I ask a question about jury selection?

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.

MR. SLATER: And I think the defense might have been agreeable to this. When you're questioning the witnesses, we're obviously going to have the questionnaires and we're going to know which questions we think are important to follow-up on and all, is it possible to question the jurors when they actually have to -- when they have answers that we need to talk about rather than in open court, either in the jury room or somewhere else where we can bring the jurors in one at a time? We find it's easier -- I found in some trials it's easier for all the counsel to be able to interact.

I don't know if you let us ask questions also as follow-up or if Your Honor does all the questioning. Those are probably some of the nuances that I'm sure all the counsel are

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     questioning or wondering about. But we would certainly ask to
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     consider doing it so that the jurors come one at a time into
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     the room to the extent there needs to be follow-up.
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, the way I normally do it is
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     you're going to have these questionnaires.
 6
               They're going to get these ahead of time, right?
 7
               MS. LOCKARD: Yes.
 8
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: We're going to mail them to the
     jurors; is that what we're doing? We're planning on mailing
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     them to the jurors?
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               MS. LOCKARD: That was our understanding.
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               MR. SLATER: We -- I thought they were going to
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     actually come to court to fill them out, so that --
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               MS. ALLON: No, no.
1.5
               (Counsel conferring.)
16
               (Discussion was held off the record in open court.)
17
               MR. SLATER: Or electronically, yeah.
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               MS. ALLON: Our understanding from Judge Kugler was
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     that we'll get them ahead of time. They'll be sent to them.
     They will fill them out. We'll get them. Because -- we talked
20
21
     with Judge Kugler about this process.
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               MR. SLATER:
                            No. Well, my --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I think the better way to do it,
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     because it's such a -- it will be a long trial, and it's going
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     to be a lengthy questionnaire -- well, it's not --
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               MR. SLATER: We definitely need them in advance.
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     concern, which was discussed with Judge Kugler, was if you send
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     them to them at home, when they're filling them out, they can
     sit there with their husband, wife, friends, fill it out.
 4
 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
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               MR. SLATER: Perhaps not be as -- as opposed to if
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     they're here at the courthouse, they have to do it while
 8
     they're here. They have to answer based on their own
 9
     knowledge. They can't --
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               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah; I'll do it the way I
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     normally do it. So the way I normally pick -- how many jurors
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     do you think we should pick?
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                            I suppose it depends, but...
               MR. SLATER:
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               (Court conferring with deputy clerk.)
15
                            Your Honor, I thought that we were
               MR. SLATER:
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     originally going to have them come in and do it on the iPads
17
     when they came to Court.
18
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Do it on the iPads?
19
               MR. SLATER:
                            That they would come in advance like of
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     the jury selection, have the questionnaires on an iPad or fill
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     it out in hard copy and then we can have them in advance.
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     can make sure all the parties have them, and then we could look
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     at them for a day or two so that when we come into court, Your
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     Honor, for example, could say, look, this is Juror No. 12, you
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have the questionnaires, do you have follow-up questions on any

of the answers? Do you have follow-up questions on any of the answers? We could tell you what we have follow-up questions on. Your Honor could decide — then follow up and say you said this, what did you mean by that, or you said you had this opinion about pharma companies that are tremendously wonderful or not tremendously wonderful, why do you say that or whatever. But we'd be able to have that in advance so you don't have to have us sitting here rifling through the questionnaires the day of selection figuring out what we have. If we have it done in advance for Your Honor's benefit, it will be much more efficient because we're going to know what follow-up we want with each juror at least based on their questionnaires.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, let me think about it. But let me tell you how I normally pick a jury, okay. So I just have to figure out how many I am going to seat. So you probably should think about that.

The way I normally do it is that the jurors fill out the questionnaires. I bring them in, tell them about the case. Give them a description of the case, tell them about the length of the case and then have the parties introduce themselves, and then they then recess and they go out and fill out the questionnaires. And after they've filled out the questionnaires, then the parties have an opportunity to review the questionnaires, and then I have them come and they then give their answers in open court as to their answers.

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1
               If there's any question that I feel that needs
 2
     follow-up, I will bring them to sidebar. But usually what I'll
 3
     do is I'll go through all -- let's just say I go through all 12
 4
     or 16, or how many I'm going to seat, there are some that
 5
     clearly don't qualify and I will strike them, sua sponte I will
 6
     strike them, and then usually it's the first, you know, 10 or
 7
     12, whatever we agree on, on struck jurors that sit as our
 8
     jury. If I have any follow-up questions, I come to sidebar.
 9
     And then you start exercising your peremptories once we have 20
10
     qualified or whatever. I have to do the math. I haven't done
11
     the math.
12
               Does that make sense?
13
               MR. SLATER: I think it does.
14
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I do pick my juries differently
15
     than I think any other judge here.
16
               MR. SLATER:
                            Interesting. When you say you question
17
     the jurors first, I assume you mean on their biographical,
18
     their background?
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No.
20
               MR. SLATER: You wouldn't be going through the
21
     questionnaires, would you?
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Do you have that in here?
23
               MR. SLATER: Because we don't have like the basic
24
     what do you do for a living and all that I don't think.
25
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: You don't? Yeah, you do.
```

1 MR. SLATER: Oh, we do in the beginning, you're 2 right. 3 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. MR. SLATER: A little bit. 4 5 Would you be going through the whole questionnaire or 6 just the biographical background? 7 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: No. I have them stand up and say: 8 My name is Renée Bumb, I'm female, my date of birth. 9 Why do you need the date of birth? Let's take that 10 out and just put year of birth. Let's change that. Well, why 11 do you even need that? It just says age. Take the date of 12 birth out. 13 MR. SLATER: That's fine. 14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Where do you live, and then they just give you their answers. A lot of times they'll just --15 16 and then when they get to 8, they'll say yes. 9, no. 10, yes. 17 12, yes. And then they just go through and give us 18 their answers. 19 MS. ALLON: So, Your Honor, I do actually agree with Mr. Slater that in my experience --20 21 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. 22 MS. ALLON: -- when the parties are able to get the 23 questionnaires before, it streamlines the selection. 24 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah. 25 MS. ALLON: Because everybody decides where they may

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1
     have cause issues, and they can just figure that out in advance
     rather than in the moment and it just shortens jury selection.
 2
 3
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
 4
               MS. ALLON: So I don't know if it's possible to do.
 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah, I might do that just because
 6
     the questionnaires are long, and the length of -- you're going
 7
     to lose a lot of jurors who can't sit this long.
 8
               MS. ALLON: Right, exactly.
 9
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: But I quess I'll -- okay. Subject
     to change, I'll bring them in, all of them, they'll all fill
10
11
     out the questionnaires. I think we're going to have more than
12
     75 come in.
13
               How many jurors should we seat? So if we start with
14
     the promise that we need -- how many jurors? We need six
15
              I would say probably seat 12, don't you think?
     iurors.
16
               MS. BROWN: Yes.
17
               MS. ALLON: Yeah. I think for a trial of this
18
     length, 12 makes sense.
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Seat 12.
20
               I'm just trying to do the math how many I have to
21
     prequalify. How many peremptories? You'd think I would know
22
     this. Nine, 12. So 12 peremptories.
23
               MR. SLATER: Your Honor, 12 with the intent to have
24
     six deliberate; is that what you said?
25
               MS. ALLON: No, no. Our view would be -- oh, sorry.
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1
     I don't know if you agree, but my view is that anybody who sits
 2
     should deliberate.
 3
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, if we seat 12, then all 12
     have to deliberate unless there's an agreement otherwise,
 4
 5
     although seating 12 maybe -- yeah.
 6
               MR. SLATER: I don't think we need 12. I would think
 7
     if we -- you need six for a valid verdict, right?
 8
               MS. BROWN: Right.
 9
               MR. SLATER: So, I mean, I would think that 10 would
10
     probably be sufficient.
11
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB:
12
               MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, just given the length we
13
     would ask to seat 12. I just tried a six-week case in the
14
     District of New Jersey and we lost three jurors over that time
15
     period.
16
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Criminal or civil?
17
               MS. BROWN: Civil, yes.
18
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay.
19
               Well, let me think about it. No less than 10. Maybe
20
     12.
          So let's just say if we seat 12, and we have 12
21
     peremptories, how many do I have? I'm just trying to do the
22
     math, which I'm not very good at.
23
               So I have to have 24 prequalified, right? Am I doing
24
     the math right?
25
               MS. ALLON: But, Your Honor, I seem to recall a
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1
     submission when we talked about the number of peremptories --
 2
               MR. SLATER:
                            Yeah. It was agreed that we would have
 3
     the same number as the defendants.
               MS. ALLON: I thought we agreed to three and three.
 4
 5
     It wasn't going to go per defendant.
 6
               MR. SLATER: Right. It was an equal number. I don't
 7
     remember what the number was, but it was equal.
 8
               MS. ALLON: It definitely wasn't 12.
 9
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, that's better.
               MS. ALLON: Yeah. So that makes it faster.
10
11
               MR. SLATER: Whatever we have, you guys have the same
12
     total.
13
               MS. ALLON: We have the same, correct.
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Okay. All right. So then we have
14
15
     to prequalify approximately if there's only six peremptories,
16
     then I have to prequalify 18 jurors, if we seat 12, okay.
17
               It's doable.
18
               Jurors love to serve. That's my theme.
19
               Okay. All right. So can I be of help on anything
            Anything I didn't resolve?
20
     else?
21
               (No response.)
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I really am anxious to get that
23
     briefing.
24
               MS. ALLON: Yes.
25
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because I really want to get a
```

1	handle on this.
2	MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor
3	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: And I think a lot is going to
4	depend upon what the plaintiffs tell me the warranty is that
5	was breached. Yeah. Okay.
6	MS. BROWN: And, Your Honor, just to ask for
7	clarification, I'm so I have a December 3rd trial in front
8	of Judge Shipp in the District of New Jersey. As I understood
9	the Court to be saying, tonight we sit down, hammer out what
10	four weeks looks like with an equal split and we report to Your
11	Honor in the morning.
12	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
13	MS. BROWN: Okay.
14	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: What kind of case is it before
15	Judge Shipp?
16	MS. BROWN: It's the talc MDL bellwether trial, Your
17	Honor. And I represent Johnson & Johnson.
18	MR. SLATER: I didn't realize we were supposed to
19	have this done by tomorrow morning the entire we're going to
20	now talk through the entire
21	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Didn't I say you're just going to
22	go out and talk, go use my jury room.
23	MR. SLATER: Okay. All right. Then we'll do it.
24	CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Use my jury room.
25	MR. SLATER: We'll go in.

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1
               MS. BROWN: I think we have to, Your Honor, because
 2
     that's an enormous uncertainty. This bellwether has been
 3
     pending. We had a Daubert hearing in 2019. This case is going
     to try now for the first time. I mean, if what we're looking
 4
     at is even the possibility that I wouldn't be able to try that
 5
 6
     on December 3rd, that creates enormous problems for my client,
 7
     my clients, and I know the same is true for my codefendants.
 8
     So I just -- I would be --
 9
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: So I have a solution. Off the
10
     record.
11
               (Discussion was held off the record in open court.)
12
               (Counsel conferring.)
13
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: We're off the record.
14
               (Discussion was held off the record in open court.)
15
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Anything else I can do for you
     all?
16
17
               MS. ROSE: Your Honor, can I raise one more issue? I
18
     don't know if you want to go back on the record.
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes, let's go back on the record.
20
               MS. ROSE: I just have one issue on the briefing
21
     you'd like.
22
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yeah.
23
               MS. ROSE: I think it makes sense because it sounds
24
     like, especially on the first issue, is plaintiffs' warranty
25
     claim, what their theory is, and then to proffer case law on
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1 whether or not their theory of adulteration retroactively means 2 no value. It probably makes sense for plaintiffs to submit the 3 initial brief and then for defendants to respond. We have a lot of issues for us to discuss and to work out between us. 4 So 5 I didn't -- I wanted to have some clarity on what it is --6 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: It comes down to what is the 7 warranty that -- what is the warranty or warranties that were 8 communicated to the TPPs and how were those warranties 9 breached. So that's the first question, right? Because it 10 does matter, we're talking about TPPs, we're not talking about 11 consumers. We're not talking about, you know, prescribing 12 physicians, so... 13 MR. SLATER: Understood. 14 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: That makes a difference. And 15 there is this, it appears, this disconnect about even that from 16 this morning. 17 Which is -- oh, I'm sorry. MR. SLATER: 18 CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Which the second issue is, 19 assuming that that breach, that the plaintiffs prove that there 20 was a breach of that warranty, does that mean that you get the 21 full refund that you say you get? 22 There's also that disconnect. The parties have 23 spoken about benefit-of-the-bargain. The parties have spoken 24 about strict liability. The parties have spoken about, you

know, I don't remember what it's called, the quantity --

MS. ALLON: Quantity effects.

CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Yes, that.

And so it's very intriguing to me. And now I'm sitting up here saying, hmm, maybe I'll just hold off and force you folks to settle this because you are not going to know how I'll rule, but -- or maybe I'll rule and it helps settlement. So that's all gone into my calculation now, too.

But at the end of the day, though, is I need to have clarity about what the claim is and where is the case law that supports the plaintiffs' position, and then the defendants, where is the defendants' position as to what supports.

So I want simultaneous briefing on the issue of the damages, because let's both assume on the issue of briefing plaintiffs have shown a breach. Let's assume that, okay. So that you don't need to wait to hear from them on what their warranty claim is. I just need clarity on that, too. What's the damages? And what is the -- what are the parties permitted to introduce with respect to damages?

MR. SLATER: And I think you're going to see, Your Honor, also, as far as the warranties, I believe Judge Kugler ruled that there's actually, as a matter of law, that the very saying, I think I'm paraphrasing, that by the defendants saying this is valsartan USP, Orange Book rated, that was the warranty, and as a matter of law held that that was the warranty by holding it out to the world that way.

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1
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Well, show it to me and prove it
 2
     to me.
 3
               MR. SLATER: No, obviously, I understand. I just
 4
     want to say I think that --
 5
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: Because they're saying with
 6
     respect to the TPPs that's not what the warranty is.
 7
               So lay it out to me, show me where that's been in the
 8
     complaint.
 9
               MR. SLATER: Will do.
10
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I'm just going to throw another
11
     hypothetical out.
12
               I mean, it just seems to me that there's got to be
13
     case law out there that helps me. So what about all the
14
     salmonella cases for people who don't get sick but ate it
15
     anyway?
               MR. SLATER: We'd have to look. I think it's going
16
17
     to ultimately be straightforward warranty law, frankly, on the
18
     warranty claim.
19
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know.
20
               MS. ALLON: It's --
21
               CHIEF JUDGE BUMB: I don't know. It's intriguing to
22
     me that I'm struggling. Maybe you all aren't, but I am, I'm
23
     struggling with it. It's interesting to me.
24
               Anyway. Good to see you all. I'll see you at 9:30
25
     tomorrow, okay.
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1
               Have a good night. Thank you.
 2
               MS. ALLON: Thank you, Your Honor.
 3
               THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
                (Proceedings concluded at 4:55 p.m.)
 4
 5
              FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
 6
 7
            I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
 8
     from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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                                                    September 11, 2024
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     /S/John J. Kurz, RDR-RMR-CRR-CRC
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     Court Reporter/Transcriber
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